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Introduction
Chapter 1
This thesis consists of three essays that are organised in the following three 
chapters and either refer to mechanisms of creating new employment or 
selected changes of labour market institutions and their impact. Particularly, 
chapter 2 focusses on the structure and dynamic of matching processes and 
considers mobility on occupational labour markets – from my knowledge for 
the first time – in a search and matching framework. Chapters 3 and 4 deliver 
analyses of effects of important institutional changes; chapter 3 contributes 
new and more differentiated details about the effects of the German labour 
market reforms 2003–2005 on the matching efficiency. Chapter 4 provides a 
study of the effects of the introduction and the adjustments of the National 
Minimum Wage in the United Kingdom 1999–2010 that faces up some 
methodological issues in previous work. Beside others, this chapter explicitly 
considers interdependencies of local areas for the first time in a study for a 
nation wide minimum wage.
Each of the analyses considers aspects of labour market structure and 
functioning under the following common assumption: from a workers 
perspective, the decisions to search for jobs, to change jobs, to live in a certain 
local area or to work in another area are made taking, beside others, the 
situation on relevant partial labour markets as well as the institutional setting 
into account. Firms consider the same aspects when they decide about the 
location, the kind of their economic activities, where to search for workers, and 
which workers should be hired. The resulting behaviour can be observed as a 
number of key descriptive measures in relevant regional and/or occupational 
labour markets1.
The analyses in the three chapters are based on different data sets. The 
commonality of these data is the panel structure that reveals to be a good 
basis for answering the addressed research questions (for the following, see also 
Hsiao, 2007). One reason for this is the gain of variation compared with pure time 
series or cross sectional data. E.g., in chapter 2 the methodology refers to groups 
of cross-sectional units in terms of jobs that are assumed to be alternatives in 
recruitment and job search processes and the repeated observations for each 
cross-sectional unit over time are used to derive robust inference. In chapters  3 
and 4, a period before the institutional change is compared with the period 
after the change and the variation in the cross-sectional units is utilised for the 
identification of the effects. Another advantage of panel data, in order to get 
unbiased estimates of the impact of interesting variables, is that it is relatively 
1 Here, occupations are understood as partial labour markets comprising jobs that share extensive commonalities in 
terms of requirements, skills and tasks.
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easy to control for unobservable cross-sectional and time series heterogeneity 
by dummy coding or by using within estimators, respectively.2
The theoretical basis for the analyses of the matching processes in chapters  2 
and 3 is the job matching function that relates the number of new hires to the 
number of job searchers and the number of vacancies. It is a central element of 
a theory to explain unemployment equilibria (compare Pissarides, 1979, 1985; 
Diamond, 1982a, b; Mortensen, 1982). This basis allows, beside others3, to describe 
the efficiency of job matching processes. Lots of studies deal with the estimation 
of macroeconomic matching functions (compare the surveys by Petrongolo and 
Pissarides, 2001; Rogerson et al., 2005; Yashiv, 2007). A greater part of these 
studies is based on the assumption of homogeneous job searchers and worker 
searching firms in the whole labour market. Relaxing this assumption allows 
straightforwardly analyses whether and how the parameters of the matching 
function differ in partial labour markets. The literature refers to sectors (Broersma 
and Ours, 1999), regions (Burda and Wyplosz, 1994; Anderson and Burgess, 2000; 
Kangasharju et al., 2005; Lottmann, 2012), skill levels and occupations (Entorf, 
1994; Fahr and Sunde, 2004; Mora and Santacruz, 2007; Stops and Mazzoni, 2010) 
as relevant and delimitable partial labour markets. Regarding occupational labour 
markets, Fahr and Sunde (2004) and Stops and Mazzoni (2010) showed that the 
matching efficiencies are notifiable different on these markets. Both studies are 
based on the assumption of separated occupational labour markets. This means 
that, generally, workers would not change their occupation during working life.
Based on the same administrative data sources used for the analyses in Stops 
and Mazzoni (2010), it is shown in chapter 2 that, on average, one third of all 
flows from one certain job to other jobs are associated with a change of the 
occupation. This clearly deteriorates the separation assumption for occupational 
labour markets. Chapter 2 discusses theoretically and empirically the implications 
of a relaxation of this assumption. It gives arguments that predictable or 
systematic relationships between new hires in a certain occupation and vacancies 
and unemployed in another occupation should be only observed for groups of 
occupations that can be regarded as alternatives to each other in recruiting 
decisions from the firms perspective or in job search decisions from the workers 
perspective, respectively (compare also with Gathmann and Schönberg, 2010). 
2 Naturally, panel data also reveal – like the other data structures – certain issues depending on the specific analyses 
and the assumptions the employed methodology is based on. Thus, also this data has to be tested and the adequate 
methodology has carefully to be selected. This is, where necessary, further discussed in the following chapters.
3 E.g., it allows also to model the observable negative relationship between unemployed and vacancies during the 
business cycle (represented by the Beveridge curve, compare with Blanchard and Diamond, 1989) or the observable 
(positive) correlation of the labour market tension, in terms of the ratio of the number of vacancies and the number 
of unemployed, and the probability that unemployed find a new job.
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Following this idea, chapter 2 shows theoretically the relevance of occupational 
changes for the job search intensity and matching efficiency. This is based on a 
model structure firstly described by Burda and Profit (1996) to explain the influence 
of regional distances between job searchers and jobs on matching elasticities. 
The empirical assessment of the derived hypotheses is conducted with a model 
framework that is formally equivalent to panel data models containing spatial 
lags of exogenous regressors (SLX models, as described in LeSage and Pace, 2009, 
S. 179). The model follows the idea that an observation of a dependent variable in 
a certain cross-sectional unit like regions or occupations does not only depend on 
exogenous variables in the same cross-sectional unit but also in other – selected  – 
units. One very often used selection criteria for regions is Waldo Tobler’s first law 
of geography: “Everything is related to everything else, but near things are more 
related than distant things.” (Tobler, 1970, p. 236). This principle can be easily 
modelled with information about topology of the regions because in this case 
information about distances or contiguity of regions is available. Chapter 2 adopts 
this idea for occupational groups whereas it is distinguished between groups that 
are similar to each other from groups that are not. This information stems from 
the study by Matthes et al. (2008) in which groups of occupations are described 
that can be considered as alternatives for recruiting or job search processes. The 
SLX model can easily be implemented in more established model frameworks like 
the ordinary least squares (OLS), the within estimator or the Pooled-Mean-Group 
model that was firstly applied by Stops and Mazzoni (2010) to estimate matching 
elasticities. The latter model revealed to be more adequate for the used data; it is 
based on the assumption that a long-term relationship between the variables of 
interest exists, thus the relationship of new hires on the one side and unemployed 
and vacancies on the other. Finally, this model does not only allow implications for 
the (different) matching elasticities in different partial labour markets. Since the 
long-term relationship is modelled as error-correction term, the coefficient of this 
term allows implications for the question whether there is dynamics in the data 
that adjusts short term deviations to an equilibrium. The results of chapter 2 are 
compared with previous studies and, by using information criteria, the quality of 
the models considering occupational changes in matching models are compared 
with models that do not consider these changes.
In chapter 3 the effects of the German labour market reforms 2003–2005 are 
analysed taken the whole labour market and occupational labour markets into 
account. The reforms are a topic of unchanged importance for Germany (well 
documented in recent studies by Dustmann et al., 2014; Gartner and Fujita, 2014; 
Krebs and Scheffel, 2013; Rinne and Zimmermann, 2013, 2012; Hertweck and 
Sigrist, 2012; Burda and Hunt, 2011; Möller, 2010; Fitzenberger, 2009). Considering 
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that one of the main objectives of the reforms was to improve the matching 
process on the labour market, this chapter presents new details regarding the 
development of job-matching performance before, during, and after the reform 
years. Thus, it complements previous studies like these from Fahr and Sunde 
(2009); Hillmann (2009); Klinger and Rothe (2012); Klinger and Weber (2014), 
who found evidence for a better job matching after the reform years. The analysis 
in chapter  3 is conducted on the basis of a highly frequent administrative panel 
data set with a huge variation of detailed observations for occupations in local 
areas. The data set allows to control for local temporal shocks, e.g. induced by 
different economic situations in the German Federal States, and for time fixed 
effects in the same model. This allows a precise estimation of the pure time 
effect on the matching productivity for the whole economy but also for groups of 
occupations. Therefore, the chapter provides new details about the development 
of the matching productivity for the whole labour market, for occupational 
labour markets before and after the reform years, with and without considering 
the economic situation and it informs about the further development during the 
financial crisis and afterwards. Robustness checks are provided that are, beside 
others, based on the stock-flow matching approach proposed by Coles (1994); 
Coles and Smith (1998).
Finally, chapter 4 deals with the employment effects of the introduction and 
adjustment of the National Minimum Wage (NMW) in the United Kingdom (UK). 
The identification of these and other effects, e.g. on the wage distribution, is of 
general interest, particularly for Germany: here a nationwide minimum wage was 
recently introduced and its effects are widely discussed, though it is apparent that 
it is not possible to empirically assess its effects shortly after the introduction due 
to data availability and because firms are expected to react with a certain lag of 
time. From a theoretical perspective the direction of the effects depends on the 
minimum wage level and the assumptions about the type of the product market 
and the labour market. Theory based on the assumption of perfect competition on 
product and labour markets predicts negative employment effects of minimum 
wage rates that lie above the market clearing wage level, the equilibrium wage: 
A minimum wage at this level would raise the cost of labour and, therefore, the 
marginal cost of production. Firms would face higher output prices that lead to a 
decreasing demand for this products and the production will be downsized (the 
“scale effect”). The firms would further tend to substitute labour by capital (the 
“substitution effect”) due to higher wages. Thus, due to both effects the demand 
on labour diminishes, firms lay off or do not recruit other workers with relative 
lower productivity, and generally these workers would face worse employment 
prospects (compare this neoclassic textbook approach with, e.g., Neumark and 
17
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Wascher, 2008). However, according to alternative theoretic approaches based on 
monopsony market types, a minimum wage can reduce recruitment and retention 
costs. In case of high turnover rates, like in low wage sectors, these costs could be 
substantial (compare with Card and Krueger, 1995). Considering a formal version 
of this model for a “single monopsonist”, Manning (2003) argues that there is 
always a minimum wage at a certain level that would increase employment. But 
this is not necessarily the case in oligopsonistic labour markets, beside others due 
to firm heterogeneity and interdependencies between these firms. That is why the 
same author concludes that theory can only give an orientation but no answer 
in evaluating the effects of minimum wage schemes and that “[an] openminded 
empirical approach is appropriate for investigating the impact of minimum wages 
on employment” (Manning, 2003, p. 27).
With this in mind, the starting point of the analyses in chapter 4 are the 
empirical studies by Stewart (2002) and Dolton et al. (2012).4 The latter study 
proposes an estimator that considers employment adjustments on the long run 
as well as short term adjustments due to the yearly changes of the NMW. The 
analysis in chapter 4 is based on two panel data sets for different geographies, 
one data set for 138 travel to work areas and one for 140 Unitary Authorities and 
Counties. As already mentioned, our empirical strategy addresses the main critics 
on previous studies. Firstly, the analysis takes the spatial dependence of local 
labour markets into account by estimating models that explicitly consider spatial 
dependencies of the error terms (SEMP models, compare, e.g., with Elhorst, 2010c). 
This is the most general case to consider spatial dependence, given a spatial 
dependency structure. In the chapter, it is assumed that commuting patterns and 
the contiguity structure of regions can represent this dependency structure and the 
advantages and disadvantages of these approximations are discussed. Not least 
because recent studies formulated some concerns regarding the identification 
of spatial lag effects, compare the study by Gibbons and Overman (2012) as an 
excellent summary, the baseline results for the standard errors are compared with 
the results of a methodology of computing standard errors considering spatial 
relatedness in the sense of the mentioned first law of geography by Tobler. This 
4 The number of existing studies dealing with nation wide minimum wages is naturally quite larger, see the surveys 
by Brown et al. (1982); Card and Krueger (1995); Brown (1999); Neumark and Wascher (2008). There is also an 
increasing number of literature which attempts to identify the effects of a minimum wage on employment by 
using geographical variation in the bite of the MW in spatially separated markets, see Card (1992); Neumark and 
Wascher (1992, 2007); Card and Krueger (1994, 2000); Burkhauser et al. (2000); Dube et al. (2007, 2010); Baskaya 
and Rubinstein (2012); Neumark et al. (2014) for the United States; Baker et al. (1999) for Canada; Bosch and 
Manacorda (2010) for Mexico; Stewart (2002, 2004a, b); Dolton et al. (2009, 2012) for the UK. Studies for Germany 
are not explicitly considered in this analysis because they refer to minimum wages in certain sectors or branches, 
compare with König and Möller (2009) for the construction sector or Aretz et al. (2013) for the roofing sector to 
name two important examples. As already mentioned, an explicit German nation wide minimum wage did not exist 
before 2015.
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methodology is described by Conley (1999). Secondly, the analysis implements 
regional demand side shocks for the first time; particularly the financial crisis 
lead to the concern of the UK Low Pay Commission how to adjust the minimum 
wage in times of (heavy) recessions without the risk of huge employment losses. 
Previous studies considered only rough measures for times of recessions (Dickens 
and Dolton, 2010; Dolton et al., 2011; Dolton and Rosazza-Bondibene, 2012). 
Thirdly, possible endogeneity of the Minimum Wage variable and the dynamic 
structure of the employment rate are discussed and addressed by estimating a 
further model class that belongs to the System General Methods of Moments 
(SGMM) estimators, as it is described by Roodman (2009b).
Each of the following chapters 2–4 starts with an abstract, ends with detailed 
conclusions, and is complemented by comprehensive appendices that make each 
analysis step transparent. The final chapter 5 draws some general conclusions.
Chapter 2
Job matching across occupational  
labour markets1
1 The contents of this chapter are published in the journal “Oxford Economic Papers” (Stops, 2014).
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Introduction
The analysis in this chapter refers to job matching processes in occupational labour 
markets in terms of jobs that share extensive commonalities in their required 
qualifications and tasks. To date, all studies in this field have been based on the 
assumption that matching processes only transpire within distinct occupational 
labour markets and that no occupational changes occur. I present theoretical and 
empirical arguments that undermine the validity of this assumption. I construct 
an “occupational topology” based on information about the ways in which 
occupational groups may be seen as alternatives in searches for jobs or workers. I 
then use different empirical models that consider cross-sectional dependency to 
test the hypothesis that job search and matching occur across occupational labour 
markets. The results support my hypothesis. The findings suggest that an augmented 
empirical model should be utilized that considers job and worker searches across 
occupational labour markets in estimating job matching elasticities.
2.1 Introduction
The determinants of matching labour demand and labour supply to create new 
jobs are of continual interest for both labour market researchers and politicians. In 
part, because it is difficult to observe the individual search processes that underlie 
this type of matching on the micro level, studies in this field typically refer to 
the analytical results obtained using macroeconomic matching functions that 
model the empirical dependency of the number of new hires on the number of 
job-seekers and vacancies in a particular context of interest; for an overview of 
the foregoing, compare the surveys of Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001), Rogerson 
et al. (2005), and Yashiv (2007). These studies help elucidate the efficiency of 
matching processes both in aggregated and partial labour markets. Therefore, 
studies examined particular sectors (Broersma and Ours, 1999), regions (Anderson 
and Burgess, 2000; Kangasharju et al., 2005), or occupational groups, which 
are classes of jobs that share extensive commonalities in their qualification 
requirements and tasks (Entorf, 1994; Fahr and Sunde, 2004; Mora and Santacruz, 
2007; Stops and Mazzoni, 2010). The central assumption of most studies in this 
field is that partial labour markets are completely separated from each other; in 
other words, there are no flows of job-seekers from one partial labour market 
to another partial labour market, and no correlations exist between different 
labour markets with respect to newly created jobs or numbers of job vacancies. 
This central assumption is not presumed by studies of regional labour markets 
(e.g., Burda and Profit, 1996; Fahr and Sunde, 2006; Lottmann, 2012; Dauth et 
al., 2014) that consider the penetrability of partial labour markets. However, to 
date, no study of occupational labour markets has considered the dependencies 
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between these partial labour markets. In investigations by Entorf (1994); Fahr 
and Sunde (2004); Mora and Santacruz (2007); Stops and Mazzoni (2010), the 
number of new jobs in a given occupational group is explained by the number of 
unemployed workers and vacancies in same occupational group.
In this paper, I use both theoretical and empirical arguments to demonstrate 
that the assumption of separate occupational labour markets is not appropriate. I 
test my hypotheses using pooled ordinary least squares, fixed effects and pooled 
mean-group models that include cross-sectional dependency lags of regressors. 
Therefore, the estimators take into account interactions between cross-sectional 
units. To achieve this purpose, I construct an empirically based “occupational 
topology” – as analogon to the spatial order of regions – in terms of a matrix that 
contains information about occupations that either are assumed to be substitutes 
for recruitment and employment or are not assumed to be substitutes following 
the considerations by Gathmann and Schönberg (2010) and Matthes et al. (2008). 
I discuss empirically and theoretically if job matching models that consider job 
searchers and vacancies in other occupational substitutes as explaining variables 
for new matches should be preferred. If that applies these models adjust and 
complement the well known (direct) matching elasticities of vacancies and job 
searchers in the occupational labour markets of interest with (indirect) matching 
elasticities of vacancies and job searchers in occupational groups that are 
considered to be substitutes to one another.
In the following section, I describe the motivation and theoretical framework 
of my estimation approach to the matching function. In section 2.3, I present the 
data used in this study, and the empirical estimates are subsequently provided in 
section 2.4. Section 2.5 summarizes the main results of the investigation.
2.2 Motivation and theoretical framework
The standard model of the matching function assumes the existence of a 
homogeneous pool of unemployed workers and a homogeneous pool of vacancies. 
The search activities of both sides of the market can be described as a matching 
technology. The processes underlying this matching procedure are not explicitly 
modelled;2 instead, the matching process can be regarded as a black box (Petrongolo 
and Pissarides, 2001). The variables U, V and M may be used to represent the 
numbers of unemployed workers, vacancies and new hires (matches), respectively. 
The matching function f  (U,  V ) is frequently specified using a Cobb-Douglas 
functional form:
2 Examples of these processes include job and worker search decisions, job searches, and negotiations of wages.
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M = AUβU VβV  (2.1)
where A describes the “augmented” matching productivity (e.g., Fahr and 
Sunde, 2004). The coefficients βU and βV represent the matching elasticities of 
unemployed and vacancies, respectively. In accordance with standard matching 
theory, both elasticities are positive. Furthermore, the theoretical model assumes 
constant returns to scale, which implies that βU + βV = 1 with βU , βV > 0.
In the following, the assumption of homogeneous pools of vacancies and 
unemployed workers will be relaxed. It is reasonable to assume that occupation-
specific differences exist with respect to the matching processes due to differences 
in job requirements, apprenticeships and other factors (for empirical evidence, 
see Fahr and Sunde, 2004; Stops and Mazzoni, 2010). In Germany, in particular, 
occupations are more suitable units than regions or economic sectors for analyses 
of matching processes (compare with Fahr and Sunde, 2004), because occupations 
include specific qualification requirements, tasks, and other characteristics. 
Furthermore, individuals in Germany acquire occupation-specific knowledge 
over the courses of their careers. Typically, firms with vacancies attempt to hire 
workers with certain qualifications, whereas job searchers seek jobs in certain 
occupations. The aforementioned studies (Fahr and Sunde, 2004; Stops and 
Mazzoni, 2010) assume that the number of new jobs in an occupational group 
does not depend on the number of unemployed workers and vacancies in other 
occupational groups. Fahr and Sunde (2004) propose the existence of partial 
occupational labour markets that are aggregates of specific occupational groups. 
These labour markets should be separated from each other; no flows of workers 
between different occupational labour markets should occur, and no correlations 
should exist between different labour markets with respect to newly created jobs 
or numbers of job vacancies, but this may be the case within these markets. Both 
Fahr and Sunde (2004) and Stops and Mazzoni (2010) use data on occupational 
groups that are assigned to each occupational labour market to estimate matching 
elasticities for these markets. However, these researchers do not explicitly engage in 
either empirical or theoretical considerations of the flows or correlations between 
different occupations. Therefore, they assume that partial labour markets in terms 
of occupational groups are completely separate.
However, occupational labour markets could certainly interact with each 
other with respect to the matching process. One argument for the existence of 
these interactions is that both unemployed and employed persons change their 
occupations during their employment careers (Fitzenberger and Spitz, 2004; 
Seibert, 2007; Kambourov and Manovskii, 2009; Gathmann and Schönberg, 2010; 
Schmillen and Möller, 2012). An observation of the flows of individuals into 
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employment between 1982 and 2007 reveals that the shares of these flows that 
involve occupational changes is rather in certain industries. In particular, these 
shares range from 16 per cent (the occupational changes of former foresters and 
huntsmen) to 75 per cent (the occupational changes of polymer processors).3 
These empirical examples show clearly that assumption of no mobility between 
occupational labour markets is even too strict for Germany. Furthermore, this 
should also apply a fortiori to countries such as the UK and the USA, both of which 
have labour markets that are less structured by well defined job titles.
From a theoretical point of view, the incorporation of flows between 
occupational labour markets causes analyses of the matching process to become 
considerably more complex: job searchers must decide on their search strategy 
with respect to their optimal numbers of job interviews in several different 
occupational labour markets.
In the following discussion, I utilize a theoretical matching model that offers 
deeper insights into the implications for the matching elasticities for unemployed 
workers and vacancies that derive from the fact that job and worker searches 
occur not only within occupational labour markets but also across these markets. 
Although the structure of this model is based on a paper by Burda and Profit 
(1996), the interpretation of the model has been widely modified. According 
to the model and under certain assumptions4, the optimal search intensity 
Ni*j of an individual with (former) occupation i in a job search in the new or 
same occupation j depends negatively on the costs of the job search c + auDij 
with a fixed component c and a component associated with searching in other 
occupational groups that consists of a cost rate au and a dissimilarity measure Dij 
for occupations i and j, positively on returns for a successful job search in terms 
of wages adjusted by the interest rate /r, and negatively on the probability of 
obtaining a job after completing a job application pj in the case in which the 
expected gain from job search highly exceeds the costs; in the opposite case Ni*j 
would be zero:
N∗i j =
⎧⎨
⎩
1
p j
ln( (w/r)p jc+auDi j ) for
w
r p j ≥ (c+auDi j)
0 for wr p j < (c+auDi j)  
(2.2)
The negative relationship between optimal job search intensity and the probability 
of obtaining a job after applying arises from the assumption that the search costs 
3 See appendix 2.A.1 for more detailed information.
4 The formal considerations for this model are presented in appendix 2.A.2.
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are linear and should be significantly smaller than the expected revenues from the 
job search; thus, ( /r) pj >> c + au Dij .5
In their analysis of regional labour markets Burda and Profit (1996) complement 
fixed search costs c from standard search models with the variable element auDij , 
which depends positively on the distance Dij between the region i in which a job 
searcher is located and the region j in which this individual is searching for a job. 
With respect to permeability, occupational labour markets may resemble regional 
labour markets.
In particular, workers and vacancies are typically associated with particular 
occupational groups. Nevertheless, workers and firms often do not limit their 
search to a single occupational labour market. With respect to regional labour 
markets, various metrics – such as geographic distances or commuting flows – 
should represent the strength of the interdependencies (and causal relationships) 
between economic activities in different regions. In many instances, the topology 
of the regions of interest provides a good indicator of the relationships that must 
be analysed: In occupational labour markets, the resulting “topology” becomes 
more complex because there are no physical restrictions on the numbers of borders 
and neighbours of particular occupational groups. Thus, metrics are required that 
represent similarities among occupational groups with respect to their property as 
alternatives for both job searchers and firms that are seeking workers.
In the following analyses, I differentiate only between the case of two or more 
occupations that are similar because they are plausible alternatives in the job 
search and matching process and the opposite case that consists of dissimilar 
occupations. Therefore, in the model, I assume that the variable portion of search 
costs might be zero if a job searcher is searching in his former occupational labour 
market (Dij = 0), positive but moderate for a job search in similar occupational 
markets (Dij = d; 0 < d << ∞), or prohibitively high for a job search in dissimilar 
occupational labour markets (Dij → ∞). Thus, in the case of job searches in 
dissimilar occupational labour markets, the optimal search intensity should be 
low or even zero.
5 This finding contradicts the standard assumption of the discouraged worker hypothesis (Pissarides, 2000). According 
to this hypothesis, workers increase their job search intensity when the probability of obtaining a job increases but 
give up their search when the expected revenues from the search are relatively low. The hypothesis is derived from a 
model that assumes that search costs increase exponentially with job search intensity. Under the conditions of this 
model, optimal job search intensity depends positively on the job finding probability. The framework of the model 
is rather controversial; in particular, Shimer (2005) reveals that this model “[...] cannot generate business-cycle-
frequency fluctuations in unemployment and job vacancies in response to shocks of a plausible magnitude [...]”. 
One reason for this deficiency in the model could be that workers do not behave in accordance with the model’s 
predictions. In a recession, the expected revenues of job searches may become quite low because of the decreased 
wages and smaller number of vacancies (which decrease the probability of finding a job); nonetheless, it could be 
reasonable for workers to increase their efforts to find a job under these difficult economic conditions. By contrast, 
in an economic upswing, workers may decrease their job search intensity because they know that a high search 
intensity is not required to obtain a job.
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This approach implies directly that the number of matches in a certain occupation 
is determined not only by the number of unemployed workers and vacancies 
in the occupation itself but also by the number of unemployed workers and 
vacancies in similar occupations. Therefore, the empirical matching function 
should be augmented accordingly. The observed occupational market and similar 
occupational markets may be differentiated with respect to vacancies and 
unemployed workers. The following general modified matching function may thus 
be derived:
Mi = AiUi βUVi βVUisγUVisγV  (2.3)
where Mi, Ai, Ui and Vi represent matches, “augmented” matching productivity, 
unemployed workers and vacancies in occupational group i, respectively. The terms 
Uis and Vis represent the number of unemployed and vacancies in occupational 
groups that are similar to occupational group i. Therefore, in addition to the well-
known matching elasticities βV and βU , two further matching elasticities, γV and 
γU , must be considered because the latter represent the effects of dependencies 
on similar occupational labour markets.
Based on a quasi-reduced form of the matching model,6 the sign of these 
matching elasticities are determined by two mechanisms. The number of matches 
in a certain occupation decreases with a decreasing probability, that a worker 
will receive a job offer in the same occupation, due to an increase in the number 
of unemployed workers in similar occupations. Simultaneously, this decreased 
probability of receiving a job offer leads to a higher optimal job search intensity, 
assuming that the expected gain from a job search is significantly higher than the 
search (and travel) costs and that the latter costs are small and increase linearly 
with the number of job applications; such an increase in search intensity tends to 
produce a higher number of job matches. An increase in the stock of vacancies, 
cet. par., would cause more matches – due to a higher job finding rate – but 
would also have indirect negative effects caused by the tendency towards lower 
optimal search intensities. For example, positive matching elasticities of vacancies 
in similar occupational groups would ensue if the decrease in the optimal search 
intensity is not too large. To sum up, the matching elasticities of the unemployed 
and vacancies in similar occupations might have positive signs if the (optimal) job 
search elasticity of the job finding rate is negative and lies in a certain range less 
than zero7.
6 The matches depend directly only on the number of unemployed and the job finding rate. The latter depends also 
on the number of vacancies.
7 See appendix 2.A.2.
27Chapter 2
Data
2.3 Data
I construct a panel data set that is similar in its structure but larger in its time 
dimension than the data set that was used by Stops and Mazzoni (2010); Fahr and 
Sunde (2004). This data set consists of 81 occupational groups as cross-section 
units over the course of 26 time periods (1982 to 2007). The units are obtained from 
the German occupational classification scheme from 1988 (KldB 888). Information 
about the unemployed and (registered) vacancies is provided by rich operative 
data from the Statistics of the German Federal Employment Agency. These data 
are only available at the required level of disaggregation for the reference date 
of September 30th of each year. To calculate new hires for each sampled year, I 
used the data from the IAB Sample of the Integrated Labour Market Biographies 
1975–2008 (SIAB 1975–2008) from October 1st of each year to September 
30th of the following year. The SIAB 1975–2008 is a representative 2% sample 
of an individual’s history of unemployment and employment that is subject to 
social insurance contributions (Dorner et al., 2010). The number of new hires in 
the occupational groups is equal to the sum of flows to employment in each 
occupational group for each examined period (which ranges from October 1st of a 
year to September 30th of the following year). I calculated the number of new hires 
in the national economy using a ratio estimator that was suggested by Cochran 
(1977, pp. 150) and applied by Stops and Mazzoni (2010). In particular, the number 
of new hires is divided by the employment levels from the SIAB 1975–2008 data, 
and the resulting quotient is then multiplied by the employment levels9 from the 
employment statistics of the Federal Employment Agency. This ratio estimator is 
more accurate than a simple extrapolation because the level of employment and 
the number of new hires are highly positively correlated. Because there are only 
40 occupational sections in the employment statistics of the Federal Employment 
Agency, I assign the 81 occupational groups of this study to the 40 occupational 
sections.10
Mi,t =
Eo|i∈o,t
eo|i∈o,t
·mi,t   (2.4)
where the variables have following definitions:
 • Mi, t is the interpolated number of new hires by the occupational groups 
i  =  1, …, 81 for the time period t,
8 Klassifizierung der Berufe 1988; see table 2.5 in appendix 2.A.3.
9 Employees who are subject to social insurance contributions are measured.
10 See table 2.6 in appendix 2.A.3.
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 • mi,t is the number of new hires m from the SIAB 1975–2008 data by 
occupational groups i = 1, …, 81 for the year t,
 • eo|i ∈o,t is the number of employed persons from the SIAB 1975–2008 data 
in the occupational group i ∈ o that has been assigned to the occupational 
sectors o  = 1, …, 40 on September 30th of each year t, and
 • Eo|i ∈o,t is the level of employment on September 30th of each year t in the 
occupational group i ∈ o that has been assigned to the occupational sector 
o  = 1, …, 40 on September 30th of each year t.
The data set includes information about the German labour market since the early 
1980s; however, data for Eastern Germany are only available since 1992. Thus, 
only the information for Western Germany can be used in this study, and neither 
Western German job seekers who obtained employment in Eastern Germany nor 
Eastern German unemployed workers were considered by this investigation. The 
numbers of Western German unemployed workers and registered vacancies are the 
explanatory variables used in this investigation to explain the dependent variable 
of the flows in employment in Western Germany. Another constraint of this study 
relates to the frequency of its time series. It has frequently been noted that 
information about the dynamic changes in the numbers of unemployed workers 
and vacancies is lost if yearly data are used; consequently, the estimation results 
could be biased (Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001, for a broader discussion, see). 
However, I am forced to neglect this issue because data with greater frequencies 
are not available for the observed period.
Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics for the aggregated stocks and flows 
from the data.
2.4 Empirical strategy and results
2.4.1 An occupational ”topology”
The empirical approach of this work is based on the idea that cross-sectional units 
interact with others; this interaction effect implies that the average behaviour in a 
group influences the behaviours of those who comprise the group (Manski, 1993; 
Elhorst, 2010a). Analogously to a regional topology, which depends on region 
adjacency, I derive an “occupational group topology” that relies on the similarities 
between occupational groups, in accordance with Matthes et al. (2008).11
11 See table 2.7 in appendix 2.A.3.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics
Average  
1982–2007  
(in numbers)
 
Share  
(in per cent)
Labour market stocks
Labour force E +U 25,436,839 100.00%
Employed E 23,172,935 91.10%
Unemployed U 2,263,904 8.90%
Registered Vacancies V 277,831 1.09%
Flows in employment M 5,595,605
Note: The averaged stocks by year were calculated during the course of this study.
Source:  The data centre of the statistics department of the Federal Employment Agency and the SIAB 1975–2008.
The approach in Matthes et al. (2008) is to aggregate occupational groups that are 
somewhat “similar” or “homogeneous” according to the KldB 88 into occupational 
segments (Berufssegmente), following the concept outlined in an earlier version of 
Gathmann and Schönberg (2010). In accordance with this approach, occupational 
groups at the 3-digit level12 are assumed to be similar if they are alternatives in 
recruitment decisions by firms or in job search decisions by potential employees. 
This information is available from the Federal Employment Agency and its Central 
Occupational File (Federal Employment Agency, 2010, Zentrale Berufedatei ). 
To identify the similarities among given occupational groups, the Federal 
Employment Service has analysed not only the specific skills, licences, certificates, 
and knowledge requirements but also the typical tasks and techniques that are 
involved in each occupational group (Matthes et al., 2008).13
I transform the results for occupational groups at the 3-digit level into 
occupational groups on the 2-digit level; this transformation is possible due to 
the hierarchical structure of the occupational classification scheme.14 Based on 
this information, I construct a symmetric 81 × 81 first-order contiguity weight 
matrix  W in which a value of one reflects correlations between similar occupational 
groups. The diagonal elements are set to zero since it cannot be assumed that a 
occupational group is neighboured to itself; – furthermore – each occupational 
12 The German occupational classification scheme 88 (KldB 88) code is a hierarchical construction that incorporates 
the following levels (from lowest to highest): occupational classes, which have a 4-digit code; occupational orders, 
which have a 3-digit code; occupational groups, which have a 2-digit-code; and occupational ranges, which have a 
1-digit code. Under this classification scheme, a given occupational range consists of certain occupational groups, 
each of which in turn consists of certain occupational orders, where each of the latter in turn consists of certain 
occupational classes.
13 More details about the methodology can be found in appendix 2.A.4.
14 As mentioned, the results of this procedure are summarized in table 2.7 in appendix 2.A.3.
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group is considered separately from other similar occupational groups in the 
empirical model. Finally, after the weight matrix is row-normalized, it can be used 
to calculate weighted averaged numbers of unemployed and vacancies in similar 
occupational groups. Thus, Uis (Vis ) is the product of the ith 1 × 81 row vector wi of 
the weight matrix W and the 81 × 1 column vector of the numbers of unemployed 
U (vacancies V) in each occupational group:
Uis ≡wiU=
81∑
j=1
(wi jUj), and Vis ≡wiV=
81∑
j=1
(wi jVj)
One restriction of this approach must be noted. Some 2-digit groups are not assigned 
to only one occupational segment because they contain particular 3-digit groups that 
belong to one segment and other 3-digit groups that belong to another segment15. 
However, these occupational groups may be regarded as occupations that are similar 
to more than one segment (e.g., segment A and segment B) because they include 
certain tasks or qualifications that are only found in segment A and other tasks or 
qualifications that are only found in segment B. Therefore, though segments A and B 
are linked by an occupational group, they are not necessarily similar.
2.4.2 Estimation approach and results
To examine the influences of exogenous regressors in other occupational groups, I 
use the logarithmic version of the model in equation (2.3) considering a panel data 
structure with observation periods t:
logMi,t = logAi+βU logUi,t+βV logVi,t+γU logUis,t+γV logVis,t  (2.5)
At this stage, I present the model, assuming the availability of perfect information 
about job searchers, vacancies, and new hires. Subsequently, to overcome several 
shortcomings of the available data, like stationarity issues and a lack of information 
about non-registered vacancies, I complement the model with a recession and 
a time trend variable. In the first step of model construction, I apply a pooled 
ordinary least squares (pooled OLS) estimation. This model is used as a reference 
for previous studies, such as those of Fahr and Sunde (2004) or Stops and Mazzoni 
(2010). This estimator is based on two further important assumptions: (i) equality 
of the matching function parameters across all occupational groups and (ii) the 
stationarity of the time series used. In the second step of the estimation, I relax the 
15 For example, consider occupational group 63, “technical specialist”, in table 2.7 in appendix 2.A.3. This group is 
assigned to “Miner/chemical occupations”; “Glass, ceramic, paper production”; and “Construction”.
31Chapter 2
Empirical strategy and results
assumption of equality of the intercept by applying a fixed effects (FE) estimator. 
Finally, I relax assumption (ii) by applying a pooled mean-group model, which is 
an approach that was introduced by Pesaran et al. (1999, S. 623).
2.4.3 Pooled OLS and FE estimators
The pooled OLS and FE models can be expressed, respectively, using the following 
regression equation with additional control variables and i.i.d. error terms εi,t:
logMi,t = Ai+βU logUi,t+βV logVi,t+γU logUis,t+γV logVis,t+ ...
...+ωt+ζGDPcyc,t+i,t
 
(2.6)
In accordance with the literature (LeSage and Pace, 2009, p. 180), βV and βU can 
be interpreted as direct effects on the number of matches, and γV and γU can 
be interpreted as indirect effects (of the average number of unemployed workers 
in similar occupational groups) on the number of matches. With respect to the 
field of labour market theory, it is important not only to compare the impacts of 
vacancies and unemployed workers on the matching process but also to analyse 
returns to scale in terms of the sum of the matching elasticities. LeSage and Pace 
(2009, pp.  34) demonstrate that for the simple case of models with cross-sectional 
dependence regressors (“SLX” models), such as those presented in this paper, the 
(average) total elasticity is simply the sum of the (direct) elasticities, βV and βU , 
and the indirect elasticities, γV and γU . Therefore, to analyse the returns to scale of 
the estimated matching functions, I provide a Wald test with the null hypothesis 
that the sum of all direct and indirect elasticities is unity16. Among others, Berman 
(1997) argues that (monthly) numbers of the unemployed and vacancies are reduced 
by every hiring, eventually producing a downward bias in the estimated elasticities. 
Several studies for different countries based on elasticity estimations without 
restrictions on returns to scale empirically confirm this conjecture (see, e.g., Burda 
and Wyplosz, 1994; Fahr and Sunde, 2004; Stops and Mazzoni, 2010). In fact, in 
this paper, a further potential source of underestimated elasticities is addressed, 
namely, the omission of job searchers and vacancies in similar occupational groups.
In the pooled OLS version of the model, the “augmented” productivity 
coefficient Ai is equal across the occupational groups, whereas the value of this 
coefficient may vary in the FE version of the model. Furthermore, the model 
contains a trend coefficient, ω , that may be interpreted as an indicator of the 
average development of matching productivity during the observation period.
16 H0: βU + βV + γU + γV = 1 vs. Ha: βU + βV + γU + γV ≠ 1
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Table 2.2: The results for the matching equation
dep. variable (1)  
log M
(2)  
log M
(3)  
log M
(4)  
log M
(5)  
Δ log M
(6)  
Δ log M
Pooled 
OLS i
Pooled 
OLS ii
FE i FE ii PMG i PMG ii
βU 0.440*** 0.458*** 0.192** 0.189*** 0.411*** 0.493***
(0.025) (0.022) (0.080) (0.071) (0.045) (0.038)
βV 0.389*** 0.377*** 0.210*** 0.236*** 0.238*** 0.255***
(0.020) (0.017) (0.049) (0.041) (0.027) (0.019)
γU 0.187*** -0.014 0.358***
(0.038) (0.076) (0.075)
γV -0.059 0.077 0.133***
(0.036) (0.066) (0.039)
Trend -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.008** -0.044*** -0.032***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
GDPcyc 4.746*** 2.932** 1.658*** 2.248*** 12.212*** 9.757***
(1.243) (1.198) (0.500) (0.807) (1.419) (1.139)
ϕ -0.240*** -0.263***
(0.020) (0.023)
Constant 2.218*** 3.552*** 6.725*** 7.002*** 0.130*** 1.112***
(0.276) (0.127) (0.967) (0.760) (0.016) (0.089)
Observations 2,106 2,106 2,106 2,106 1,944 1,944
log-likelihood -1,747 -1,770 -303.3 -311.1 1,874 1,865
AIC 3,507 3,549 618.6 630.2 -3,721 -3,708
BIC 3,547 3,578 652.5 652.8 -3,649 -3,647
Wald test (Prob > F) 
H(0): constant returns to scale
0.132 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.086 0.000
Wald test (Prob > χ2 )  
H(0): γU and γV are
0.000 0.503 0.000
simultaneously zero
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Notes:  (1) Pooled OLS and FE model: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Akaikes Information Criteria (AIC), 
Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) on the base of the log-likelihood derived by the estimation results. 
(3) FE and PMG model: Constant = average of fixed effects 
(4) PMG model: Short-run coefficients are not reported here; further results can be found in table 2.3.  
Akaikes Information Criteria (AIC), Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) on the base of the log-likelihood.
Note that the observable numbers of vacancies and unemployed are proxies for all 
job searchers and vacancies in the labour market. The use of these proxies could 
produce biased estimates (Broersma and Ours, 1999; Anderson and Burgess, 2000; 
Fahr and Sunde, 2005; Sunde, 2007). Therefore, Anderson and Burgess (2000) 
propose interpreting the empirical matching elasticities as quantities obtained from a 
“reduced” model. However, the total number of vacancies might be found if the ratios 
of observable vacancies17 to total vacancies were known. These ratios are occasionally 
17 These observable vacancies are those registered by the Federal Employment Service; employers are not obliged to 
register vacancies.
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reported (Heckmann et al., 2009), but data for the entire observation period are not 
available. However, Franz (2006) reports that these ratios exhibit partially counter-
cyclical characteristics. This finding can be used to obtain the unbiased coefficient 
of the matching elasticity of vacancies. Therefore, I complement the model by 
incorporating the cyclical component of the logarithm of German real gross domestic 
product GDPcyc calculated using the Hodrick-Prescott filter (Hodrick and Prescott, 
1997)18. In accordance with the work of Franz (2006), the coefficient of the GDPcyc is 
expected to be positive.
In columns (1) to (4) of table 2.2, I present the results for the pooled OLS and 
FE models including one version of each model containing cross-sectional lags of 
exogenous regressors and one version of each model that does not include these 
lags to allow comparisons between those specifications.
Robust standard errors are calculated in accordance with Huber and White. 
Information criteria are reported, including the Akaike information criterion 
(AIC, Akaike, 1974) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC, Schwarz, 1978). 
According to the AIC and BIC, models with the cross-sectional lags of the 
exogenous regressors should be preferred over models without such lags.
The matching elasticities of the unemployed workers and vacancies are 
significantly positive in all variations of the model; however, these elasticities are 
rather small in the FE models. The positive coefficient of the cyclical component 
of the real GDP and the negative parameter of the trend are robust for all of the 
models except for the pooled OLS estimation.
The parameters measuring the impact of the unemployed from other occupational 
groups, γU , are significant, positive, and robust in the pooled OLS model but not 
in the FE model, in which γU is small and insignificant. The coefficients measuring 
the impact of vacancies in other occupational groups, γU , are also quite small and 
insignificant in both the pooled OLS model and the FE model.19 Accordingly, the null 
of the Wald test that both coefficients are simultaneously zero must be rejected 
for the pooled OLS model but not for the FE model. The results of the pooled OLS 
estimations indicate a positive relationship between new hires in an occupational 
group and unemployed workers in similar occupational groups. There is no robust 
indication that vacancies in similar occupational groups have an impact. The FE 
model does not reveal any impact from vacancies and unemployed in similar 
occupational groups. Moreover, the null of the Wald test for constant returns to 
scale must be rejected for all of the variants of the Pooled OLS and FE models.
18 Detailed considerations are provided in appendix 2.A.5.
19 Some variations of both models corroborate these results, compare with tables 2.11 and 2.12 in appendix 2.A.6.
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2.4.4 Stationarity and the pooled mean-group model
The properties of the panel variables used are important to ensure that the correct 
estimator is applied. Blanchard and Diamond (1989, pp. 55) report the results of 
augmented Dickey-Fuller tests that reject the null of non-stationarity. However, 
these researchers could not show the existence of cointegration in the observed 
data. Entorf (1998, p. 79) confirmed that unit roots are seldom found in panel 
time series for certain metrics such as new hires, vacancies and unemployed 
workers. Fahr and Sunde (2004) use a stationarity test of Hadri (2000) with a null 
of stationarity and find that the null could not be rejected for their data. Stops 
and Mazzoni (2010) employ the same test for similar data with more observation 
timepoints and demonstrate that the null must be rejected.
I apply the same test and the results indicate again that the assumption of 
stationarity should not be maintained. The null of stationarity must therefore be 
rejected for all time series of new hires, vacancies, and unemployed workers. By 
contrast, the null could not be rejected for the first-order difference series because of 
the possibility of homoscedastic standard errors20. Thus, the time series are likely to 
be integrated of order 1. Furthermore, from a theoretical perspective, there is a long-
run linear relationship between the logarithm of new hires and both unemployed 
workers and vacancies, and it can be reasonably assumed that these variables are 
co-integrated. Therefore, I apply the pooled mean-group model (PMG) proposed by 
Pesaran et al. (1999). The basis of the PMG estimator is an autoregressive distributive 
lag (l, q1, q2, …, qk ) model (ARDL model) with q = q1 = q2 = … = qk . This model is 
reparameterized in a error correction form. In this study, I use a reparameterized 
ARDL(1,1,1) model as follows:
Δ logMi,t =φi[logMi,t−1− (βU logUi,t+βV logVi,t+ ...  (2.7)
 
...+γU logUis,t+γV logVis,t)]+δUi Δ logUi,t+δVi ΔVi,t+Ai+i,t
In addition to the pooled OLS and FE estimators, the following variables are now 
implemented:
 • Δ log Mi,t are the first-order backward differences of the logarithm of the flow 
in employment,
 • Δlog Ui,t and Δlog Vi,t are the first-order backward differences of the logarithm 
of unemployed persons and vacancies, and
 • δiU and δiV are the regression coefficients of these differences.
20 This conclusion is also true with respect to heteroscedasticity of the residuals, with an exception for unemployed 
workers at a significance level of 10 per cent. Please compare the results in table 2.13 in appendix 2.A.7.
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There is an adjustment process for log Mi,t ; the error-correction term ϕi on the 
right-hand side of equation (2.40) denotes the speed of adjustment, whereas the 
term in the square brackets represents deviations from the long-run equilibrium. 
If ϕi is equal to the null, then there is no long-run equilibrium between the 
dependent and independent variables. A significant negative parameter indicates 
that the variables tend to a long-run steady state.
The PMG estimator includes the FE and short-run dynamics of the variables 
for each occupational group i and requires the long-term coefficients to be equal 
across all occupational groups i. The PMG model in equation (2.40) is non-linear 
in its parameters ϕi and (βU , βV ). Therefore, a maximum likelihood estimator is 
applied (Pesaran et al., 1999, p. 465).21 Columns (5) and (6) of table 2.2 presents 
the results for the long-run coefficients and the averaged error-correction term 
for two variations of the model, one version with cross-sectional lags of the 
exogenous regressors and one version without. In addition, for these two models, 
the null hypothesis of the Wald test, stating that γU and γV are simultaneously 
equal to zero, must be rejected. Given the information criteria examined, the 
model with the cross-sectional lags of regressors should be preferred to the model 
without such lags. Table 2.3 contains all the results of the model including the 
following (additional) covariables: the lagged first-order difference of new hires, 
ς 1ΔM–1  ; variations in te trend, ω; the cyclical component of the real gross domestic 
product GDPcyc, and the cross sectional regressors as long-term parameters in the 
error-correction term.
The long-run elasticities of vacancies and unemployed workers, the exogenous 
regressors, the cyclical component of real GDP, and the trend can be found in 
the upper part of table 2.3. At the bottom of the table, the following quantities 
appear: the error-correction term ϕ, the averages of the estimated short-term 
parameters for each occupational group and the average fixed effect A (denoted 
as Constant, Pesaran et al., 1999, p. 626).
The error-correction term ϕ is significant and negative for all variants of the 
model. This result indicates the existence of movements against deviations from 
the long-run equilibrium and therefore implies the existence of stable relationships 
between matches and both unemployed workers and vacancies.
21 See appendix 2.A.8.
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Table 2.3: The results of the PMG estimations that use Δ log M as the dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PMG 1 PMG 2 PMG 3 PMG 4 PMG 5 PMG 6
Long-run coefficients
βU 0.411*** 0.420*** 0.500*** 0.493*** 0.381*** 0.680*** 
(0.045) (0.044) (0.039) (0.038) (0.030) (0.055)
βV 0.238*** 0.282*** 0.211*** 0.255*** 0.296*** -0.036
(0.027) (0.021) (0.025) (0.019) (0.017) (0.033)
γU 0.358*** 0.306*** 0.026 -0.359***
(0.075) (0.072) (0.044) (0.073)
γV 0.133*** 0.072** 0.053** 0.017
(0.039) (0.032) (0.025) (0.043)
Trend -0.044*** -0.039*** -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.028***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
GDPcyc 12.212*** 11.971*** 10.444*** 9.757*** 15.494***
(1.419) (1.387) (1.189) (1.139) (1.934)
ϕ -0.240*** -0.244*** -0.257*** -0.263*** -0.329*** -0.180***
(0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.035) (0.015)
Short-run coefficients
ς1ΔM–1 -0.107*** -0.097*** -0.096*** -0.088*** -0.040 -0.095***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.024)
δ0ΔU -0.172*** -0.180*** -0.171*** -0.180*** -0.226*** -0.079***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.034) (0.028)
δ–1ΔU -0.061*** -0.065*** -0.055** -0.058** -0.065*** 0.002
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
δ0ΔV 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.051*** 0.046*** 0.024 0.118***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.015)
δ–1ΔV 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.046*** 0.044*** 0.040** 0.103***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.012)
Constant 0.130*** 0.416*** 1.004*** 1.112*** 1.398*** 1.346***
(0.016) (0.030) (0.077) (0.089) (0.144) (0.105)
Observations 1,944 1,944 1,944 1,944 1,944 1,944
log-likelihood 1,874 1,870 1,867 1,865 1,826 1,789
AIC -3,721 -3,716 -3,709 -3,708 -3,628 -3,554
BIC -3,649 -3,649 -3,642 -3,647 -3,561 -3,487
Wald test (Prob > F) 0.0857 0.906 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
H(0): constant returns to scale
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Constant = average of fixed effects.
The long-term coefficients βU , βV , γU , γV and GDPcyk are positive, and the trend T 
is negative and significantly different from zero; the latter result implies that, on 
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average, the augmented matching productivity decreased during the observation 
period. These results are robust for all estimated model variations22. The impact 
of unemployed workers on matches is larger than the impact of vacancies, even 
after accounting for the 95%-confidence intervals of βV and βU . This finding is in 
accordance with other studies for Germany (Stops and Mazzoni, 2010; Fahr and 
Sunde, 2004; Burda and Wyplosz, 1994). The indirect effects of unemployed and 
vacancies in similar occupational groups (γU , γV ) are each smaller than the direct 
impacts of their counterparts (βU , βV ). This implies for each occupational group 
that changes in the number of unemployed or vacancies in the same occupational 
group have a greater impact on new hires in that occupational group than do 
changes in the number of unemployed or vacancies in similar occupational 
groups.23 For all of the examined model variations, there is a significant positive 
relationship between changes in the number of new hires and changes in the 
number of vacancies, in addition a significant negative relationship between 
changes in the number of new hires and changes in the number of unemployed 
workers.
The positive relationships between new hires in an occupational group and 
vacancies and unemployed workers in similar occupational groups have important 
implications for estimations of the matching efficiencies of unemployed workers 
and vacancies. In particular, this result indicates that these efficiencies are 
determined not only by the numbers of unemployed workers and vacancies in the 
same occupational group but also by the numbers of unemployed workers and 
vacancies in similar occupational groups.
2.5 Conclusions
This paper analyses matching processes in occupational labour markets in terms 
of classes of jobs that share commonalities in required qualifications and tasks. 
All previous studies in this field have been based on the assumption that job 
search and job matching processes occur separately in each occupational labour 
22 There is one exception γU takes a negative sign after excluding the trend T. However, this model specification 
would at least preferred according to the information criteria reported.
23 At this stage, it may be beneficial to enquire about the empirical impact of changes in non-similar occupational 
groups, and it may be expected that there is no impact. However, such a direct falsification test appears to be 
inadequate because the resulting estimates may partially reveal only common trends or shocks to the single 
occupational unemployment and vacancy time series. Furthermore, the results should instead be interpreted as 
correlations rather than elasticities, because the utilized weight matrices of non-similar occupational groups are 
neither theoretically nor empirically based. Considering that I provide an indirect falsification test that utilizes the 
same model framework but compares shock-adjusted correlations of the unemployed and vacancies in similar 
occupational groups and new hires with those of randomly selected non-similar occupational groups. The results 
show that the estimated correlations for the empirically based selection of similar occupational groups are higher 
than those for the non-similar occupational groups. Details can be found in appendix 2.A.9.
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market, but this assumption is theoretically and empirically unreasonable. From the 
perspectives of both potential workers and employers, optimal search intensities 
in each occupational labour market are weighted against the expected gains and 
costs of searching, the latter of whom could be the (additional) financial burden 
of the training that is required for a change from one occupation to another. 
Therefore, workers who are prepared to work in a certain occupation may decide 
to search for a job in other occupations if the resulting search costs are not too 
high relative to the expected gains; similarly, firms with vacancies in a certain 
occupation may decide to search for workers currently in other occupations, if such 
workers might be viable alternatives. This reasoning implies that the processes of 
job search and matching occur not only in each occupational labour market but 
also across certain occupational labour markets. I support this prediction through 
observations of occupational changes that are obtained from German microdata.
I argue that these findings have important implications for estimating the 
macroeconomic matching function because an explanation of matches (in terms of 
new hires) in a given occupation requires consideration not only of vacancies and 
unemployed workers in the occupation of interest but also vacancies and unemployed 
workers in other relevant occupations. I use information regarding similarities of 
occupational groups with respect to their capacities to function as alternatives in the 
processes of worker and job search to construct an “occupational topology”. Based 
on this topology, it is possible to calculate, for each occupational group, average 
vacancies and unemployed in similar occupations. Finally, I estimate an augmented 
matching function using pooled ordinary least squares, fixed effects and pooled 
mean-group models that include cross-sectional dependency lags of regressors in 
terms of vacancies and unemployed workers in similar occupational groups.
The results of this study indicate considerable dependencies between similar 
occupational groups in the matching process. I show that there are significant and 
positive matching elasticities of vacancies and unemployed in similar occupational 
groups, which is a finding that has important implications for estimating the 
matching elasticities of unemployed workers and vacancies; such elasticities are 
determined not only by the number of unemployed workers and vacancies in the 
occupational group of interest but also by the number of unemployed workers 
and vacancies in other occupational groups. Furthermore, the results reveal that 
returns to scale that are implied by the estimation results for the pooled mean-
group model – which considers cross-sectional dependency – are constant on a 
significance level of 5 per cent. In sum, the findings of this study suggest that an 
augmented empirical matching function that considers job and worker searches 
across different occupational labour markets should be employed to obtain 
unbiased elasticity estimates.
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2.A Appendix to chapter 2
2.A.1 Observing occupational changes in administrative data
I use the SIAB data set24 to count the flows of either unemployment or 
employment in one occupational group to employment in other occupational 
groups. To obtain this count, certain restrictions must be employed. (1) The first 
observed employment sequence of every individual is not considered because 
no information about the (unobserved) employment status and any related 
occupation of the individual is available prior to the first observation. Therefore, 
I disregard these initial employment sequences in this study. (2) Cases of flows 
from unemployment to employment are treated as flows in employment with an 
occupational change if the occupation of the employment sequence before the 
unemployment period differs from the occupation in the employment sequence 
after unemployment. These flows are treated as flows in employment without 
an occupational change if the occupation for the employment sequence prior 
to the unemployment period is the same as the occupation for the employment 
that occurred after the unemployment period. If there was no employment 
sequence prior to the unemployment period, then the flow from unemployment 
to subsequent employment is not considered by this study. The results of this 
study demonstrate that the averaged percentages of all flows in employment with 
occupational changes ranged from 16 per cent (forester and huntsman) to 75 per 
cent (polymer processor; see table 2.4).
24 See section 2.3 for further details.
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Table 2.4: Percentages of flows in employment with occupational changes on all flows
Code Percentages of flows in employment
(KldB 88) with change of occupation  
(1982–2007)
average min. max.
1 farmer, fisher 0.48 0.36 0.67
3 agricultural administrator 0.60 0.36 0.83
4 helper in the agricultural sector, agricultural workers, 
stockbreeding professions
0.56 0.46 0.66
5 gardener, florist 0.38 0.31 0.47
6 forester and huntsman 0.16 0.10 0.41
7 miner and related professions 0.21 0.07 0.50
8 exhauster of mineral resources 0.34 0.26 0.54
9 mineral rehasher, mineral burner 0.56 0.33 1.00
10 stone processor 0.30 0.20 0.45
11 producer of building materials 0.40 0.24 0.59
12 ceramicist, glazier 0.68 0.41 0.79
13 glazier, glass processor, glass refiner 0.68 0.17 0.89
14 chemical worker 0.66 0.30 0.83
15 polymer processor 0.75 0.37 0.86
16 paper producer 0.73 0.56 0.84
17 printer 0.49 0.36 0.60
18 woodworker, wood processor 0.57 0.40 0.77
19 metal worker 0.63 0.36 0.87
20 moulder, caster, semi-metal cleaner 0.71 0.49 0.84
21 metal press workers, metal formers 0.72 0.53 0.85
22 turner, cutter, driller, metal polisher 0.54 0.39 0.66
23 metal burnisher, galvanizer, enameler 0.71 0.54 0.89
24 welder, solderer, riveter, metal gluter 0.54 0.41 0.65
25 steel smith, copper smith 0.69 0.54 0.91
26 plumber, plant locksmith 0.36 0.28 0.45
27 locksmith, fitter 0.47 0.37 0.57
28 mechanic 0.42 0.34 0.53
29 toolmaker 0.49 0.34 0.64
30 metal precision-workers, orthodontists, opticians 0.27 0.16 0.41
31 electricians 0.30 0.23 0.39
32 assemblers and metal related professions 0.74 0.60 0.82
33 spinner, ropemaker 0.63 0.25 0.85
34 weaver, other textile producer 0.55 0.21 0.78
35 tailor, sewer 0.40 0.28 0.58
36 textile dyer 0.64 0.39 0.81
37 leather and fur manufacturers, shoemaker 0.48 0.33 0.63
39 baker, confectioner 0.36 0.26 0.49
40 butcher, fishworkmansip and related 0.39 0.27 0.52
41 cooks, convenience food preparatory 0.45 0.39 0.53
42 brewer, manufacturer for tobacco products 0.65 0.45 0.75
43 milk/fat processor, nutriments producer 0.65 0.45 0.78
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Code Percentages of flows in employment
(KldB 88) with change of occupation  
(1982–2007)
average min. max.
44 bricklayer, concrete builder 0.26 0.18 0.36
45 carpenter, roofer, spiderman 0.34 0.24 0.45
46 road/track constructors, demolisher, culture structurer 0.42 0.28 0.55
47 helper in the construction sector 0.60 0.48 0.68
48 plasterer, tiler, glazier, screedlayer 0.41 0.27 0.55
49 interior designer, furniture supplier 0.56 0.38 0.68
50 joiner, modeler, cartwright 0.36 0.26 0.43
51 painter, varnisher and related professions 0.27 0.20 0.39
52 goods tester, consignment professions 0.74 0.63 0.80
53 unskilled worker 0.72 0.60 0.86
54 machinist and related professions 0.42 0.28 0.63
60 engineer, architect 0.41 0.37 0.46
61 chemist, physicist 0.52 0.36 0.64
62 technician 0.47 0.39 0.56
63 technical specialist 0.39 0.28 0.51
68 merchandise manager 0.41 0.35 0.50
69 banking professional, insurance merchant 0.32 0.21 0.42
70 merchant/specialist in conveyance, tourism, other services 0.55 0.46 0.65
71 conductor, driver, motorist 0.38 0.27 0.46
72 navigator, ship engineer, water/air traffic professions 0.25 0.14 0.42
73 mail distributer 0.61 0.40 0.75
74 storekeeper, worker in storage and transport 0.68 0.60 0.73
75 manager, consultant, accountant 0.52 0.47 0.56
76 member of parliament, association manager 0.69 0.57 0.77
77 accounting clerk, cashier, data processing expert 0.54 0.45 0.61
78 clerk, typist, secretary 0.38 0.32 0.45
79 plant security, guard, gate keeper, servant 0.65 0.55 0.76
80 other security related professions, health caring professions 0.44 0.26 0.64
81 law related professions 0.63 0.52 0.81
82 publicist, translator, librarian 0.51 0.43 0.60
83 artist and related professions 0.34 0.20 0.46
84 physician, dentist, apothecaries 0.23 0.11 0.41
85 nurse, helper in nursing, receptionist and related 0.27 0.23 0.35
86 social worker, care taker 0.35 0.29 0.42
87 professor, teacher 0.53 0.36 0.62
88 scientist 0.65 0.52 0.73
89 helper for cure of souls and cult 0.66 0.47 0.83
90 beauty culture 0.20 0.14 0.30
91 guest assistant, steward, barkeeper 0.46 0.38 0.62
92 domestic economy, housekeeping 0.61 0.56 0.72
93 cleaning industry related professions 0.54 0.43 0.64
Total 0.50 0.07 1.00
Source: SIAB 1975–2008. Own calculations.
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2.A.2 Theoretical model
Job search and matching on non-separated occupational labour markets
The following paragraphs are based on the work of Burda and Profit (1996), which 
provide a spatial extension of the “bulletin board” matching process model that 
was conceived by Hall (1979) and Pissarides (1979). Although I use the structure 
of this model, its interpretation is modified to apply to the context of the current 
study.
Assume an economy with J occupational labour markets, which are denoted by 
j = 1, …, J. There are Uj identical unemployed job searchers in each occupational 
labour market and Vj identical firms, each of which is searching for one worker 
in occupation j. All of the prospective workers reach decisions about their search 
intensity in two separate dimensions. Assuming that these workers choose to 
engage in a search for employment, they can decide to search in more than 
one occupational group, and they fix the number of jobs that they apply for in 
each occupation. In accordance with Burda and Profit (1996), I assume that the 
return on an effective search in terms of the wage  is equal over all potential 
occupations. An application or a job interview costs c + auDij and can be regarded 
as a random draw. The terms c and au are constants, and Dij is a measure for 
the dissimilarity of the occupations i and j 25. Thus, Dij refers to the capacity of 
occupations to be alternatives to each other in the search and matching process. 
The term auDij denotes additional costs for job searches in other occupational 
groups. These costs result from the financial burden of the additional training 
that would be required to change from one occupation to another. Generally, 
these costs will be greater for occupations that are less similar to each other.
The job searchers decide on their search intensities for each occupation, which 
can be denoted by their optimal number of job interviews N *ij in occupation j. To 
keep the model simple, workers’ search costs are assumed to be relatively small. 
This assumption implies that income effects from searches for jobs in other similar 
occupations can be ignored. Therefore, optimal search intensities can be analysed 
within each occupation j. The probability of obtaining a job after an interview 
within occupation j is provided by pj for each occupation j = 1, …, J. The job 
searcher is assumed to maximise the (net) utility of the job search, which is equal 
to the difference between the revenue from the job search and the costs of this 
search:
25 Because every pair of occupations is separated by a certain distance Dij , the model allows for the implementation 
of a continuous distance measure or a contiguity measure as well, as I use it in section 2.2.
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max
Ni j
{[1− (1− p j)Ni j ]wr −Ni j(c+auDi j)}
  (2.8)
In the above equation, {[1 – (1 – pj )Nij ] /r} denotes the expected revenue to 
a job searcher who is currently in occupation i from realising Nij interviews in 
occupation j, given pj , the probability of obtaining a job, and the assumption that 
a worker cannot hold more than one job at any given time. I also assume that the 
expected income of unemployment is zero. It can be shown that the first-order 
condition of the optimisation problem in (2.8) can be expressed as follows:
− (1− p j)Ni j ln(1− p j)wr − (c+auDi j)= 0 (2.9)
with the following solution:
N∗i j =
1
ln(1− p j)
ln(− c+auDi jw
r ln(1− p j)
)  (2.10)
For small pj , I obtain the following approximation:
N∗i j =
⎧⎨
⎩
1
p j
ln( (w/r)p jc+auDi j ) for
w
r p j ≥ (c+auDi j)
0 for wr p j < (c+auDi j)
 (2.11)
Therefore, optimal job search intensity depends positively on the ratio of the gains 
to the costs of a particular job search. A higher wage  has positive effects on 
job search intensity, whereas higher search costs and higher interest rates have 
negative effects on this intensity. The effects of a change in pj , the probability 
of obtaining a job, are not clear; a higher probability leads to higher expected 
revenues of the job search, but this increased probability also implies that less 
intensive job searching will be required to obtain a given level of expected benefits. 
The differentiation of the upper case on the right-hand side of equation  (2.11) 
leads to the following expression:
∂N∗i j
∂p j
= 1
p2j
(1− ln (w/r)p j
c+auDi j
)   (2.12)
Equation (2.12) implies that a higher pj has negative effects on the optimal search 
intensity if the expected gain from a job search is significantly larger than the 
search costs (( /r) pj >> c + au D ij ). Given the assumption of low search costs, 
an increase of pj will, cet. par., reduce the search intensity. Furthermore, the 
optimal choice of search intensity determines the range of the job search. Because 
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the job search intensity must be positive, a maximum measure of similarity of 
occupational groups is present; this result can be derived from equation (2.11):
D∗i =
1
au
(
w
r
pmax− c) with pmax ≡ sup p j (2.13)
An increasing maximum of the job-finding probabilities over pj leads to a higher 
optimal range Di . Furthermore, this range decreases with increasing dissimilarity 
costs au and increasing search costs c.
In the next step of the analysis, the unconditional job finding probabilities 
in any occupation can be derived from the optimal number of interviews in 
occupation j in which job searchers from occupation i ∈ 1, …, J  have participated. 
I assume that there is no information exchange between job searchers. Therefore, 
it is reasonable that certain vacancies could attract many applicants, whereas 
other vacancies do not attach strong applicant interest. Furthermore, I assume 
that all vacancies in all occupations Vj = V are known by all job searchers (in 
other words, a “bulletin board” of potential jobs exists). Consequently, the decision 
of job searchers in a certain occupation to search in other occupations depends 
on the competitive contexts among all of the job searchers in that occupation. 
By defining Uj ≡ ∑i Pi Nij *ui as the sum of applications by unemployed workers, 
I approximately derive the probability that a vacancy will not be considered as 
follows:
J∏
i=1
[
N∗i j∏
k=1
(1− 1
Vj−k+1
)]ui ≈
J∏
i=1
[
N∗i j∏
k=1
e]
− uiVj = exp(−Uj
Vj
)  (2.14)
The job finding probability, pj , can now be derived. This probability will be equal 
to the ratio of the number of vacancies considered (Vj−Vj exp(−UjVj )) to Uj , the 
number of applications that were submitted by unemployed workers:
p j =
Vj
Uj
[1−exp(−Uj
Vj
)]   (2.15)
Finally, in accordance with Burda and Profit (1996), a matching function that 
returns the number of flows from unemployment to employment in an occupation  i 
can be formulated:
Mi(u,v)= uiPi = ui[1−
J∏
j=1
(1− p j)N
∗
i j ]   (2.16)
In the equation above, u and v denote the vectors of the number of unemployed 
workers and vacancies in each occupation, Pi represents the probability that a job 
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searcher in occupation i will receive at least one job offer. This probability is equal 
to 1 minus the probability of receiving no job offer from all occupations.
The matching function above relates exits from unemployment to employment 
in a certain occupation to the labour market situation in every occupation. From 
an empirical perspective, a problem arises, namely, the optimal search intensity 
cannot be observed. To address this issue, according to Burda and Profit (1996), 
this matching function could be addressed in a quasi-reduced form that regards 
vacancies and wages as given quantities. This approach renders it possible to study 
the effects of the changes in the number of unemployed workers and vacancies on 
the number of matches:
∂Mi
∂ui
= Pi+ui ∂Pi
∂ui
  (2.17)
∂Mi
∂u j
= ui ∂Pi
∂u j
, j = i  (2.18)
∂Mi
∂vj
= ui ∂Pi
∂vj
, for all j = 1, ...,J   (2.19)
The first term in equation (2.17) is positive, implying that an increase in the 
number of unemployed workers in occupation i leads to more matches Mi given 
a particular (constant) probability Pi . The sign of the second term could be 
either negative or positive. This term represents the external effect of additional 
unemployed workers on the job-finding probabilities of workers who are already 
unemployed in occupation i.
Burda and Profit (1996) showed that, in theory, for the second terms in 
equations (2.18) and (2.19), both positive and negative external effects are 
plausible:
∂Pi
∂uτ
=
J∑
j=1
{[
N∗i j
1− p j
−
∂N∗i j
∂p j
ln(1− p j)]
∂p j
∂uτ
J∏
k=1
(1− pk)N
∗
ik } (2.20)
Analogously to (2.20), the first derivative of the job-finding probability Pi with 
respect to the vacancies vτ is expressed as follows:
∂Pi
∂vτ
=
J∑
j=1
{[
N∗i j
1− p j
−
∂N∗i j
∂p j
ln(1− p j)]
∂p j
∂vτ
J∏
k=1
(1− pk)N
∗
ik }  (2.21)
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The effect on the job-finding probability Pi induced by an increase either in 
unemployment or in the vacancies in occupation τ results from the weighted 
average of the effects on the (unconditional) job finding probabilities in all 
occupations ∂pj /∂uτ . Therefore, these results represent the net effect of variation 
in pj for j = 1,  …,  J. A change in pj directly affects the job-finding probability for 
unemployed workers in occupation i  given a search intensity of [Ni*j /(1 – pj )]∂pj/∂uτ  
in a situation involving the variation of uτ  and a search intensity of [Ni*j /1 – pj)]∂pj /∂vτ  
in a situation involving the variation of vτ . This change indirectly affects the 
optimal search intensity in all occupations and the employment prospects of 
the unemployed workers in occupation i, (∂Ni*j /∂pj) ln(1 – pj )(∂pj /∂uτ ). Therefore, 
the sign of ∂Pi /∂uτ  in a situation involving a cet. par. change of uτ  depends on 
the spillover effects, ∂pj /∂uτ , which provide feedback to Pi by affecting search 
intensity. The same argument holds for ∂Pi/∂vτ  in a situation involving a cet. par. 
change of vτ  and the spillover effects of ∂pj /∂vτ .
This model structure allows for the conditions for positive (or negative) 
external effects of job searches across different occupations to be defined. The 
starting point of this model is the total differential of the job-finding probability 
in equation (2.15) for occupation j.
The matching elasticities of unemployed workers
To obtain a prediction for the matching elasticities of unemployed workers, only 
the unemployment in occupation τ should be allowed to vary:
dp j = κ jN∗τ jduτ+κ j
J∑
k=1
(uk
∂N∗k j
∂pk
)dpk  (2.22)
with
κ j ≡ 1Uj
[exp(−Uj
Vj
)− p j]   (2.23)
In the above equation, as discussed by Burda and Profit (1996), κj is assumed to be 
smaller than zero26. The change in the unconditional finding rate dpj of occupation 
j reacts to duτ  via two channels. First, for κj < 0, there is a negative direct effect 
due to the dilution of job-finding prospects. The second indirect effect of a change 
in uτ  results from the shift in the search intensit y of the unemployed who are 
searching in occupation j; this shift is caused by the implications of the change in 
26 Given equation (2.15) for pj , this assumption holds true for  > 0.806, which should represent the real situation 
in the most occupational labour markets.
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uτ  on their job-finding probabilities pk (∂Nk*j /∂pk , for k = 1, …, J, including k = j ). 
In accordance with equation (2.11), it must be concluded that the optimal search 
intensity Nk*j  for occupation j of an unemployed worker in occupation k depends 
only on the job-finding probability in occupation j and does not depend on this 
probability in occupation k, which implies that ∂Nk*j /∂pk = 0 except for k = j 27.
Therefore, equation 2.22 can be simplified to the following form:
dp j = κ jN∗τ jduτ+κ ju j
∂N∗j j
∂p j
dp j   (2.24)
After several simple transformations, I obtain the following expression:
dp j
duτ
=
κ jN∗τ j
1−κ ju j(∂N∗j j/∂p j)
  (2.25)
The sign of ∂pj /∂uτ  depends on the sign and the absolute value of κjuj (∂Nj*j /∂pj ). 
The standard situation in job matching theory is ∂Nj*j /∂pj = 0. This situation would 
lead to a negative external effect28. According to equation (2.20), the condition 
of ∂Pi /∂uτ > 0, which represents a positive external effect, results in the following 
range for the elasticity ηNij, pj ≡ (∂Ni*j /∂pj)/(Ni*j /pj ):
− 1
1− p j
< ηNi j ,p j <
p j
κ jN∗i ju j
  (2.26)
The matching elasticities of vacancies
In contrast to the previous subsection, the number of vacancies in occupation 
τ should be allowed to vary, cet. par.; in this situation, the total differential of 
equation (2.15) is as follows:
dp j =−
Uj
Vj
κ jdvτ+κ j
J∑
k=1
(uk
∂N∗k j
∂pk
)dpk  (2.27)
Again, κj is assumed to be smaller than zero. Analogously to the previous finding, 
I find once again that a change in the number of vacancies in occupation τ has 
effects on the job-finding probability via two channels; these effects are different 
and merit further consideration. In particular, an increase in the vacancy stock 
27 This holds only under the strong assumption of small costs and no substitution effects between occupational 
labour markets, which would be important in the case of budget constraints and income effects. However, a 
theoretical treatment of this case is left for further research. 
28 I obtain the same result if ∂Nj*j /∂pj > 0. A positive external effect is induced by ∂Nj*j /∂pj > , given κ j, ∂Nj*j /∂pj < 0.
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produces a direct and positive effect on job-finding probabilities because of the 
change in the supply of vacancies. The second indirect effect can be ascribed to 
changes in the optimal search strategy. As discussed above, equation (2.11) implies 
that ∂Nk*j /∂pk = 0 except for k = j; therefore, equation (2.27) may be simplified as 
follows:
dp j =−
Uj
Vj
κ jdvτ+κ ju j
∂N∗j j
∂p j
dp j   (2.28)
allowing me to obtain the following equation:
dp j
dvτ
=
−UjVj κ j
1−κ ju j(∂N∗j j/∂p j)
  (2.29)
In either the standard case (∂Nj*j /∂pj = 0) or the situation in which ∂Nj*j /∂pj < , 
given κj < 0, I would obtain a positive external effect. Using equation (2.21), I can 
derive the condition for ∂Pi /∂vτ > 0, which results in the following range for the 
elasticity ηNij, pj :
− 1
1− p j
< ηNi j ,p j < 0   (2.30)
Conclusions for the matching elasticities
The absolute values of ηNij, pj  will vary with the similarity of the occupations i 
and  j. In particular, workers will not seek interviews in occupations that are not 
similar to their original occupation; therefore, the condition above will not hold 
for all combinations of occupations j and i. In the model mechanisms conceived by 
Burda and Profit (1996), it can be demonstrated that both positive and negative 
external effects are conceivable. Within a certain range of ηNij, pj , the external 
effects of vacancies and unemployed can both be positive.29
 
29 − 11−p j < ηNi j ,p j <
p j
κ jN∗i j u j
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2.A.3 Additional information tables
Table 2.5:  Occupational groups according to the German occupational classification scheme 
(KldB 88)
Code 
(KldB 88)
Occupational group
1 farmer, fisher
3 agricultural administrator
4 helper in the agricultural sector, agricultural workers, stockbreeding professions
5 gardener, florist
6 forester and huntsman
7 miner and related professions
8 exhauster of mineral resources
9 mineral rehasher, mineral burner*
10 stone processor
11 producer of building materials
12 ceramicist, glazier
13 glazier, glass processor, glass refiner
14 chemical worker
15 polymer processor
16 paper producer
17 printer
18 woodworker, wood processor
19 metal worker
20 moulder, caster, semi-metal cleaner
21 metal press workers, metal formers
22 turner, cutter, driller, metal polisher
23 metal burnisher, galvanizer, enameler
24 welder, solderer, riveter, metal gluter
25 steel smith, copper smith
26 plumber, plant locksmith
27 locksmith, fitter
28 mechanic
29 toolmaker
30 metal precision-workers, orthodontists, opticians
31 electricians
32 assemblers and metal related professions
33 spinner, ropemaker
34 weaver, other textile producer
35 tailor, sewer
36 textile dyer
37 leather and fur manufacturers, shoemaker
39 baker, confectioner
40 butcher, fishworkmansip and related
41 cooks, convenience food preparatory
42 brewer, manufacturer for tobacco products
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Code 
(KldB 88)
Occupational group
43 milk/fat processor, nutriments producer
44 bricklayer, concrete builder
45 carpenter, roofer, spiderman
46 road/track constructors, demolisher, culture structurer
47 helper in the construction sector
48 plasterer, tiler, glazier, screed layer
49 interior designer, furniture supplier
50 joiner, modeler, cartwright
51 painter, varnisher and related professions
52 goods tester, consignment professions
53 unskilled worker
54 machinist and related professions
60 engineer, architect
61 chemist, physicist
62 technician
63 technical specialist
68 merchandise manager
69 banking professional, insurance merchant
70 merchant/specialist in conveyance, tourism, other services
71 conductor, driver, motorist
72 navigator, ship engineer, water/air traffic professions
73 mail distributer
74 storekeeper, worker in storage and transport
75 manager, consultant, accountant
76 member of parliament, association manager
77 accounting clerk, cashier, data processing expert
78 clerk, typist, secretary
79 plant security, guard, gate keeper, servant
80 other security related professions, health caring professions
81 law related professions
82 publicist, translator, librarian
83 artist and related professions
84 physician, dentist, apothecaries
85 nurse, helper in nursing, receptionist and related
86 social worker, care taker
87 professor, teacher
88 scientist
89 helper for cure of souls and cult
90 beauty culture
91 guest assistant, steward, barkeeper
92 domestic economy, housekeeping
93 cleaning industry related professions
*Note:  Occupational group 9 contains some missing values for vacancies. That’s why it has to be dropped out for 
the estimations. 
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Table 2.6:  Assignment of the occupational groups to the occupational section of the employment 
statistics of the Federal Employment Agency
Occupational 
groups  
in data
i = 1, …, 82
Occupational 
section  
in employment 
statistics
o = 1, …, 40
Name of the occupational section
1, 3 -5 1 Plant cultivator/stockbreeding/fisher
6 2 Forester/huntsman
7 -9 3 Miner/exhauster of mineral resources
10 -11 4 Stone processor/producer of building materials
12 -13 5 Ceramicist/glazier
14 -15 6 Chemical worker/polymer processor
16 7 Paper producer
17 8 Printer
18 9 Woodworker/wood-processor
19 -24 10 Metal worker
25 -30 11 Locksmith/mechanic
31 12 Electrician
32 13 Assembler/metal-related professions
33 -36 14 Textile-related professions
37 15 Leather and fur manufacturer
39 -43 16 Nutrition-related professions
44 -47 17 Construction-related professions
48 -49 18 Interior designer/furniture supplier/upholsterer
50 19 Carpenter/modeller
51 20 Painter/varnisher/related professions
52 21 Goods tester/consignment professions
53 22 Unskilled worker
54 23 Machinist/related professions
60 -61 24 Engineer/chemist/physicist/mathematician
62 25 Technician
63 26 Technical specialist
68 27 Merchandise manager
69 -70 28 Service merchants
71 -73 29 Transportation-related professions
74 30 Storekeeper/worker in storage and transport
75 -78 31 Organization-/management-/office-related professions
79 -81 32 Security service-related professions
82 33 Publicist/translator/librarian
83 34 Artists and related professions
84 -85 35 Health care-related professions
86 -89 36 Social worker/pedagogue/science careers
90 37 Beauty culture
91 38 Guest assistant/steward/barkeeper
92 39 Domestic economy/housekeeping
93 40 Cleaning industry-related professions
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Table 2.7:  Assignment of the occupational groups to the occupational segments  
(Matthes et al., 2008)
Occupational segment Occupational group (KldB 88)
Code Name Code Name
101 Agricultural occupations 1 farmer, fisher
3 agricultural administrator
4 helper in the agricultural sector, agricultural workers, 
stockbreeding professions
5 gardener, florist
6 forester and huntsman
42 brewer, manufacturer for tobacco products
201 Miner/chemical 
occupations
7 miner and related professions
8 exhauster of mineral resources
9 mineral rehasher, mineral burner
14 chemical worker
15 polymer processor
46 road/track constructors, demolisher, culture structurer
54 machinist and related professions
60 engineer, architect
62 technician
63 technical specialist
202 Glass, ceramic, paper 
producer
11 producer of building materials
12 ceramicist, glazier
13 glazier, glass processor, glass refiner
16 paper producer
17 printer
51 painter, varnisher and related professions
63 technical specialist
83 artist and related professions
203 Textile, leather producer 33 spinner, ropemaker
34 weaver, other textile producer
35 tailor, sewer
36 textile dyer
37 leather and fur manufacturers, shoemaker
54 machinist and related professions
62 technician
93 cleaning industry related professions
204 Metal producer 19 metal worker
20 moulder, caster, semi-metal cleaner
21 metal press workers, metal formers
22 turner, cutter, driller, metal polisher
23 metal burnisher, galvanizer, enameler
24 welder, solderer, riveter, metal gluter
25 steel smith, copper smith
26 plumber, plant locksmith
27 locksmith, fitter
53
Appendix to chapter 2
Chapter 2
Occupational segment Occupational group (KldB 88)
Code Name Code Name
28 mechanic
29 toolmaker
30 metal precision-workers, orthodontists, opticians
32 assemblers and metal related professions
50 joiner, modeler, cartwright
60 engineer, architect
62 technician
68 merchandise manager
205 Electricians 31 electricians
32 assemblers and metal related professions
60 engineer, architect
62 technician
77 accounting clerk, cashier, data processing expert
206 Wood occupations 18 woodworker, wood processor
30 metal precision-workers, orthodontists, opticians
48 plasterer, tiler, glazier, screed layer
50 joiner, modeler, cartwright
51 painter, varnisher and related professions
207 Construction 
occupations
11 producer of building materials
44 bricklayer, concrete builder
45 carpenter, roofer, spiderman
46 road/track constructors, demolisher, culture structurer
47 helper in the construction sector
48 plasterer, tiler, glazier, screed layer
49 interior designer, furniture supplier
51 painter, varnisher and related professions
54 machinist and related professions
60 engineer, architect
62 technician
63 technical specialist
71 conductor, driver, motorist
83 artist and related professions
301 Hotel/restaurant 
occupations
39 baker, confectioner
40 butcher, fishworkmansip and related
41 cooks, convenience food preparatory
43 milk/fat processor, nutriments producer
70 merchant/specialist in conveyance, tourism, other services
80 other security related professions, health caring 
professions
91 guest assistant, steward, barkeeper
92 domestic economy, housekeeping
93 cleaning industry related professions
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Occupational segment Occupational group (KldB 88)
Code Name Code Name
302 Storage/transport 
occupations
52 goods tester, consignment professions
70 merchant/specialist in conveyance, tourism, other services
71 conductor, driver, motorist
72 navigator, ship engineer, water/air traffic professions
73 mail distributer
74 storekeeper, worker in storage and transport
303 Merchandise 
occupations
68 merchandise manager
69 banking professional, insurance merchant
70 merchant/specialist in conveyance, tourism, other services
77 accounting clerk, cashier, data processing expert
85 nurse, helper in nursing, receptionist and related
90 beauty culture
304 White collar worker 70 merchant/specialist in conveyance, tourism, other services
73 mail distributer
75 manager, consultant, accountant
76 member of parliament, association manager
77 accounting clerk, cashier, data processing expert
78 clerk, typist, secretary
81 law related professions
86 social worker, care taker
88 scientist
305 Security occupations 60 engineer, architect
62 technician
79 plant security, guard, gate keeper, servant
80 other security related professions, health caring 
professions
306 Social/care occupations 86 social worker, care taker
89 helper for cure of souls and cult
307 Medical occupations 85 nurse, helper in nursing, receptionist and related
308 Physicians 84 physician, dentist, apothecaries
309 Teaching professions 87 professor, teacher
310 Artists/Athlets 10 stone processor
83 artist and related professions
87 professor, teacher
311 Natural scientists 60 engineer, architect
61 chemist, physicist
84 physician, dentist, apothecaries
88 scientist
312 Humanists 82 publicist, translator, librarian
88 scientist
999 Unskilled worker 53 unskilled worker
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2.A.4  Construction of the occupational segments (in addition to the following 
subsection, please consult Matthes et al., 2008, pp. 13 ff.)
With the Central Occupational File (Zentrale Berufedatei) – a rich data set 
with detailed information about occupations and tasks – Matthes et al. (2008) 
construct occupational segments based on the following criteria: (a) occupational 
segments must contain job titles that are employment and recruiting substitutes; 
(b) job titles in different occupational segments must not be employment and 
recruiting substitutes; and (c) occupational segments must be clearly linked to 
the 3-digit occupational orders of the German Occupational Classification System 
1988 (KldB  88). In the following, I provide more details about the data base and 
the steps involved in the construction of the occupational segments (Source: 
Matthes et al., 2008, pp. 13 ff.).
The Central Occupational File (Zentrale Berufedatei) is an administrative expert’s 
data base of the German Federal Employment Agency that contains all professional 
education titles, job titles, and task titles in Germany that are certified, substantially 
defined, or comparable. Therefore, it contains all occupations that are based on 
regulated professional education or advanced training. If a title cannot be linked 
to regulated training, the experts assess the relevance of the title to the labour 
market. Titles are considered to be relevant to the labour market if they are explicitly 
mentioned in collective agreements, if there is a certain number of employees with 
such title, or if they are subject to specific educational requirements. Thus, one 
can conclude that the data base contains virtually all job titles used in Germany. 
Titles are linked to substantial quantities of information, regarding work tasks, work 
equipment, conditions of work, required qualifications, and regulations. Each title is 
assigned to “systematic numbers” (Systematiknummern) with 7 digits. The first four 
digits are equivalent to the German occupational classification scheme 88 (KldB 88), 
and the 5th digit signifies whether the title refers to professional education or to 
a job. The last two digits are randomly assigned, so that each title has its own 
“systematic number”. The data base contains information about direct employment 
or placement alternatives for each systematic number. This information is based 
on an analysis of the skills typically required for a give job title, typical areas of 
deployment (e.g., customer care), tasks, and particular techniques or required 
licenses (e.g., languages, IT qualifications, software training). This information is 
used to compute a preliminary similarity matrix. The matrix is considered to be 
preliminary because the dimensions are not weighted yet. Thus, similarities might 
arise when two completely different jobs require identical qualifications. Such 
similarities might be useful to study aggregate qualification issues but not to study 
issues related to occupational mobility or job matching, which is the subject matter 
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of this paper. Thus, at the base of the preliminary similarity matrix, data base experts 
assign jobs of interest a value based on an ordinal scale, using the following criteria:
 • Employment and recruiting substitutes for jobs that do not involve initial 
training (value: 0.95): The competence profiles (skills and experiences) of such 
job titles are virtually identical (e.g., original job – qualified dental employee; 
new job – dental assistant).
 • Employment and recruiting substitutes for jobs that involve brief initial 
training (value: 0.90): The competence profiles (skills and experiences) of such 
job titles are nearly identical; brief industry specific, task specific, or product 
specific initial training is required (e.g., original job – property assistant; new 
job – management assistant in real estate).
 • Employment and recruiting substitutes for job groups that involve brief initial 
training (value: 0.85): Employees in such jobs have competencies in a basic 
qualification or task (e.g., original job – management assistant in retail shoe 
business; new job – management assistant in retail cosmetics business).
 • Employment and recruiting substitutes for parts of job tasks and forms of 
specialisation of original job with or without initial training (value: 0.75): 
Such jobs are forms of specialisation or are linked to specific tasks related to 
the original job. Brief initial training might be necessary (e.g., original job – 
gardener/cultivator of ornamental plants; new job – cemetery gardener – or 
– original job – baker; new job – bread-baker).
 • Employment and recruiting substitutes for “adjacent” occupations (value:  0.70): 
Employees have valuable skills and experiences from the original job, and are 
thus able to perform partial tasks after initial training in certain new jobs (e.g., 
original job – mason; new job – steel fixer or prefabricated house constructor).
 • Employment and recruiting substitutes in lower qualification level (value: 
0.65): These are jobs related to original jobs but with a lower qualification 
level (e.g., origin job – master precision machinist; new job – lathe operator).
 • Job titles that do not meet the above criteria are generally assigned to the 
similarity level of 0.00.
On the basis of these definitions, an additional similarity matrix is computed. 
An extract of the similarity matrix can be found in table 2.8 for 7-digit job titles 
within the occupational group of turners (221). The rows specify each job-title and 
indicate original jobs. The columns specify the same job titles in the same order 
and indicate the new jobs. The numbers in each cell correspond to the assigned 
values of the similarity levels.
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Thus, the job title of cutting-machine operator (systematic number 221–2102) has 
a similarity (ordinal) value level of 0.75 to the CNC turner (221-0100) and 0.85 to 
turner (221-0102). An employer searching for a turret lathe turner, therefore, could 
decide to recruit a CNC turning machine fitter because of the relatively high similarity 
level of 0.90. As a first step, Matthes et al. (2008) used this matrix to calculate the 
degree of homogeneity within occupational orders (the 3-digit level of the German 
occupational classification scheme KldB 88) by computing the averages of the 
similarity levels of each job title on the 7-digit level that belong to those occupational 
orders30. The following examples are illustrative: The degree of homogeneity is 0.370 
for turners (221), 1.000 for printer helper (177), 0.019 for “other” production engineers 
(606), and 0.144 for qualified office employee (781). Compare for the computation 
table 2.9. In the second step, Matthes et al. (2008) summarized the occupational 
orders into occupational segments: they construct another similarity matrix of the 
occupational orders based on degrees of homogeneity. On the main diagonal are 
degrees of homogeneity for each occupational order. In the other cells are degrees 
between pairs of occupational orders, calculated as in the first step. Thus, the degree 
of homogeneity in a given cell refers to both the original occupational order belonging 
to the ith row and the new occupational order belonging to the j th column.
Table 2.9: Calculation of degrees of (within) homogeneity for various occupational orders
Occupational  
order
Similarity level
1.00 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.00 Sum
Turners  
(221)
Frequency
Frequency x Similarity level
23
23.00
25
23.75
76
68.40
8
6.80
74
55.50
14
9.80
13
8.45
296
0.00
529
195.70
Grade of homogeneity: 195.70/529 = 0.370
Printer 
helper 
(177)
Frequency
Frequency x Similarity level
1
1.00
0
0.00
0
0.00
0
0.00
0
0.00
0
0.00
0
0.00
0
0.00
1
1.00
Grade of homogeneity: 1.00/1 = 1.000
Other 
production 
engineers 
(606)
Frequency
Frequency x Similarity level
125
125.00
17
16.15
37
33.30
23
19.55
120
90.00
10
7.00
0
0.00
15293
0.00
15625
291.00
Grade of homogeneity: 291.00/15,625 = 0.019
Qualified 
office 
employee 
(781)
Frequency
Frequency x Similarity level
17
17.00
7
6.65
6
5.40
0
0.00
15
11.25
0
0.00
2
1.30
242
0.00
289
41.60
Grade of homogeneity: 41.60/289 = 0.144
Source: Matthes et al. (2008, p. 17)
30 Thus, Matthes et al. (2008) implicitly assume that the values levels are measured on a cardinal scale. This is not 
problematic because the averages are used only to compare the degrees of homogeneity of occupational orders. 
Thus, the decisions described below are based on whether a degree of homogeneity within an occupational order 
is higher, lower, or equal to others – and not on an assessment of differences of several degrees of homogeneity.
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Figure 2.1 shows an extract of the similarity matrix. Cells coloured in dark grey are 
cells contain degrees of homogeneity above 0.1. Cells coloured in light grey contain 
degrees of homogeneity with values between 0.01 and 0.1, and cells coloured in 
white contain degrees of homogeneity of 0.01 or less. In the third step, occupational 
order pairs with highest degrees of homogeneity (degrees of homogeneity for 
7-digit job titles that are outside the main diagonal of the matrix) and above a 
certain threshold value are summarized as occupational aggregates. The aim of the 
procedure is to obtain occupational segments with similar degrees of homogeneity. 
Therefore, the threshold value is determined as the lowest value of the degree of 
homogeneity of the 3-digit occupational orders, specifically, 0.019. As one example, 
the occupational orders of farmers (011) and farm labourers (041) were aggregated 
because the sum of the degrees of homogeneity outside the diagonal of the matrix 
has the highest value (0.050 from row [041] and column [011] and 0.063 from 
row [011] and column [041]; compare with figure 2.1). After aggregation of these 
occupational orders, the new aggregate has a degree of homogeneity of 0.118 
(for computation, see table 2.10). Thus, the grade of homogeneity even exceeds 
the sum of the individual degrees of homogeneity because there are additional 
similar 7-digit job titles between these two occupational orders. Thus, there is a 
new similarity table with the new occupational aggregates, and the third step is 
repeated until the degrees of homogeneity does not come below the threshold value 
of 0.019. As noted above, the degrees of homogeneity between pairs of aggregates 
Figure 2.1: Extract of the similarity matrix for the occupational orders
011 012 021 022 031 032 041 042 043 044 051 052 053 061 062 071 072 …
011 0.326 0.018 0.011 0.044 0.027 0.063 0.022 0.002 0.042 0.003
012 0.015 0.772 0.025 0.030 0.010
021 0.016 0.071 0.023 0.039 0.015 0.014 0.045 0.020 0.001
022 0.028 0.262
031 0.004 0.195 0.005 0.004
032 0.012 0.021 0.004 0.038 0.068 0.002 0.000 0.005 0.001
041 0.050 0.016 0.009 0.008 0.082 0.021 0.002
042 0.026 0.051 0.038 0.017 0.018 0.663 0.016
043 –
044 0.004 0.031 0.007 0.003 0.010 0.036 0.093
051 0.031 0.005 0.151 0.027 0.005 0.008
052 0.002 0.007 0.006 0.029 0.136
053 0.004 0.340
061 0.001 0.144 0.010
062 0.004 0.012 0.016 0.229
071 0.371 0.135
072 0.128 0.333
… …
Source: Matthes et al. (2008, p. 19)
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should be ideally zero. Matthes et al. (2008) defined the following criteria for a 
sufficient separation of two occupational aggregates: the degree of homogeneity 
of all 7-digit job titles in one occupational aggregate should be higher than the 
degree of homogeneity of the 7-digit job titles and 7-digit job titles of the other 
occupational aggregate.
Table 2.10:  Computation of the grade of homogeneity of the occupational orders farmers (011) 
and farm labourer (041)
Origin 
occupational 
order
New 
occupational 
order
Similarity levels
1.00 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.00 Sum
011 011 17 11 33 3 20 16 13 176 289
011 041 0 0 0 0 22 0 9 326 357
041 041 21 13 3 0 0 0 0 404 441
041 011 0 0 20 0 0 0 0 337 357
Frequencies 38 24 56 3 20 38 22 1,243 1,444
Similarity level x frequency 38.00 22.80 50.40 2.55 31.50 11.20 14.30 0.00 170.75
Grade of homogeneity: 170.75/1,444 = 0.118
Source: Matthes et al. (2008, p. 20)
If two occupational aggregates do not meet this criterion, i.e., thus if they are not 
sufficiently separate from one another, they are summarized as one aggregate. 
For example, the occupational aggregate that could be labelled “metal extractors” 
(an aggregate that contains rollers (192), casters (202), and farriers (251)) and the 
aggregate for “metal workers” (turners (221), machine fitters (273), and precision 
mechanics (284)) do not show a strong separation. Therefore, those aggregates 
are summarized by the occupational segment “Metal producers”.
2.A.5  Real GDP and the proportion of all vacancies that are registered 
vacancies (in addition to the following subsection, please consult Stops 
and Mazzoni, 2010)
Only vacancies V can be observed that are registered by the Federal Employment 
Service. To estimate the matching function, it would be ideal to know of all 
vacancies VALL. RBA denotes the proportion of all vacancies VALL that are composed 
of registered vacancies V :
V = RBA • VALL  (2.31)
Employers register their vacancies if they expect that searches for workers via 
the Federal Employment Service will be successful. During economic booms, the 
number of registered job searchers decreases. This phenomenon is noticed by 
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firms; therefore, it could be assumed that firms have more negative expectations 
about their abilities to find staff through the Federal Employment Service during 
prosperous economic times. In accordance with (vgl. Franz, 2006, S. 107 f.), 
RBA decreases during economic recovery phases; in other words, this variable 
is anticyclical. Therefore, the (logarithm of) RBA correlates negatively with the 
cyclical component of the real gross domestic product (GDPcyc ). This component 
could be interpreted as the deviation of the GDP from its long-term trend. 
Therefore, GDPcyc  is an indicator for the economic situation at a certain time; 
consequently, the rate RBA could be regarded as a function of GDPcyc :
RBA = f  (GDPcyc )  (2.32)
Thus,
V = f  (GDPcyc ) • VALL  (2.33)
and after several simple rearrangements, I obtain
VALL =
V
f (GDPcyc)
  (2.34)
The matching function is specified by the following expression:
M = AVβVALLUβU   (2.35)
Taking the logarithm of both sides yields
logM = logA+βV logVALL+βU logU  (2.36) 
The use of equation (2.34) allows this equation to be rewritten as follows:
M = logA+βV [logV − log f (GDPcyc)]+βU logU  (2.37) 
The assumption log f  (GDPcyc ) ≅ (–βgdpGDPcyc ) permits the following simplification:
logM = logA+βV logV +βGDPGDPcyc+βU logU  (2.38) 
where βGDP = (–βV ) · (–β gdp).
Finally, the assumptions βV > 0 and βgdp > 0 imply that βGDP > 0
IAB-Bibliothek 35962
Job matching across occupational labour markets
2.A.6 Additional empirical results
The pooled OLS model
Table 2.11: The results of the pooled OLS estimations with log M as the dependent variable
(1)
Pooled OLS 1
(2)
Pooled OLS 2
(3)
Pooled OLS 3
(4)
Pooled OLS 4
(5)
Pooled OLS 5
(6)
Pooled OLS 6
βU 0.440*** 0.450*** 0.464*** 0.458*** 0.431*** 0.445***
(0.025) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.025) (0.025)
βV 0.389*** 0.379*** 0.370*** 0.377*** 0.395*** 0.385***
(0.020) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020)
γU 0.187*** 0.151*** 0.158*** 0.197***
(0.038) (0.027) (0.036) (0.038)
γV -0.059 0.043 -0.031 -0.132***
(0.036) (0.026) (0.035) (0.033)
Trend -0.013*** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.013***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
GDPcyc 4.746*** 4.051*** 2.622** 2.932** 4.153***
(1.243) (1.199) (1.191) (1.198) (1.256)
Constant 2.218*** 2.115*** 3.226*** 3.552*** 2.333*** 2.480***
(0.276) (0.275) (0.256) (0.127) (0.273) (0.275)
Observations 2,106 2,106 2,106 2,106 2,106 2,106
ll -1747 -1749 -1768 -1770 -1754 -1770
AIC 3507 3510 3548 3549 3520 3551
BIC 3547 3544 3581 3578 3554 3585
Wald test (Prob > F) 0.132 0.457 0.000 0.000 0.095 0.000
H(0): constant returns to scale
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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The fixed effects model
Table 2.12: The results of the fixed effects estimations with log M as the dependent variable
(1)
FE 1
(2)
FE 2
(3)
FE 3
(4)
FE 4
(5)
FE 5
(6)
FE 6
βU 0.192** 0.189** 0.189** 0.189*** 0.186** 0.218**
(0.080) (0.077) (0.072) (0.071) (0.080) (0.084)
βV 0.210*** 0.236*** 0.211*** 0.236*** 0.212*** 0.209***
(0.049) (0.041) (0.048) (0.041) (0.049) (0.048)
γU -0.014 0.002 -0.041 -0.126
(0.076) (0.077) (0.075) (0.081)
γV 0.077 0.076 0.089 0.001
(0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.055)
Trend -0.010*** -0.008** -0.010*** -0.008** -0.010***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
GDPcyc 1.658*** 2.260*** 1.751** 2.248*** 1.131**
(0.500) (0.707) (0.696) (0.807) (0.505)
Constant 6.725*** 6.985*** 6.609*** 7.002*** 6.936*** 8.084***
(0.967) (0.845) (0.955) (0.760) (0.986) (0.875)
Observations 2,106 2,106 2,106 2,106 2,106 2,106
Number of groups 81 81 81 81 81 81
ll -303.3 -311.1 -303.4 -311.1 -306.5 -335.0
AIC 618.6 632.2 616.8 630.2 622.9 679.9
BIC 652.5 660.5 645.0 652.8 651.2 708.2
Wald test (Prob > F) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
H(0): constant returns to scale
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Constant = average of fixed effects
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2.A.7 Hadri’s LM test
Table 2.13:  Results of the LM test by Hadri (2000) for the levels and the first-order differences 
of the logarithm of time series
Variable Characteristics  
of Residuals
Model I
(without trend)
Model II
(with trend) 
t-stat P-value t-stat P-value
log M Homoscedasticity 93.390 0.000 30.515 0.000
Heteroscedasticity 66.107 0.000 34.453 0.000
log U Homoscedasticity 46.723 0.000 44.480 0.000
Heteroscedasticity 45.825 0.000 38.670 0.000
log V Homoscedasticity 63.112 0.000 47.491 0.000
Heteroscedasticity 52.905 0.000 42.465 0.000
Δ log M Homoscedasticity -4.507 1.000 -6.010 1.000
Heteroscedasticity -1.303 0.904 -3.182 0.999
Δ log U Homoscedasticity -0.919 0.821 -4.150 1.000
Heteroscedasticity 7.357 0.000 3.490 0.000
Δ log V Homoscedasticity -2.200 0.986 -1.759 0.9607
Heteroscedasticity 0.483 0.315 1.699 0.045
H(0): Stationarity
2.A.8 Maximum likelihood estimation
The likelihood equation that is used to estimate the model in equation (2.40) has 
the following form:31
lT(ϑ′,φ′,σ′)=−T2
N∑
i=1
log(2πσ2i )−
1
2
∑
i=1
N
1
σ2i
[Δ logMh,i−φiξi(ϑ)]′Hi[Δ logMh,i−φiξi(ϑ)] (2.39)
where
ξi(ϑ) = log Mh,i,– 1 – (log Ui , log Vi )(βU , βV) ' – (log(wiU),  log(wiV))(γU IN ,  γV IN ) '
  with ϑ as the vector of the coefficients
Hi = IT – Li(L 'i Li )Li for an identity matrix IT , whereas
Li = (log Mh,i,– 1, …, log Mh,i,– p + 1, ΔlogUi , ΔlogVi , ι) 
ϕ = (ϕ1, ϕ2, …, ϕN )' 
σ = (σ 21, σ 
2
2, …, σ
2
N )' 
The residuals ξi(ϑ) = log Mh,i,– 1 – (log Ui , log Vi )(βU , βV) ' – (log(wiU),  log(wiV))(γU IN ,  γV 
IN ) ' are included in the logarithm of the density function of the normal distribution.
31 The equation is expressed in terms of vectors and matrices (bold letters). Data for different observation times are 
staggered in the columns of the matrices or in the vectors; therefore, the index t becomes expendable.
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2.A.9 Falsification test on the weight matrix
The empirical models utilized capture recessionary shocks through a measure of 
the cyclical component of real gross domestic product. In addition, the PMG model 
comprises short term deviations from the long run-trend of the macroeconomic 
matching function through 1st difference time series of new hires, unemployed 
and vacancies. Thus, the estimated coefficients are solid measures of the matching 
elasticities of interest.
My strategy for a falsification test on the empirically based weight matrix is to 
construct randomly selected weight matrices in which occupational groups that 
are considered to be non-similar are treated as similar. I restricted the number 
of similar occupational groups to 11, because this is the average of the number 
of occupational groups that are similar, according to the occupational segments. 
This ensures that the sparsity of the randomly selected weight matrices equals the 
empirically based weight matrix. As consequence, I could theoretically construct
(81 – 11)!
70 – 11!
 
≈
 86.374 trillion different randomly selected weight matrices. I decided to 
re-estimate the PMG model specification based on 500 different randomly selected 
weight matrices. Under the assumption that occupational groups are either similar 
or not similar, the results should reveal no, or at least fewer significant matching 
elasticities of unemployed and vacancies in non-similar occupational groups.
However, it is not possible to specify exactly the same model because it may 
be reasonable that including randomly selected non-similar occupational groups 
in the weight matrix induces “matching elasticities” that are similar to those of 
the empirical based similar occupational groups. There are two reasons for this:
 • First, although I obtain accurate information about similar occupational 
groups on the basis of the analysis of Matthes et al. (2008), it is not possible to 
construct a weight matrix that contains only “total” non-similar occupational 
groups because some of the non-similar occupational groups are somewhat 
more similar to the observed occupational group than other non-similar 
occupational groups32. Therefore, a somewhat significant impact might remain.
 • Second, the observed occupational time series of unemployed and vacancies 
might be influenced not only by occupation specific determinants but by 
common shocks caused due to, e.g., institutional changes and other factors. 
Thus, estimations based on other (randomly) selected matrices than the 
empirical based weight matrix may reveal shocks that are not occupation 
specific.
32 Referring to section 2.2, this would correspond to a distance d < Dij << ∞.
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Whereas the model containing similar occupational groups allows me to 
estimate matching elasticities based on theoretical considerations and empirical 
evidence, the “matching elasticities” revealed by models containing non-similar 
occupational groups are spurious correlations. However, it can be shown that the 
empirically based computed averages of vacancies and unemployed in similar 
occupational groups have greater effects on new hires than randomly computed 
averages, if aggregate short term shocks on the occupational time series of 
unemployed and vacancies can be ruled out, which would isolate the effect of 
the “pure” occupational component of the times series. Although we have no 
explicit information about such common shocks, they should clearly influence 
the aggregate time series. Thus, the information from the aggregate time series 
can be used to generate a common shock component. This creates an opportunity 
to measure “matching elasticities” that are adjusted by common shocks other 
than recessionary shocks and, thus reveal the influence of the “pure” occupational 
component of the time series. I therefore complement the long-term part of 
the PMG model with the cyclical components  and  of the aggregated 
unemployed and vacancy times series, which is computed using the Hodrick-
Prescott filter. Thus, the PMG model in equation (2.40) is modified to 
Δ logMi,t =φi[logMi,t−1− (βU logUi,t+βV logVi,t+ ...
...+γ∗U logUis,t+γ∗V logVis,t+ ...
...+ψUUaggrcyc,t +ψVVaggrcyc,t )]+ ...
...+δUi Δ logUi,t+δVi ΔVi,t+Ai+i,t
 
  (2.40)
The “matching elasticities” computed by this model should not be confused 
with the matching elasticities of interest, as a common component of these 
measures is the shock coefficient. Thus, I refer to these “matching elasticities” as 
occupation related correlations γ  *U  and γ  *V . This strategy should reveal whether 
occupational groups identified as similar exhibit larger occupational correlations 
than occupational groups identified as non-similar. 
As only the occupational correlations of unemployed γ  *U  and vacancies γ  *V   in the 
empirically based selection of similar occupational groups with new hires compared 
to those of randomly selected occupational groups are of interest, I present point 
and interval estimates for those coefficients in figure 2.2. The horizontal lines in 
each figure represent the estimations based on the empirical weight matrix. The 
figures illustrate that the point estimates based on the empirical weight matrix 
are larger than those based on the randomly selected weight matrices. Indeed, the 
vast majority of them is significantly smaller. Furthermore, the vast majority of the 
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occupational related correlations of matches and vacancies are not significantly 
unequal zero. That is not the case for the correlations of matches and unemployed. 
These results let me finally conclude that the empirically based weight matrix 
passes the indirect falsification test.
Figure 2.2: Point and 95%-interval estimates of the occupational correlations γU* and γV*
Notes:  Estimates are based on the empirical weight matrix and 500 randomly selected weight matrices. The 
solid horizontal lines mark the point estimates and the dotted lines indicate the 95%-confidence interval 
estimates of the occupational correlations based on the empirically based weight matrix: 
γU* = 0.967; 95%-confidence interval (lower bound, upper bound): 0.761, 1.174. 
γV* = 0.420; 95%-confidence interval (lower bound, upper bound): 0.314, 0.525. 
The dots and the vertical lines mark the point and 95%-interval estimates of the occupational correlations 
based on randomly selected weight matrices of non-similar occupational groups.
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Chapter 3
Revisiting German labour market reform effects –  
a panel data analysis for occupational labour markets1
1 Parts of this chapter are intended to be published in the "IZA Journal of European Labour Studies".
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There is an ongoing discussion that centres on the German labour market reforms 
(2003–2005) and the role of these reforms in boosting the German economy. 
Considering that one of the main objectives of the reforms was to improve the 
matching process on the labour market, I use rich, high-frequency, and recent 
administrative panel data to present new details regarding the development of 
job-matching performance before, during, and after the reform years. The results 
show that matching productivity increased during all reform stages and slightly 
deteriorated in 2009 (the year of the financial crisis), even after controlling for the 
recession. Furthermore, increases in matching productivity have become smaller 
in recent years. Beyond these findings, the results show detailed differences in the 
changes in matching productivity on occupational labour markets.
3.1 Introduction
The tenth anniversary of the German labour market reforms has been accompanied by 
a lively discussion regarding the contributions of these reforms to the development 
of the German labour market and the German economy as a whole (Dustmann et al., 
2014; Gartner and Fujita, 2014; Krebs and Scheffel, 2013; Rinne and Zimmermann, 
2013, 2012; Hertweck and Sigrist, 2012; Burda and Hunt, 2011; Möller, 2010; 
Fitzenberger, 2009). Whether the results of various studies imply that German 
labour market policy in the last decade can thus be regarded as a role model for 
other countries seems to depend on policy makers’ expectations for these reforms. 
In particular, it is debatable whether the reforms were expected to boost the entire 
German economy and raise its competitiveness. However, it is clear that one of the 
main objectives of the reforms was explicit in its mandate to improve matching 
processes on the German labour market (Hartz et al., 2002) because Germany 
suffered from a high degree of structural unemployment in the early 2000s.
In this paper, I present comprehensive details regarding the development of 
the jobmatching function and its performance before and after the reforms took 
effect. The German labour market reforms were implemented in four stages and 
spanned the period from 2003 to 2005. The laws that were implemented are 
referred to as Hartz I to Hartz IV and were named after the head of the expert 
commission that worked out the substantial propositions for the German labour 
market reforms (Hartz et al., 2002). In January 2003, the first two reform stages 
were implemented (Hartz I and II). The third stage, Hartz III, followed in January 
2004 and the last stage, Hartz IV, was implemented in January 2005. Few studies 
have shed light on the direction and structure of the reform’s effects on job 
matching productivity. Fahr and Sunde (2009) reported better matching for the 
aggregated German labour market after the first three reform stages (Hartz I/II 
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and Hartz III) had been implemented. Klinger and Rothe (2012) used newer and 
richer data, which enabled these authors to analyse the last reform stage (Hartz  IV 
in 2005) and to distinguish between long- and short-term unemployed. Overall, 
these authors also found that the reforms had positive effects on matching 
efficiency, particularly after Hartz I/II (2003) and III (2004) were introduced. 
In addition, they found stronger reform effects for the long-term unemployed. 
However, the last reform stage (Hartz IV) – consisting of a fundamental change in 
the tax-financed and means-tested unemployment benefit scheme – did not lead 
to further positive effects. The same authors explain this finding using statistical 
effects because the number of unemployed increased sharply in 2005 due to 
the changes under Hartz IV. Hillmann (2009), who also used newer data, found 
that Hartz IV had positive effects; her analysis constructed the reform dummy 
differently for Hartz IV.2 Finally, Klinger and Weber (2014) used data from 1979 
to 2009 to analyse the inward shift of the Beveridge curve after the reform years 
and were able to generally confirm the positive effects of the reforms on matching 
efficiency, although these authors also found that the positive trend of matching 
efficiency came to an end in 2009. Clearly, these studies have shed light on the 
temporal and structural properties of the effects of these reforms.
However, until now, it has not been known whether the positive changes in 
matching efficiency can be observed for all jobs or how the matching efficiencies 
changed in the relevant partial labour markets and particularly in occupational 
labour markets. Another relevant question is whether the effects changed 
temporarily or permanently during (extreme) economic situations, such as the 
2008/2009 financial crisis.
This paper complements previous research by estimating the parameters of a 
macroeconomic matching function on the basis of detailed, high-frequency, and 
more recent administrative data for the 2000–2011 period; thus, it includes the 
span of the 2008/2009 financial crisis. As this study’s first step, I deliver a highly 
exact and detailed analysis of the evolution of the matching productivity. In the 
second step, I present an analyses of occupational labour markets because it is 
known that matching efficiency varies in different occupational labour markets, 
as shown in Stops and Mazzoni (2010) and Fahr and Sunde (2006). To distinguish 
occupational labour markets, I use the German occupational classification scheme 
according to Blossfeld (1983). It is possible to identify the temporal evolution 
of matching productivity by estimating yearly time fixed effects that can be 
interpreted as year-specific deviations from average matching productivity during 
2 Klinger and Rothe (2012) generated a dummy variable that was valued at zero before 2005 and unity after 2005. 
Hillmann (2009) assumed an exponentially growing reform effect during the first 12 months after Hartz IV was 
implemented.
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the observation period. To identify the temporal evolution of matching productivity 
in occupational labour markets, I complement the model with interaction dummy 
variables that combine yearly and occupational labour market effects.
My analysis corroborates the previous findings of positive changes in matching 
productivity during and after all the reform stages and clarifies that there are also 
positive changes after Hartz IV. Furthermore, these findings can be corroborated in 
all the occupational labour markets. However, there are some differences in later 
years. A (temporary and small) decrease in matching productivity is observable 
during the recession in 2009 (“crisis dip”) in some occupational labour markets, 
even after controlling for the recession; in addition, there are differences in more 
recent changes of matching productivity.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In section 3.2, I describe 
some relevant facts regarding the German labour market reforms and their 
(theoretical) implications for matching productivity. Then, I present the theoretical 
foundations of the macroeconomic matching function, the interpretation of 
its parameters, and, finally, information about the occupational labour market 
structure the analysis will be related to. Section 3.3 presents details about the data 
used for the analysis and certain descriptive key statistics. Section 3.4 explains 
the empirical strategy and reports and discusses estimation results. Robustness 
checks that generally confirm these results and that are based on both another 
theoretical perspective of job matching and higher aggregated data are reported 
in section 3.5. Section 3.6 contains the main conclusions.
3.2 Labour market reforms and job matching
3.2.1 Hartz reforms, organisational changes, and organisational outcomes
Empirical findings for the early 2000s in Germany reveal high and persistent 
unemployment that was independent of the business cycle (Klinger and Rothe, 
2012). Furthermore, there were discussions regarding opportunities to measure 
the efforts of public job placement services and to make the job placement 
organisation more efficient. Therefore, the government stipulated four laws that 
were implemented in three waves. In particular, the government considered the 
working results of an expert commission, the so-called Hartz commission. Each 
of the Hartz I to IV reform laws consisted of various components that refer to 
the organisation and rules of the labour market. The reform laws consist of three 
elements that should influence the job-finding rate of unemployed workers (see, 
for instance, Ochel, 2005; Bieber et al., 2005; Jacobi and Kluve, 2007; Klinger and 
Rothe, 2012).
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 • Raising the effectiveness and efficiency of the Federal Employment Agency: 
Re-Organising the Federal Employment Agency, promoting competition 
between public and private placement services into the private sector, or 
identifying measures of active labour market policy that promised to be more 
effective. The Federal Employment Agency consists of three levels – the head 
office, regional directorates (Regionaldirektionen), and employment agencies 
(Agenturen für Arbeit) and job centres. Before the reform, the head office was 
primarily responsible for the operational business of the regional units. The 
reform clarified that the head office is in charge of targeting and strategy 
development and that the regional directorates are responsible for steering 
the employment agencies. The latter are in charge of operational business. 
The employment agencies are supposed to operate as branch offices and 
are responsible for their own work results. Labour market instruments, such 
as training and/or financial support for applications, are provided that are 
consistent with clear customer group definitions that distinguish customers 
who are near the labour market from customers with a need for counselling and 
from customers with one or more issues regarding labour market integration. In 
particular, the type of counselling and the usage of labour market instruments 
varies with different customer groups. Generally, the Federal Employment 
Service should invest in an unemployed person only when the investment is 
effective (and efficient), which implies that the customer group that is near 
the market and the group with one or more issues regarding labour market 
integration are hardly provided with instruments.
 • More activation and higher self-responsibility of the unemployed (principle of 
“Promoting and demanding”3): new start-up subsidies, targets on reintegration 
efforts, reconfiguring the unemployment benefit and social assistance system 
towards lower or shorter benefit entitlement and higher claims of search 
effort.
 • Easing of labour market policy: relaxing regulations for temporary agency 
work, fixed term contracts, and employment protection.
3.2.2 Random matching
It generally remains an empirical question whether and to what extent all the 
reform efforts affect labour market outcomes, such as the efficiency of matching. 
It is not possible to identify the total extent and variation in the described 
efforts within the different reform stages. Nevertheless, it is possible to evaluate 
3 German expression “Fördern und Fordern”.
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changes in matching productivity before, during and after the reform years with a 
macroeconomic matching function framework.
The macroeconomic matching function and the matching process behind 
it were conceived by Pissarides (1979, 1985); Diamond (1982a, b); Mortensen 
(1982). The matching process begins with the decisions of firms to create a new 
job or to fill a vacancy (job creation decisions), and decisions of (unemployed) 
persons regarding how intensely to search for a new job (job search decisions) 
(Pissarides, 2000, p. xi). Firms spend time, financial, and personnel resources for 
job advertisements, screening, training, and vocational adjustments. Job seekers 
spend resources for job search and application procedures. Unemployed persons 
and firms are randomly matched and begin to bargain regarding wages.
The basic model assumes homogeneous unemployed persons and homogeneous 
jobs. The activities of both market sides are matching technologies. The processes 
behind these activities are not explicitly modelled, so the matching process can 
be compared with a black box (Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001). The variables U, 
V and M represent the stock of unemployed, the stock of vacancies and the flows 
of new hires, respectively. The resulting matching function f (U, V ) is specified in 
a Cobb-Douglas form:
Mt = AtUβUst VβVst   (3.1)
where A describes the “augmented” matching productivity. Constant returns to 
scale imply βUs + βVs = 1 with βUs, βVs > 0. Another important assumption lies 
behind the approach – workers and firms are randomly matched and originate 
from the pool of existing unemployed workers and job vacancies.
My analysis refers to changes in the parameter A of the matching function that 
result of changes in the institutional framework of the labour market resulting 
from the reforms. The central question is whether this parameter changed after 
implementing the reforms. Therefore, I assume that this parameter varies over 
time; thus, At is different for different observation periods, whereas the elasticities 
remain constant during the entire observation period.
This model differs from Klinger and Rothe (2012) and Fahr and Sunde (2009), who 
both assumed that there is a constant augmented productivity for the observation 
period before the reforms were implemented and a (possibly) different augmented 
productivity after the reform was introduced4. In the model described above, this 
term differs from observation period to observation period. Therefore, it is possible 
to compare the temporal evolution of augmented productivity, which is similar to 
4 Thus, they estimated an averaged augmented productivity term before and after the reforms’ implementation.
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Klinger and Weber (2014), who estimates an “extended matching function” that 
contains a time-varying matching efficiency parameter that is decomposed in a 
cyclical and a trend component. However, their identification strategy differs from 
the strategy utilised herein because it is based on a multivariate time series and 
correlated unobserved components model, whereas the identification made in this 
paper is based on variations in repeated observations in regional and occupational 
labour markets.
To analyse the reforms’ effects on occupational labour markets, I use the 
occupational classification scheme derived by Blossfeld (1983), who divides the 
labour market into 12 broader occupational categories and a category “[0] Not 
assignable” (table 3.1). These categories can be roughly assigned to qualification 
levels and sectors. Thus, this classification can be understood as an approximation 
of occupational labour markets that are assumed to be separate from one another 
and as a good (exogenous) base for the analysis of changes in the matching 
efficiency of occupational labour markets.
Table 3.1: Occupational categories 
[1] AGR agrarian occupations
[2] EMB simple manual occupations
[3] QMB qualified manual occupations
[4] TEC technicians
[5] ING engineers
[6] EDI simple service occupations
[7] QDI qualified service occupations
[8] SEMI semi-professions
[9] PROF professions
[10] EVB simple business and administrative occupations
[11] QVB qualified business and administrative occupations
[12] MAN manager
[0] Not assignable
Source: Occupational categories are taken from Blossfeld (1983).
Again, I assume constant matching elasticities of unemployed and vacancies 
(stocks and flows) in the economy, but the augmented productivity term Atb now 
varies with the occupational categories b and observation periods t:
Mtb = AtbUβUstb V
βVs
tb   (3.2)
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3.3 Data
I use a unique administrative panel data set of 329 occupational orders in 
402  NUTS3 regions with 138 observation periods from January 2000 to June 
2011. The occupational orders are coded according to the German occupational 
classification scheme (three digits, KldB 885). All the data stem from the Federal 
Employment Agency. The groups are assigned to the 13 occupational labour markets 
described in the previous section.6
I use monthly data regarding flows from unemployment to employment and 
stocks of unemployed and registered vacancies. Table 3.2 shows some descriptive 
statistics.
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics
Measure
Monthly averages 2000–2011 (in1,000)
Mean Minimum Maximum Standard deviation
Employment inflows M 259 144 412 51
Unemployment stock U 3,750 2,761 4,950 570
Registered vacancies stock V 332 173 460 79
Source:  Own calculation based on the administrative data from the statistics department of the Federal Employment 
Agency 2000–2011.
To get unbiased matching parameter estimations, I adjust the data set by 
observations for occupations and NUTS3 regions, respectively, in which vacancies, 
unemployed or flows into employment are zero, which leads to an unbalanced 
panel data structure with 2,394,250 observations.
Figure 3.1 shows the time series of unemployment stocks, unemployment 
inflows, vacancy stocks, vacancy inflows and flows from unemployment into 
employment and their trends. The trends are computed using the Hodrick Prescott 
filter (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997). It is clear that there is a change in the trends 
from 2003 to 2005, i.e., the reform years. Whereas the trends of the unemployment 
outflows and inflows and stock of registered vacancies decreased before and 
increased after the reform years, the stock and inflows of the unemployed 
increased before and decreased after the reform years. However, the strongest 
changes are shown in the unemployment and the vacancy stocks, whereas the 
outflows reveal only slight changes in the trend.
5 Klassifizierung der Berufe 1988.
6 Further information can also be found in appendix 3.A.1.
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Figure 3.1: Time series of the key figures for the 2000–2011 analysis
Source:  Statistics of the Federal Employment Agency, own computations. Trends are computed with the Hodrick 
Prescott filter (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997, smoothing parameter α = 129,600).
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3.4 Empirical strategy and results
3.4.1 Aggregated estimations
At first, I estimate regression equations that are based on the logarithm version of 
equation (3.1) and complemented by further variables that are included stepwise:
logMi jt = a+βUs logUi jt+βVs logVi jt+μi j+γGDPcyc,FS(i),year(t)+dt+i jt  (3.3)
Here, the term log Mijt denotes the logarithm of the flows from unemployment 
to employment for region i, occupational order j and observation period t. The 
parameter a is a constant and thus a component of the logarithm of the average 
augmented matching productivity. The variables log U and log V are the logarithms 
of the unemployed and vacancy stocks, whereas βUs and βVs denote the matching 
elasticities of the unemployed and vacancies, respectively. Furthermore, the 
regression equation contains a fixed effect, μij , for each regional occupational 
labour market, ij , that can be interpreted as the occupational and local area 
specific augmented productivity. Finally, this basic specification includes also an 
i.i.d. error term, εijt , for each observation.
In the next step, I include the cyclical component of real gross domestic 
product, GDPcyc, FS(i), year(t), for the federal state, FS, that region i belongs to and 
the year that the observation period, t, belongs to. The coefficient for this variable 
is  γ. Then, I include monthly time fixed effects, dt , that are – for the moment – the 
coefficients of interest. These variables are effect coded, and their coefficients 
can thus be directly interpreted as the monthly deviations from the average 
augmented matching productivity for the 2000 to 2011 observation period.7 The 
reference period is January 2000.
Finally, I modify the regression above by including dummy variables dq(t) 
for the 1st, 2nd, or 3rd quarter of the year. Furthermore, I substitute the monthly 
observation period time fixed effects with year fixed effects dyear(t). This variable 
is also effect coded8, and the reference year is 2000. Thus, the latter variable 
can be interpreted as the yearly seasonal adjusted deviation from the average of 
augmented matching productivity during the 2001 to 2011 observation period. 
The regression equation is then as follows:
logMi jt = a+βUs logUi jt+βVs logVi jt+γGDPcyc,FS(i),year(t)  
(3.4) +dq(t)+dyear(t)+μi j+i jt
7 Compare details about effect coding in appendix 3.A.2. 
8 See appendix 3.A.2.
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The results of the estimations can be found in table 3.3. Column FE 1 of table 3.3 
refers to the basic specification. As expected from the theoretical model, the 
matching elasticities of the unemployed and vacancy stocks are both significantly 
positive. Furthermore, the matching elasticity of the unemployed is higher than 
the matching elasticity of the vacancies. This result corroborates previous studies 
for Germany (Burda and Wyplosz, 1994; Entorf, 1998; Fahr and Sunde, 2004; 
Stops and Mazzoni, 2010; Klinger and Rothe, 2012).
The results in the second column, FE 2, belong to the same specification 
augmented with the cyclical component of the yearly gross domestic product for 
the 16 federal states (GDPcyc, FS(i), year(t)). These results do not differ much from 
the results in the first column, FE 1.
The third column, FE 3, contains the results for the regression equation (3.3), 
including monthly time fixed effects. Compared with previous specifications, the 
matching elasticities of the unemployed are somewhat higher and the matching 
elasticities of the vacancies are lower. The monthly fixed effects are not presented 
in table 3.3; however, their graphical representation can be found in the left panel 
of figure 3.2. The right panel of this figure shows the evolution of the year fixed 
effects of column 4 in table 3.3.
As explained above, these variables can be interpreted as time specific 
deviations from the average augmented matching productivity, where the average is 
normalised to zero. Accordingly, from the beginning of the observation period until 
2006, the monthly deviations might be negative or positive with a seasonal pattern. 
In addition, beginning with the reform years, 2003–2005, and continuing forward, 
the monthly deviations began to increase from year to year; from 2007 onwards, the 
deviations are all significantly positive. These results provide the first impression of 
how augmented matching productivity developed after the labour market reforms 
were implemented in 2003 to 2005. All in all, the volatile seasonal pattern gives only 
a rough first impression regarding the evolution of matching productivity.
In equation (3.4), the year dummies can be interpreted as yearly deviations 
from the averaged augmented matching productivity and should thus give a 
clearer picture.
Furthermore, seasonality patterns are adjusted by quarter dummies. The results 
of the estimations, including the yearly deviations, are reported in column  4 of 
table  3.3. The graphical representation of the year effects for the random matching 
model can be found in the right panel of figure 3.2. The yearly deviations are 
negative at the beginning of the observation period and begin to increase from 
2002 with a sharper increase from 2005 onwards; they become significantly 
positive from 2007 onwards. This increase is interrupted in 2009 the year of the 
financial crisis (although I control for the business cycle), and after a small increase 
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Table 3.3:  Fixed effects estimation results based on the data set disaggregated by occupations 
and NUTS3 regions
Dependent variable: log M
FE 1 FE 2 FE 3 FE 4
βUs 0.514*** 
(0.003)
0.519***
 (0.003)
0.625***
 (0.003)
0.626*** 
(0.003)
βVs 0.060*** 
(0.001)
0.056***
 (0.001)
0.039***
 (0.001)
0.044***
 (0.001)
Year dummies, effect coded (reference: 2000):
d2001
-0.114***
(0.001)
d2002
-0.147***
 (0.001)
d2003
-0.122***
 (0.001)
d2004
-0.111***
 (0.001)
d2005
-0.082***
 (0.002)
d2006
-0.030***
 (0.001)
d2007
0.067***
 (0.002)
d2008
0.143***
 (0.002)
d2009
0.143***
 (0.002)
d2010
0.176***
 (0.001)
d2011
0.150***
 (0.002)
γ 0.985*** 1.336*** 1.352***
(0.021) (0.047) (0.047)
a -0.428*** -0.443*** -0.990*** -0.919***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012)
Monthly time dummies no no yes no
Quarter dummies no no no yes
Observations 2,394,250 2,394,250 2,394,250 2,394,250
R-squared 0.206 0.207 0.304 0.275
Number of groups 55,422 55,422 55,422 55,422
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Column FE 3 includes monthly time fixed effects with effect coding (reference period is January 2000);  
compare with figure 3.2, left panel.
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in 2010, the deviation slightly decreases in 2011.9 In general, this result leads me 
to conclude that there are positive changes in matching productivity during and 
after implementation of the reform; in recent years, there are only small changes.
3.4.2 Occupational labour markets
Figure 3.3 describes the development of the trends of our key figures – flows from 
unemployment to employment, unemployment stocks, and the registered vacancy 
stocks – as normalised measures with index 1 first in January 2000 (left panels) 
and second for January 2005 (right panels).
Generally, these figures show that there is a certain heterogeneity in the 
development of the key figures in different occupational labour markets, which 
leads me to conclude that I can expect different results regarding the analysis 
of the changes of the matching elasticity in these markets. Thus, I separately 
estimate the deviations of the averaged augmented productivity for the 
occupational labour markets, b(j), that the occupational order j is assigned to. 
The regression is equivalent to the logarithm version of equation (3.2). Again, this 
specification is stepwise complemented by additional variables:
9 The changes are small, but I can observe a significant “crisis dip” in 2009 and larger elasticity and productivity 
coefficients based on regression equations without the recession variable as a control variable; compare with 
columns 1 to 3 of table 3.9 and the left panels of figures 3.9 and 3.10 in appendix 3.A.3.
Figure 3.2:  Random matching: Monthly and yearly time fixed effects and 95 per cent 
confidence band
Notes:  Specifications from table 3.3, left side, are FE 3; those from the right side are FE 4 – based on a data set 
disaggregated by occupations and NUTS3 regions. The dots and the vertical lines mark the point and 95% 
interval estimates, and the interval is very small in most cases. In the left panel, the dots are linked with 
a line to illustrate temporal development. Time fixed effects with effect coding (the reference period is 
January 2000 for month fixed effects or 2000 for year fixed effects, respectively).
Source: Statistics of the Federal Employment Agency, own computations.
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logMi jt = a+βUs logUi jt+βVs logVi jt+GDPcyc,FS(i),year(t)
 
(3.5)
 +di+dq(t)+dyear(t)+db( j)+db( j),year(t)+i jt
Here, it is not possible to separate the occupational and regional fixed effects 
and the occupational labour market effects, b(j), related to occupation j. 
Therefore, I exclude the fixed effects μij and I estimate an ordinary least squares 
(OLS) model. The model is augmented by local area effects di , quarter dummy 
variables (dq(t)), and year dummies (yearly observation period fixed effects, 
dyear(t)) with reference to year 2000 and thus the yearly specific deviations 
from the average augmented productivity. Furthermore, it contains dummy 
variables for 11 occupational categories with reference to the “agrarian and not 
assignable occupations” (db(j)) categories. The coefficients of these variables 
are equivalent to the occupational labour market’s specific deviations from 
average matching productivity. Finally, the model contains interaction dummies 
for the yearly and occupational labour market-specific deviations db(j), year(t). 
Formally, the latter variable is the interaction term of the year dummies and 
the occupational labour market dummy variables. Again, dummy variables are 
effect coded with the exception of the quarter dummy (the 4th quarter is the 
reference period).
The results can be found in table 3.4. Column OLS 1 contains the OLS 
estimation of a pure matching model without the recession variable or further 
dummy variables. As expected, the coefficients for the matching elasticities 
are again significantly positive. After including the recession variable (OLS 2), 
the coefficients hardly change. Column OLS 3 of table 3.4 shows the results 
for the specifications, including dummy variables for year effects, quarters and 
occupational labour markets. In particular, the year fixed effects coefficients 
have a similar pattern as the results of the fixed effects estimations. Thus, the 
main conclusions of the previous section are unaffected. Finally, column OLS 4 
reports the results of the full specification, including year- and occupational-
specific interaction effects. Due to space constraints, I do not report the latter 
coefficients, but I show the point and interval estimations graphically in 
figures  3.4 and 3.5.
Columns OLS 3 and OLS 4 reveal another finding: the occupational labour 
market specific deviations from the augmented productivity for the observation 
period are significantly negative for occupations that are assignable to a 
lower skill level (EMB, EDI, EVB), and for technicians (TEC), engineers (ING), 
and qualified business and administrative occupations (QVB). The deviations 
for the remaining occupational labour markets are significantly positive. In 
the following, I discuss the results for the year- and occupational-specific 
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Figure 3.3:  Key figures by occupational groups, normalised trends, 2000–2004  
(January 2000 = 1, left panel) and 2005–2011 (January 2005 = 1, right panel)
Abbreviations:  [01] AGR agrarian occupations; [02] EMB simple manual occupations; [03] QMB qualified manual 
occupations; [04] TEC technicians; [05] ING engineers; [06] EDI simple service occupations;  
[07] QDI qualified service occupations; [08] SEMI semi professions; [09] PROF professions; 
[10] EVB simple business and administrative occupations; [11] QVB qualified business and 
administrative occupations; [12] MAN manager.
Source:   Statistics of the Federal Employment Agency. Trends are computed with the Hodrick Prescott filter 
(Hodrick and Prescott, 1997, smoothing parameter α = 129,600).
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interaction effects. Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show 95 per cent interval estimate 
sums of the yearly dummy and the yearly interaction effects dummy variables 
in 11 panels for each occupational labour market (dyear(t) + db(j), year(t)), with 
the exception of the reference category “[AGR] agrarian and not assignable 
occupations”). These sums represent the yearly deviations from average 
occupational labour market-specific augmented productivity (db(j)); thus, they 
show how the augmented productivity in a certain occupational labour market 
is changed based on a “pure” time effect.
The common finding is that there is a positive change in the deviation from 
occupational labour market-specific augmented productivity after the reform 
years, which can be understood as an indicator that the reform had effects on the 
entire labour market. However, there are certain differences regarding the timing 
of the change and the further development of matching efficiency. In addition, 
differences arise during the years of the financial crisis in 2008/2009.
Regarding the structure of the time effects after the crisis, there are 
significantly positive effects observable from 2007 onwards, at the latest. 
Information regarding the timing of the effects complements previous studies 
that only compared matching productivity before or during the reform years and 
after the reform years (part., Fahr and Sunde, 2009; Klinger and Rothe, 2012). 
This allows an analysis without an assumption that consequences of each reform 
stage came immediately into effect or – at least – within one year.10 This can not 
be corroborated by the results in this study.11 Overall, the view on the year effects 
in the different occupational labour markets corroborate that the development of 
the matching efficiency is rather different in different labour markets; thus, the 
timing of the effects is also different.
10 In addition, the identification might also be difficult due to possible anticipation effects, which would be the case 
when firms or the unemployed changed their search decisions after the reform plans were published but before 
these plans were realised.
11 If I base this analysis on the assumption that the estimated average matching productivity (the constant in all 
models) for the 2000–2011 observation period is equivalent to long-term augmented productivity and should 
not change after varying the observation periods in the estimation, I might even conclude that the reform effects 
arise with a certain delay. However, this assumption can hardly be tested because it must be expected that a 
sample with fewer observation periods would reveal another value for the long-term augmented productivity 
and that massive short-term shocks on the labour market based on the Hartz reforms or the financial crisis 
would explain that more than “invalid” data. This analysis implies that when there are substantial concerns 
about the value of the estimated augmented productivity, the observed positive or negative deviations from 
that productivity might be different based on the true value. However, the relative size of those time effects and 
a comparison of their year-to-year differences reveal that in seven of 11 occupational categories, the highest 
positive change was from 2006 to 2007 (in addition to the figures 3.4 and 3.5, which is shown in table 3.12 
in appendix 3.A.3). For the simple manual occupations (EMB) and the simple service occupations (EDI), this 
is one year earlier (2005/2006); for the professions, this is from 2003 to 2004; and for the qualified manual 
occupations, this is from 2002 to 2003.
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Table 3.4:  OLS estimation results based on data set disaggregated by occupations  
and NUTS3 regions
Dependent variable: log M
OLS 1 OLS 2 OLS 3 OLS 4
βUs 0.577*** 0.579*** 0.634*** 0.633*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
βVs 0.141*** 0.139*** 0.117*** 0.118***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year dummies, effect coded (reference: 2000):
d2001 -0.129*** -0.142***
(0.001) (0.001)
d2002 -0.155*** -0.164***
(0.001) (0.001)
d2003 -0.111*** -0.124***
(0.001) (0.001)
d2004 -0.079*** -0.079***
(0.001) (0.002)
d2005 -0.059*** -0.051***
(0.001) (0.002)
d2006 -0.023*** -0.027***
(0.001) (0.001)
d2007 0.057*** 0.070***
(0.001) (0.002)
d2008 0.132*** 0.148***
(0.001) (0.002)
d2009 0.150*** 0.168***
(0.002) (0.002)
d2010 0.170*** 0.172***
(0.001) (0.001)
d2011 0.132*** 0.139***
(0.001) (0.002)
Dummies for occupational categories, effect coded (reference: [1] AGR):
[02] EMB -0.038*** -0.040***
(0.001) (0.001)
[03] QMB 0.153*** 0.152***
(0.001) (0.001)
[04] TEC -0.038*** -0.036***
(0.002) (0.002)
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Dependent variable: log M
OLS 1 OLS 2 OLS 3 OLS 4
[05] ING -0.033*** -0.024***
(0.002) (0.002)
[06] EDI -0.178*** -0.178***
(0.001) (0.001)
[07] QDI 0.007*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001)
[08] SEMI 0.037*** 0.034***
(0.001) (0.001)
[09] PROF 0.252*** 0.257***
(0.002) (0.002)
[10] EVB -0.233*** -0.231***
(0.001) (0.001)
[11] QVB -0.012*** -0.012***
(0.001) (0.001)
[12] MAN 0.046*** 0.043***
(0.002) (0.002)
γ 0.667*** 1.378*** 1.345***
(0.018) (0.041) (0.041)
a -0.923*** -0.925*** -1.161*** -1.162***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Local area effects yes yes yes yes
Occupational yearly interaction 
dummies
no no no yes
Quarter dummies no no yes yes
Observations 2,394,250 2,394,250 2,394,250 2,394,250
R-squared 0.684 0.684 0.718 0.720
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Columns OLS 4 includes yearly time and occupational category interaction effects (reference year is 2000, 
reference category is “[01] AGR Agrarian and not assignable occupations”), and all dummy variables are effect 
coded; compare appendix 3.A.2.
Abbreviations:  [01] AGR agrarian and not assignable occupations; [02] EMB simple manual occupations;  
[03] QMB qualified manual occupations; [04] TEC technicians; [05] ING engineers; [06] EDI simple 
service occupations; [07] QDI qualified service occupations; [08] SEMI semi professions; [09] PROF 
professions; [10] EVB simple business and administrative occupations; [11] QVB qualified business 
and administrative occupations; and [12] MAN manager.
Regarding the further evolution of the time fixed effects, the results reveal that the 
effects differ between the occupational labour markets in recent years, e.g., in the 
qualified service occupations (QDI), the semi-professions (SEMI), and the professions 
(PROF), the positive deviations decreased in at least the last years, i.e., 2009 to 2011. 
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Figure 3.4:  Estimated sums of the yearly dummy and the yearly interaction effects and  
95 per cent confidence band by occupational categories (part 1/2)
Notes:  Graphs refer to results in column OLS 4 in table 3.4, based on the data set disaggregated by  
occupations and NUTS3 regions. The dots and the vertical lines mark the point and 95% interval 
estimates.
Source: Statistics of the Federal Employment Agency, own computations.
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For the other occupational labour market the development moves more “sideward”. 
Generally, the results suggest that there were further positive changes with respect 
to the augmented (occupational specific) matching productivities one or two years 
after the last reform stage. In the years following, smaller positive or even negative 
changes were observed.
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Figure 3.5:  Estimated sums of the yearly dummy and the yearly interaction effects and  
95 per cent confidence band by occupational categories (part 2/2)
Notes:  Graphs refer to results in column OLS 4 in table 3.4, based on the data set disaggregated by  
occupations and NUTS3 regions. The dots and the vertical lines mark the point and 95% interval 
estimates.
Source: Statistics of the Federal Employment Agency, own computations.
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Finally, the results in figures 3.4 and 3.5 suggest that there is a “crisis dip” in 
2009 but only in the occupational labour markets of qualified manual occupations 
(QMB) and technicians (TEC), which illustrates that the German labour market 
was not generally invulnerable during the crisis, at least regarding matching 
productivity, even after considering the recession variable.
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3.5 Validity and robustness checks
3.5.1 Another theoretical perspective: selective search
Gregg and Petrongolo (2005) state that the unstable results of papers that study 
the parameters of matching functions result in a certain misspecification of the 
matching function due to the assumption of (completely) random search. These 
authors propose to utilise a stock-flow matching model framework, originally 
derived by Coles (1994) and Coles and Smith (1998). This approach considers 
job searching that is not completely random. However, for this, it must state 
an assumption that might be understood as a further restriction of the random 
matching approach: the assumption is made that the agents on both sides of the 
market are able to sample the entire relevant part of the stocks of the other side 
with no friction due to the availability of quite efficient information channels. 
Following that, the agents who didn’t find adequate offers and, therefore, remain 
in the unemployed or vacancy stocks, respectively, only select further offers on 
the other market side from those that have just arrived. However, Gregg and 
Petrongolo (2005) concluded that the true (single) matching process is equivalent 
to one that is somewhere between the random matching approach and the stock-
flow matching approach. Whereas random matching assumes a search process 
that consumes time to sample and assess all available and relevant (stocks of) 
offers from the other market side, the stock-flow matching approach is assumed 
to minimise the required time to check the stocks of the other market side to 
zero. These concepts offer me a good opportunity to discuss the robustness of the 
focussed efficiency parameter estimates on the basis of two different matching 
functions.
Therefore, the matches are determined, on the one hand, by the stocks of 
the unemployed and the inflows of vacancies and, on the other hand, by the 
stocks of vacancies and the inflows of the unemployed. Technically, the matching 
function in equation (3.1) is complemented by the inflows of the unemployed u 
and vacancies v with their matching elasticities βUf and βVf :
Mt = AtUβUst u
βU f
t V
βVs
t v
βV f
t   (3.6)
The model that considers the variation of the augmented productivity term with 
occupational labour markets b, compared with equation (3.2), is then modified to:
Mtb = AtbUβUstb u
βU f
tb V
βVs
tb v
βV f
tb   (3.7)
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Table 3.5: Further descriptive statistics
Measure Monthly averages 2000–2011 (in 1,000)
Mean Minimum Maximum Standard deviation
Unemployment inflows u 616 400 1,088 101
Registered vacancies inflows v 177 97 337 52
Source:  Own calculation based on the administrative data from the statistics department of the Federal 
Employment Agency 2000–2011.
Table 3.5 shows some descriptive statistics for the aggregated flows from the 
data set. The logarithm versions of the stock-flow models are equivalent to the 
regression equations (3.3) and (3.4) for the random matching model complemented 
by parameters and variables of the logarithm of the flow measures:
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different matching functions.
Therefore, the matches are determined, on the one hand, by the stocks of the unem-
ployed and the inflows of vacancies and, on the other hand, by the stocks of vacancies
and the inflows of the unemployed. Technically, the matching function in equation
(3.1) is complemented by the inflows of the unemployed u and vacancies v with their
matching elasticities βU f and βV f :
Mt = AtUβUst u
βU f
t V
βVs
t v
βV f
t (3.6)
The model that considers the variation of the augmented productivity term with
occupational labour markets b, compared with equation (3.2), is then modified to:
Mtb = AtbUβUstb u
βU f
tb V
βVs
tb v
βV f
tb (3.7)
Table 3.5 shows some descriptive statistics for the aggregated flows from the data
set. The logarithm versions of the stock-flow models are equivalent to the regression
Table 3.5: Further descriptive statistics
Measure Monthly averages 2000-2011 (in 1,000)
Mean Minimum Maximum Standard deviation
Unemploy ent inflows u 616 400 1,088 101
Registered vacancies inflows v 177 97 337 52
Source: Own calculation based on the administrative data from the statistics department of the
Federal Employment Agency 2000-2011.
equations (3.3) and (3.4) for the random matching model complemented by parame-
ters and variables of the logarithm of the flow measures:
logMi jt = [Right side of equation (3.3) or (3.4)]+βU f logui jt+βV f logvi jt (3.8)
Thus, the variables logu and logv are the logarithms of the unemployed and vacancy
inflows whereas βU f and βV f denote the matching elasticities of the inflows of the
unemployed and vacancies, respectively.
The results of the estimations of the stock-flow matching parameters can be found
in table 3.6. Compared with table 3.3, the columns contain the results of the same
specifications augmented with the inflow measures for registered vacancies and the
unemployed. The graphic representation for the month fixed effects (FE 3) and year
fixed effects (FE 4) can be found in figure 3.6. Overall, the results do not reveal fun-
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Thus, the variables log u and log v are the logarithms of the unemployed and vacancy 
inflows whereas βUf and βVf denote the matching elasticities of the inflows of the 
unemployed and vacancies, respectively.
The results of the estimations of the stock-flow matching parameters can 
be found in table 3.6. Compared with table 3.3, the columns contain the results 
of the same specifications augmented with the inflow measures for registered 
vacancies and the unemployed. The graphic representation for the month fixed 
effects (FE 3) and year fixed effects (FE 4) can be found in figure 3.6. Overall, 
the results do not reveal fundamental differences with those that are based on 
the random matching approach. The foregoing is also true for the regressions’ 
estimates without the recession variable, compare with columns 4 to 6 of table 3.9 
and the right panels of figures 3.9 and 3.10 in appendix 3.A.3. Again, the “crisis 
dip” becomes larger after excluding the recession variable.
The results of the analysis for the occupational labour markets can be found in 
table 3.7. The columns contain the results of specifications analogous to table 3.4, 
augmented with the flow measures. Again, the results are quite similar to those 
based on the random matching approach.
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Table 3.6:  Robustness check: Fixed effects estimation results based on the stock-flow matching 
model and data set disaggregated by occupations and NUTS3 regions
Dependent variable: log M
FE 1 FE 2 FE 3 FE 4
βUs 0.453***
(0.003)
0.457***
(0.003)
0.565***
(0.003)
0.584***
(0.003)
βUf 0.085***
(0.002)
0.087***
(0.002)
0.071***
(0.001)
0.049***
(0.001)
βVs 0.041***
(0.001)
0.037***
(0.001)
0.020***
(0.001)
0.022***
(0.001)
βVf 0.029***
(0.001)
0.029***
(0.001)
0.031***
(0.001)
0.035***
(0.001)
Year dummies, effect coded (reference: 2000):
d2001
-0.115***
(0.001)
d2002
-0.140***
(0.001)
d2003
-0.115***
(0.001)
d2004
-0.109***
(0.001)
d2005
-0.074***
(0.002)
d2006
-0.023***
(0.001)
d2007
0.068***
(0.002)
d2008
0.136***
(0.002)
d2009
0.139***
(0.002)
d2010
0.167***
(0.001)
d2011
0.142***
(0.002)
γ 1.094*** 1.375*** 1.413***
(0.021) (0.045) (0.045)
a -0.381*** -0.395*** -0.909*** -0.867***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012)
Monthly time dummies no no yes no
Quarter dummies no no no yes
Observations 2,394,250 2,394,250 2,394,250 2,394,250
R-squared 0.213 0.215 0.309 0.278
Number of id 55,422 55,422 55,422 55,422
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Note:  Column FE 3 includes monthly time fixed effects with effect coding (reference period is January 
2000), compare with figure 3.6, left panel.
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Only the yearly deviations from average augmented productivity are mainly 
less volatile in the stock-flow matching approach than in the random matching 
model. Thus, the main conclusions of the previous section are unaffected. Finally, 
column OLS 4 reports the results of the full specification, including the year- 
and occupational-specific interaction effects. Again, I do not report the results 
for the specification, including year- and occupational-specific interaction 
effects (OLS 4), but I graphically show the point and interval estimations in 
figures 3.7 and 3.8.
There is one difference between the results based on the stock-flow matching 
model compared with the random matching model for the the occupational 
labour market– specific deviations of the qualified service occupations (QDI) and 
the engineers (ING): the signs of the deviations differ between the stock-flow 
matching and the random matching model. However, the magnitude of these 
deviations are quite small in both models. Considering the results for the year- 
and occupational-specific interaction effects, there are only minor differences 
regarding the timing of the change and the further development of the matching 
efficiency. Furthermore, there are differences during the years of the financial 
crisis in 2008/2009.
Figure 3.6:  Stock-flow matching: Monthly and yearly time fixed effects and 95 per cent  
confidence band
Notes:  Specifications from table 3.6, left side: FE 3; right side: FE 4, based on the data set disaggregated 
by occupations and NUTS3 regions. The dots and the vertical lines mark the point and 95% interval 
estimates; in most cases, the interval is very small. In the left panel, the dots are linked with a line to 
illustrate temporal development. Time fixed effects with effect coding (reference period is January 2000 
for month or year 2000 for year fixed effects).
Source: Statistics of the Federal Employment Agency, own computations.
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Table 3.7:  Robustness check: OLS estimation results based on stock-flow matching model and 
data set disaggregated by occupations and NUTS3 regions
Dependent variable: log M
OLS1 OLS2 OLS3 OLS4
βUs 0.347*** 0.348*** 0.440*** 0.441*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
βUf 0.247*** 0.249*** 0.196*** 0.193***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
βVs 0.063*** 0.060*** 0.049*** 0.049***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
βVf 0.075*** 0.074*** 0.076*** 0.078***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Year dummies, effect coded (reference: 2000):
d2001 -0.117*** -0.127***
(0.001) (0.001)
d2002 -0.123*** -0.133***
(0.001) (0.001)
d2003 -0.082*** -0.096***
(0.001) (0.001)
d2004 -0.070*** -0.072***
(0.001) (0.002)
d2005 -0.028*** -0.025***
(0.001) (0.002)
d2006 0.005*** -0.003*
(0.001) (0.001)
d2007 0.061*** 0.072***
(0.001) (0.002)
d2008 0.099*** 0.114***
(0.001) (0.002)
d2009 0.110*** 0.126***
(0.002) (0.002)
d2010 0.124*** 0.130***
(0.001) (0.001)
d2011 0.093*** 0.103***
(0.001) (0.002)
Dummies for occupational categories, effect coded (reference: [0]/[1] AGR):
[02]EMB -0.045*** -0.047***
(0.001) (0.001
[03] QMB 0.113*** 0.112***
(0.001) (0.001)
[04] TEC -0.019*** -0.018***
(0.002) (0.002)
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Dependent variable: log M
OLS1 OLS2 OLS3 OLS4
[05] ING 0.006*** 0.013***
(0.002) (0.002)
[06] EDI -0.176*** -0.177***
(0.001) (0.001)
[07] QDI -0.022*** -0.024***
(0.001) (0.001)
[08] SEMI 0.017*** 0.013***
(0.001) (0.001)
[09] PROF 0.245*** 0.250***
(0.002) (0.002)
[10] EVB -0.210*** -0.208***
(0.001) (0.001)
[11] QVB -0.008*** -0.009***
(0.001) (0.001)
[12] MAN 0.062*** 0.059***
(0.002) (0.002)
γ 0.985*** 1.400*** 1.368***
(0.017) (0.040) (0.040)
a -0.498*** -0.499*** -0.790*** -0.791***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Local area effects yes yes yes yes
Occupational yearly interaction dummies no no no yes
Quarter dummies no no no yes
Observations 2,394,250 2,394,250 2,394,250 2,394,250
R-squared 0.704 0.705 0.731 0.732
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Note:  Column OLS 4 includes yearly time and occupational category interaction effects (reference 
year is 2000, reference category is “[01] AGR Agrarian and not assignable occupations”), all 
dummy variables are effect coded, compare appendix 3.A.2.
Abbreviations:  [01] AGR agrarian and not assignable occupations; [02] EMB simple manual occupations; 
[03] QMB qualified manual occupations; [04] TEC technicians; [05] ING engineers; 
[06]  EDI simple service occupations; [07] QDI qualified service occupations; [08] SEMI semi 
professions; [09] PROF professions; [10] EVB simple business and administrative occupations; 
[11] QVB qualified business and administrative occupations; [12] MAN manager.
Regarding the largest absolute changes of the yearly time fixed effects from year 
to year, table 3.13 in appendix 3.A.3 shows hardly any differences compared with 
the results based on the random matching model (table 3.12) with the exception 
of the semi-professions and professions. For these occupational categories, the 
largest absolute changes in the yearly time fixed effects based on the stock-flow 
matching model was measured from 2004 to 2005 for the semi professions and 
from 2008 to 2009 for the professions.
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Figure 3.7:  Estimated sums of the yearly dummy and the yearly interaction effects and  
95 per cent confidence band by occupational categories (part 1/2)
Notes:  Graphs refer to results in column OLS 4 in table 3.7, based on the data set disaggregated by  
occupations and NUTS3 regions. The dots and the vertical lines mark the point and 95% interval 
estimates.
Source: Statistics of the Federal Employment Agency, own computations.
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Figure 3.8:  Estimated sums of the yearly dummy and the yearly interaction effects and  
95 per cent confidence band by occupational categories (part 2/2)
Notes:  Graphs refer to results in column OLS 4 in table 3.7, based on the data set disaggregated by  
occupations and NUTS3 regions. The dots and the vertical lines mark the point and 95% interval 
estimates.
Source: Statistics of the Federal Employment Agency, own computations.
SEMI semi professions – Stock-flow matching PROF professions – Stock-flow matching
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3.5.2 Aggregated data
Most of the estimates presented are highly significant with very small standard 
errors and are also significantly different from one another. The reason for this 
result is the enormous variation of the data set the study is based on. From my 
knowledge, this study is the first to deliver such exact evidence. However, one 
shortcoming of such a detailed data set is that the probability of measurement 
errors at the small local area level or occupational level increases. In aggregated 
data sets, those measurement errors could be “compensated” for, and the prize 
are higher standard errors. Because I am interested in the effects on partial 
labour markets, it is important to see whether the results would change after 
aggregating the data set. Therefore, I aggregated the data sets by NUTS3 regions 
over occupations and vice versa. As expected, the results show less precision, but 
the main conclusions remain stable. Compare further results in appendix 3.A.3, 
table 3.10 with figures 3.11 and 3.12 for the data set with NUTS3 regions as well 
as table 3.11 with figures 3.13 and 3.14 for the data set with occupations.
3.6 Conclusions
In this paper, I present analyses of changes in the job matching productivity 
before, during, and after the German labour market reforms of 2003 to 2005, 
which are also known as the Hartz reforms. Although one of the main objectives 
of the German labour market reforms was to improve the matching processes on 
the labour market, there are only a few studies that elucidate the direction and 
structure of the reform effects on job matching. Previous studies confirm positive 
effects, but there are different conclusions regarding the effects of the different 
reform stages. Furthermore, it was not known whether the reform effects covered 
the entire labour market or only parts of it. Another question is how the effects 
change during extreme economic situations like the financial crisis of 2008/2009.
The paper closes some of these gaps by estimating (unrestricted) macroeconomic 
matching function parameters on the basis of detailed, high-frequency, and 
recent administrative panel data for the 2000–2011 period. To identify effects 
for occupational labour markets, I utilise an occupational category scheme that 
distinguishes between simple manual occupations, qualified manual occupations, 
technicians, engineers, simple service occupations, qualified service occupations, 
semi-professions, professions, simple business and administrative occupations, 
qualified business and administrative occupations, and managers.
The results complement previous findings and show significant differences in 
the changes of matching productivity in different occupational labour markets. In 
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general, six important new conclusions can be derived: (1) matching productivity 
increased during all reform stages, including Hartz IV; (2) even after controlling 
for the recession, matching productivity was (slightly) deteriorated in 2009, the 
year of the financial crisis; (3) the positive changes become smaller in recent 
years; (4) the reform reached all occupational labour markets, as suggested, in 
particular, by the results of the analysis for occupational labour markets; (5) the 
result of smaller positive effects in recent years is not true for all occupational 
groups; and (6) a (rather small) “crisis dip” during 2009 can be observed in the 
occupational labour markets of technicians and qualified manual occupations.
The results complement studies that find that the German reforms had 
positive effects on the labour market. It can be stated that a more efficient job 
matching contributes to a more successful realisation of companies’ activity plans 
and, therefore, this higher efficiency should boost – rather than weaken – the 
standing of firms in their relevant markets.
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3.A  Appendix to chapter 3
3.A.1 Occupational labour markets
Table 3.8:  Assignment of Blossfelds occupational categories to the 3-digit code of the German 
occupational classification scheme 1988 (KldB 88)
KldB 88 – occupational orders
Occupational category Code Title
[01] AGR agrarian
occupations
11 Farmers
12 Winegrowers
21 Livestock farmer
22 Fish farmer
41 Mixed crop and livestock farm labourers
42 Livestock and dairy producers
44 Pet groomers, animal care workers and related occupations
51 Gardeners, horticultural and nursery growers
53 Florists
61 Forestry production managers, foresters and huntspersons
62 Forestry labourers
[02] EMB simple
manual occupations
71 Miners
72 Mining shot firers and blasters
81 Stone crushers
82 Earth, gravel and sand quarry workers
83 Gas and crude oil quarry workers
91 Mineral and stone processing plant operators
101 Stone splitters, cutters and carvers
102 Precious-stone workers, jewel preparers
111 Brickmakers and other stoneware makers
112 Cement and concrete block makers
121 Ceramics plant operators
131 Frit makers, glass vitrifiers
132 Hollow glassware makers
133 Flat glass makers
135 Glass cutters, grinders and refiners
141 Chemical products, plant and machine operators
143 Rubber products machine operators
151 Plastic products machine operators
161 Pulp and cellulose plant operators
162 Packaging makers
164 Other paper products machine operators
176 Hecto- and mimeo-graphers
177 Printer’s hands
181 Wood-processing plant operators
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KldB 88 – occupational orders
Occupational category Code Title
182 Woodworking machine setters and setter-operators, and 
appropriate occupations
183 Wood products, brush- and cork-maker
184 Basketry weavers and wicker worker
191 Ore and metal furnace operators, metal melters
192 Rolling-mill operators
193 Metal drawers and extruders
203 Casters of semi-finished products and other mould casters
211 Sheet metal pressers, drawer and puncher
212 Wire moulder, cable splicers
213 Other metal moulders non cutting deformation
222 Metal milling cutters
223 Metal planers
224 Metal borers
225 Metal grinders
226 Other metal-cutting occupations
231 Metal polishers
232 Engravers, chasers
233 Metal finishers
234 Galvanisers, metal colourers
235 Enamelers, zinc platers and other metal surface finishers
241 Welder, oxy-acetylene cutters
242 Solderers
243 Riveters
244 Metal bonders and other metal connectors
263 Pipe and tube fitters
301 Precious fitters otherwise undisclosed
313 Electric motor, transformer fitters
321 Electrical appliance and equipment assemblers
322 Metal, rubber, plastic, paperboard, textile and related products 
assemblers
323 Metal plant operators no further specification
332 Spoolers, twisters, rope makers
341 Weaving- and knitting-machine preparers
342 Weavers and weaving-machine operators
343 Tufted textile-, fur- and leather-products makers
344 Knitters and knitting-machine operators
345 Felt and hat body makers
346 Textile braiders
352 Sewers and sewing-machine operators
353 Lingerie tailors and sewers
354 Embroiderers
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KldB 88 – occupational orders
Occupational category Code Title
355 Hatters and cap makers
356 Sewer and sewing-machine operators otherwise undisclosed
357 Other textile-products makers
361 Textile dyer and dyeing-machine operators
362 Textile bleaching-, cleaning-machine operators and other finishers
371 Tanners, catgut string makers and other leather-preparing machine 
operators
373 Shoemaking-machine operators
375 Purse, hand bag and other fine-leather products makers
376 Leather garment makers and other leather-products machine 
operators
377 Leather glove makers
402 Meat- and sausage-processing machine operators
403 Fish-processing machine operators
412 Ready-made meal-, fruit- and vegetable-processing machine 
operators
424 Tobacco preparers, product makers
431 Dairy-products machine operators, butter, lard and margarine 
makers
432 Grain- and spice-milling machine operators
433 Sugar-production machine operators, chocolate, sweets and ice-
cream makers
442 Steel fixers, concrete workers
452 Roofers
453 Scaffolders
461 Pavers
462 Road building experts
463 Track building experts
465 Land improvement, maintenance and hydraulic structure building 
experts
466 Well, duct and other civil engineering building experts
471 Earth-moving labourers
472 Building construction labourers and other construction and 
maintenance labourers otherwise undisclosed
482 Insulators and proofers
486 Composition floor and terrazzo layers
504 Other wood-products makers, Boat-, glider- and wooden sports-
equipment building experts
512 Goods painters and varnishers
513 Wood surface finishers, veneers
514 Glass, ceramics and related decorative painters, glass engravers 
and etchers
521 Products testers, sorters otherwise undisclosed
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KldB 88 – occupational orders
Occupational category Code Title
522 Product packagers, balers, wrappers, qualifiers and other loading 
agents
531 Labourers not further specified
543 Pump-, compressor-, assembly line-, boring and other machines 
operators
544 Crane and hoist plant operators
545 Earth-moving and related plant operators
546 Construction plant operators
547 Machine maintenance operators, machinists’ assistants
548 Boiler persons, incinerators and related plant operators
549 Machine-tool setters and setter-operators no further specified
[03] QMB qualified
manual occupations
134 Gaffer
142 Chemical laboratory workers
144 Tyre vulcanisers
163 Bookbinding workers
171 Type setters, pre-press workers
173 Book printers, letterpress
174 Flat screen, gravure and intaglio printers
175 Special, silk-screen printers
201 Moulders and core makers
202 Casters
221 Metal lathe operators
251 Steel-, black-, hammersmiths and forging press workers
252 Tank and container builders, coppersmiths and related occupations
261 Tinsmiths
262 Plumbers
270 Locksmiths and fitters, not further specified
271 Building fitters
272 Sheet metal worker, plastics fitters
273 Engine fitters
274 Plant and maintenance fitters
275 Steel construction fitters, steel ship builders
281 Motor vehicle repairers
282 Agricultural machinery repairers
283 Aircraft mechanics
284 Precision mechanics
285 Other mechanics
286 Watch-, clockmakers
291 Toolmakers, instrument mechanics
302 Precious metal smiths
305 Musical instrument makers
306 Doll, model makers, taxidermists
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KldB 88 – occupational orders
Occupational category Code Title
311 Electrical fitters, mechanics
312 Telecommunications mechanics, craftsmen
314 Electrical appliance fitters
315 Radio, sound equipment mechanics
331 Spinner, fibre-preparer
351 Tailors and dressmakers
372 Shoe-makers
374 Saddlers, truss makers and other coarse-leather-products makers
378 Pelt dressers, furriers and other fur-products makers
391 Bakers and baked-goods, cereal- and chocolate-products machine 
operators
392 Pastry-cooks and confectionery makers
401 Butchers and stickers
411 Cooks
421 Wine coopers and other wine-processing operators
422 Brewers, maltsters and other brewer machine operators
423 Other beverage makers, coffee-processing-machine operators, 
tasters and graders
441 Bricklayers and masons
451 Carpenters
464 Shot firers and blasters except mining shot firers
481 Stuccoers, plasterers
483 Tile setters
484 Stove setters and air heating fitters
485 Glaziers
491 Interior decorators, carpet and parquet layers
492 Upholsterers, mattresses makers
501 Cabinetmakers, carpenters and joiners
502 Pattern and mold carpenters
503 Cartwrights, wheelwrights, coopers and tubbers
511 Construction painters, wallpaperers, varnishers
541 Power production plant operators
542 Winding-, conveyor- and ropeway-machine operators
[04] TEC technicians 32 Agricultural engineers and advisors
52 Garden and landscape architects and administrators
303 Dental technicians
304 Ophthalmic opticians
601 Mechanical and automotive engineers
602 Electrical and electronics engineers
603 Architects, civil and structural engineers
604 Cartographers and survey engineers
605 Mining, metallurgy, foundry engineers
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KldB 88 – occupational orders
Occupational category Code Title
606 Other production engineers
607 Industrial and other operating engineers
611 Chemists, chemical engineers
612 Physicists, physics engineers, mathematicians
621 Mechanical engineering technicians
622 Electrical, electronics and telecommunications engineering 
technicians
623 Civil engineering technicians
624 Survey engineering technicians
625 Mining, metallurgy, foundry engineering technicians
626 Chemical and physical engineering technicians
627 Other production technicians
628 Industrial and other operating technicians
629 Forepersons and other operations managers
631 Agronomy, forestry and life science technicians
632 Physical and mathematical science technicians
633 Chemical science technicians
634 Photo laboratory technicians
635 Draftspersons
721 Navigators, nautical ships’ officers and pilots
722 Technical ship’s officers, engineers, technicians and machinists
726 Aircraft pilots, flight engineers and other air traffic occupations
733 Radio operators
857 Medical technical, laboratory, radiological assistants
883 Biologists, geographers, meteorologists and other natural 
scientists, otherwise undisclosed
[06] EDI simple
service occupations
685 Chemist’s assistants in pharmacies
686 Filling station attendants
706 Cashiers, ticket agents, Debt- and vending-machine money 
collectors and ticket inspectors
713 Other brake, signal and switch operators, transport guides and 
conductors, fleet managers
714 Car, taxi, bus, (heavy) truck and other motor vehicle drivers
715 Cabby
716 Construction and maintenance labourers: roads, dams, bridges and 
similar constructions
723 Seagoing ships’ deck crews
724 Inland boatmen and related ships’ decks crews
725 Ferrymen, lockmasters, coastguards and other water traffic 
occupations
741 Stocks administrators and clerks
742 Lift, lifting-trucks and other materials handling equipment 
operators
IAB-Bibliothek 359106
Revisiting German labour market reform effects
KldB 88 – occupational orders
Occupational category Code Title
743 Longshoremen, furniture removers
744 Stock, loading and other transport workers
791 Factories security offices, store, hotel and other detectives
792 Watchpersons, custodians, attendants and related workers
793 Door-, gatekeepers and caretakers
794 Menials, bellmen, ushers and groundkeepers
805 Disinfectors, morticians, meat and and other health inspectors
838 Clowns, magicians, acrobats, professional sportspersons, mountain 
guides and models
911 Hoteliers, innkeepers, restaurateurs and management assistants in 
hotels and restaurants
912 Waiters, waitresses, stewards, stewardesses and buspersons
913 Porters, bartenders and other hotel and restaurant attendants
923 Valets, chambermaids and other housekeeping attendants
931 Launderers and ironers
932 Textile cleaner, dyers, chemical purifiers
933 Dishwashers, room and domestic cleaners
934 Windows, frontages and buildings cleaners
935 Sweepers, streets and sewerages cleaners, dustmen and other 
waste disposal workers
936 Car washers, vehicle cleaners, car and vehicle carers
937 Machinery, plant, tube and container cleaners
[07] QDI qualified
service occupations
172 Stereotypers and electrotypers
684 Chemists in drugstores
704 Finance, stock, trade, ship, real estate, insurance brokers
705 Landlords, hirers, agents, bookers, auctioneers
711 Locomotive engine, tram and subway drivers
712 Railway brake, signal and switch operators, shunters and railway 
guards and conductors
801 Soldiers, border guards, police officers
802 Firefighters
803 Safety inspectors, trade controllers, gauging, and environmental 
protection officers
804 Chimney sweepers
812 Law officers
814 Executory officers, prison guards
831 Composers, music directors and musicians
832 Film, stage and related directors, actors, singers and dancers
833 Sculptors, painters, graphic and related artists
834 Decorators, sign painters
835 Set designer, light board, image and sound recording engineers, 
technicians and operators
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KldB 88 – occupational orders
Occupational category Code Title
836 Interior architects, visual merchandiser
837 Photographers, camera and retouching operators
851 Non-medical practitioners, psychotherapists
852 Masseurs, physiotherapists and health care professionals
854 Paramedics and nursing auxiliary workers
855 Dieticians, nutritionists and pharmacy technicians
856 Doctor’s receptionists and assistants
892 Nuns, friars and other religious associate professionals
893 Sextons, cantors and other religious assistants
901 Hairdressers, barbers, wigmakers and related workers
902 Beauticians, manicurists, pedicurists and related workers
921 Housekeepers and related workers
922 Energy and other consumer advisors
[08] SEMI semi
professions
821 Authors, journalists, editors and announcers
822 Interpreters, translators
823 Librarians, archivists, documentalists, curators, library and filing 
clerks
853 Nurses, midwifes, nursing and midwifery associate professionals
861 Social work, welfare, health care professionals and workers; 
geriatric nurses
862 Housemasters, social pedagogue, deacons
863 Employment, vocational training, study, careers advisors
864 Kindergarten teachers, child care workers and paediatric nurses
873 Primary, secondary school, special education teachers and related 
teaching professionals
874 Vocational, professional college teachers and related teaching 
professionals
875 Art, music and voice teachers and related teaching professionals, 
otherwise undisclosed
876 PE teachers, related teaching professionals, skiing and other sports 
instructors
877 Driving, flying, hygienic and other instructors, otherwise 
undisclosed
[09] PROF professions 811 Judges and prosecutors
813 Lawyers, notaries, legal representatives, advisors and other legal 
professionals
841 Medical doctors
842 Dentists
843 Veterinaries
844 Pharmacists
871 University, college professors and related teaching professionals
872 Grammar school teacher and related teaching professionals
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KldB 88 – occupational orders
Occupational category Code Title
881 Economists, psychologists, sociologists, political scientists, 
statisticians
882 Philologists, historians, philosophers and other humanities 
scientists, otherwise undisclosed
891 Bishops, pastors, chaplains and other religious professionals
[10] EVB simple
business and 
administrative
occupations
682 Shop, stall and market salespersons and demonstrators
687 Commercial sales representatives and sales agents
732 Mail carriers, sorting clerks, porters and deliverers
734 Telephone switchboard operators
773 Cashiers and ticket clerks
782 Secretaries, stenographers and typists
783 Data entry operators
784 Scribes and other office hands
[11] QVB qualified
business and 
administrative
occupations
31 Agricultural production manager
681 Wholesaler, retail salespersons and buying agents
683 Publishers, management assistants in publishing and booksellers
691 Banking experts including tellers, finance clerks as well as finance 
dealers and brokers
692 Building society experts including representatives as well as clerks
693 Health insurance experts including representatives as well as 
clerks, not social security
694 Life, property insurance experts including representative as well 
as clerks
701 Logistics managers and transport clerks
702 Travel agency clerks, attendants, stewards, consultants, organisers 
and guides
703 Advertising and public relations experts
771 Calculators, calculating and counting clerks
772 Bookkeepers
774 Computer scientists, equipment operators, computing and data 
processing professionals
781 Office clerks, otherwise undisclosed
[12] MAN manager 751 Entrepreneurs, managing directors and division managers
752 Management personnel and other business consultants
753 Financial, tax accountants and accounting clerks
762 Senior and administrative state officials
763 Senior and administrative officials of humanitarian and other 
special-interest organisations
[00] not assignable 982 Interns, volunteer with occupation remaining to be specified
983 Job-seekers with occupation remaining to be specified
991 Labourers not further specified
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3.A.2 Effect coding
The time dummy variables, the occupational labour market dummy variables, 
and the interaction variables that are used in the regression equation to analyse 
occupational and time-specific changes in matching productivity are effect coded. 
The advantage of effect coding is that the coefficients can be directly interpreted 
as deviations from the general, the time or the occupational specific intercept in 
the model. This intercept can be interpreted as the average overall, time specific 
or occupational matching productivity.
Formally, the year dummy variable dy with y = [2001, …, 2011] with reference 
year 2000 is coded as follows ( t denotes the observed month/year):
dy =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
−1 year(t)= 2000
0 year(t) = y
1 year(t)= y
The occupational labour market dummy variables db with b = [2, …, 12] with reference 
category “Agrarian and not assignable occupations” (occupational category = 1) are 
coded as follows:
db =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
−1 occupational category( j)= 1
0 occupational category( j) = b
1 occupational category( j)= b
To measure the occupational category specific reform effects, I use effect-coded 
interaction dummy variables with the occupational reference category “Agrarian 
and not assignable occupations” and the reference year 2000. This interaction effect 
variable db, y with y = [2001, …, 2011] and b = [2, …, 12] is coded as follows:
db,y =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
−1 year(t)= 2000 and occupational category( j)= 1
0 year(t) = y and
occupational category( j) = b
1 year(t)= y and occupational category( j)= b
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3.A.3 Further empirical results
Table 3.9:  Fixed effects estimation results based on data set disaggregated by occupations and 
NUTS3 regions, all specifications without recession variable
Dependent variable: log M
FE 1 FE 2 FE 3 FE 4 FE 5 FE 6
βUs 0.514*** 0.623*** 0.624*** 0.453*** 0.563*** 0.582***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
βUf 0.085*** 0.071*** 0.049***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
βVs 0.060*** 0.040*** 0.044*** 0.041*** 0.021*** 0.023***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
βVf 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.034***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Year dummies, effect coded (reference: 2000):
d2001 -0.100*** -0.101***
(0.001) (0.001)
d2002 -0.146*** -0.139***
(0.001) (0.001)
d2003 -0.135*** -0.129***
(0.001) (0.001)
d2004 -0.123*** -0.121***
(0.001) (0.001)
d2005 -0.103*** -0.096***
(0.002) (0.002)
d2006 -0.023*** -0.016***
(0.001) (0.001)
d2007 0.099*** 0.102***
(0.001) (0.001)
d2008 0.174*** 0.169***
(0.002) (0.002)
d2009 0.089*** 0.083***
(0.001) (0.001)
d2010 0.165*** 0.155***
(0.001) (0.001)
d2011 0.162*** 0.155***
(0.002) (0.002)
a -0.428*** -0.970*** -0.912*** -0.381*** -0.888*** -0.861***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012)
Monthly time dummies no yes no no yes no
Quarter dummies no no yes no no yes
Observations 2,394,250 2,394,250 2,394,250 2,394,250 2,394,250 2,394,250
R-squared 0.206 0.304 0.274 0.213 0.309 0.278
Number of groups 55,422 55,422 55,422 55,422 55,422 55,422
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Note:  Columns FE 2 and FE 5 include monthly time fixed effects with effect coding (reference period is 
January 2000), compare with figure 3.9.
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Figure 3.9: Monthly time fixed effects and 95 per cent confidence band
Notes:  Specifications from table 3.9, left side: FE 2, right side: FE 5, based on data set disaggregated by 
occupations and NUTS3 regions, all regressions without recession variable. The dots and the vertical 
lines mark the point and 95% interval estimates; in most cases, the interval is very small. The dots are 
linked with a line to illustrate the temporal development. Monthly time fixed effects with effect coding 
(reference period is January 2000). 
Source: Statistics of the Federal Employment Agency, own computations.
Figure 3.10: Yearly time fixed effects and 95 per cent confidence band
Notes:  Specifications from table 3.9, left side: FE 3, right side: FE 6, based on a data set disaggregated by 
occupations and NUTS3 regions, all regressions without recession variable. The dots and the vertical 
lines mark the point and 95% interval estimates; in most cases, the interval is very small. Yearly time 
fixed effects with effect coding (reference period is 2000).
Source: Statistics of the Federal Employment Agency, own computations.
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Table 3.10:  Fixed effects estimation results based on data set disaggregated by NUTS3  
regions
Dependent variable: log M
FE 1 FE 2 FE 3 FE 4 FE 5 FE 6 FE 7 FE 8
βUs 0.469*** 0.469*** 0.618*** 0.690*** 0.476*** 0.476*** 0.527*** 0.745***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.021) (0.024) (0.019) (0.019) (0.024) (0.029)
βVs 0.123*** 0.123*** 0.061*** 0.110*** 0.074*** 0.076*** 0.026*** 0.031***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009)
βUf -0.056*** -0.058*** 0.151*** -0.109*** 
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014)
βVf 0.062*** 0.063*** 0.075*** 0.141***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007)
Year dummies, effect coded (reference: 2000):
d2001 -0.143*** -0.195***
(0.005) (0.005)
d2002 -0.165*** -0.171***
(0.005)  (0.005)
d2003 -0.099*** -0.096***
(0.006)  (0.006)
d2004 -0.066*** -0.057***
(0.006) (0.006)
d2005 -0.025*** -0.021***
(0.007)  (0.007)
d2006 -0.003 -0.007
(0.005)  (0.006)
d2007 0.066*** 0.065***
(0.005)  (0.005)
d2008 0.133*** 0.149*** 
(0.007) (0.007)
d2009 0.122*** 0.177***
(0.009)  (0.010)
d2010 0.172*** 0.201*** 
(0.006) (0.007)
d2011 0.097*** 0.114***
(0.008)  (0.009)
γ 0.014 0.895*** 0.921*** -0.203*** 1.121*** 1.266***
(0.066) (0.156) (0.162) (0.077) (0.139) (0.162)
a 1.285*** 1.285*** 0.181 -0.685*** 1.568*** 1.568*** -0.302 -0.701***
(0.182) (0.183) (0.207) (0.228) (0.169) (0.169) (0.196) (0.220)
Monthly time dummies no no yes no no no yes no
Quarter dummies no no no yes no no no yes
Observations 55,371 55,371 55,371 55,371 55,371 55,371 55,371 55,371
R-squared 0.144 0.144 0.666 0.426 0.151 0.151 0.675 0.446
Number of groups 402 402 402 402 402 402 402 402
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Note:  Columns FE 3 and FE 7 include monthly time fixed effects with effect coding (reference period is January 
2000), compare with figure 3.11.
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Figure 3.11: Monthly time fixed effects and 95 per cent confidence band
Notes:  Specifications from table 3.10, left side: FE 3, right side: FE 7, based on data set disaggregated by NUTS3 
regions. The dots and the vertical lines mark the point and 95% interval estimates; in the most cases the 
interval is very small. The dots are linked with a line to illustrate temporal development. Monthly time 
fixed effects with effect coding (reference period is January 2000).
Source: Statistics of the Federal Employment Agency, own computations.
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Figure 3.12: Yearly time fixed effects and 95 per cent confidence band
Notes:  Specifications from table 3.10, left side: FE 4, right side: FE 8, based on data set disaggregated by NUTS3 
regions. The dots and the vertical lines mark the point and 95% interval estimates. Yearly time fixed 
effects with effect coding (reference period is 2000).
Source: Statistics of the Federal Employment Agency, own computations.
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Table 3.11: Fixed effects estimation results based on data set disaggregated by occupations
Dependent variable: log M
VARIABLES FE 1 FE 2 FE 3 FE 4 FE 5 FE 6 FE 7 FE 8
βUs 0.640*** 0.645*** 0.927*** 0.928*** 0.507*** 0.505*** 0.832*** 0.940***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.028) (0.028) (0.043) (0.039)
βUf 0.174*** 0.188*** 0.091** -0.029
(0.038) (0.039) (0.042) (0.037)
βVs 0.138*** 0.132*** 0.087*** 0.098*** 0.092*** 0.085*** 0.031*** 0.035***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010)
βVf 0.052*** 0.048*** 0.071*** 0.083***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010)
Year dummies, effect coded (reference: 2000):
d2001 -0.260*** -0.281***
(0.009) (0.012)
d2002 -0.282*** -0.282***
 (0.008) (0.010)
d2003 -0.209*** -0.214***
(0.009) (0.011)
d2004 -0.141*** -0.149***
(0.009) (0.009)
d2005 -0.075*** -0.084***
(0.009) (0.011)
d2006 -0.043*** -0.042***
(0.006) (0.007)
d2007 0.113*** 0.126***
(0.008) (0.009)
d2008 0.237*** 0.254***
(0.010) (0.014)
d2009 0.279*** 0.292***
(0.011) (0.015)
d2010 0.320*** 0.330***
(0.010) (0.014)
d2011 0.248*** 0.265***
(0.014) (0.017)
γ 0.717*** 1.800*** 1.042*** 1.624*** 
(0.146) (0.180) (0.175) (0.177)
a -0.596*** -0.595*** -2.874*** -2.723*** -0.590*** -0.603*** -2.696*** -2.684***
(0.158) (0.159) (0.148) (0.139) (0.145) (0.145) (0.162) (0.152)
Monthly time dummies no no yes no no no yes no
Quarter dummies no no no yes no no no yes
Observations 42,053 42,053 42,053 42,053 42,053 42,053 42,053 42,053
R-squared 0.453 0.454 0.675 0.610 0.464 0.466 0.681 0.616
Number of groups 327 327 327 327 327 327 327 327
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Note:  Columns FE 3 and FE 7 include monthly time fixed effects with effect coding (reference period is January 2000), 
compare with figure 3.13. Specifications FE 3 and FE 7 without GDPcyc, quarter(t) due to collinearity.
115
Appendix to chapter 3
Chapter 3
Figure 3.13: Monthly time fixed effects and 95 per cent confidence band
Notes:  Specifications from table 3.11, left side: FE 3, right side: FE 7, based on data set disaggregated by 
occupations. The dots and the vertical lines mark the point and 95% interval estimates; in the most cases 
the interval is very small. The dots are linked with a line to illustrate the temporal development. Monthly 
time fixed effects with effect coding (reference period is January 2000).
Source: Statistics of the Federal Employment Agency, own computations.
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Figure 3.14: Yearly time fixed effects and 95 per cent confidence band
Notes:  Specifications from table 3.11, left side: FE 4, right side: FE 8, based on data set disaggregated by 
occupations. The dots and the vertical lines mark the point and 95% interval estimates; in most cases, 
the interval is very small. The dots are linked with a line to illustrate the temporal development. Monthly 
time fixed effects with effect coding (reference period is January 2000).
Source: Statistics of the Federal Employment Agency, own computations.
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Chapter 4
Identifying the Employment Effect of Invoking and Changing 
the Minimum Wage: A Spatial Analysis of the UK1
1 The contents of this chapter were jointly worked out with Prof. Peter Dolton, Ph.D. (University of Sussex) and 
Chiara Rosazza-Bondibene, Ph.D. (National Institute of Economic and Social Research, London). The contents of this 
chapter are published in the journal "Labour Economics" (Dolton et al., 2015).
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We assess the impact of the National Minimum Wage (NMW) on employment in 
the UK over the 1999–2010 period explicitly modelling the effect of the 2008–2010 
recession. Identification of invoking a NMW is possible by reference to a pre-period 
(prior to 1999) without a NMW. Separate identification of the effect of incremental 
changes (and year interaction effects) in the NMW is facilitated by variation in the 
bite of the NMW across local labour markets. We address the issues of possible 
endogeneity and dynamic structure of employment rate changes, regional demand 
side shocks induced by the recession, and take account of the spatial dependence of 
local labour markets. Using System GMM, we conclude that there is no discernable 
effect of the NMW introduction or its uprating on employment but show how 
more naïve estimation may have revealed the various widely different positive and 
negative effects found in the literature.
4.1 Introduction
The introduction of a minimum wage (MW) could have important implications for 
employment levels in an economy. Likewise the uprating or changing of a MW on an 
annual basis could also have separate incremental effects on employment levels in 
the economy. Up to now, the literature rarely distinguishes between the imposition 
of a new MW and its uprating, simply because in most countries we do not observe 
the pre-period prior to the introduction of a MW to set a benchmark from which to 
measure the effect of the introduction. The introduction of a new National Minimum 
Wage (NMW) in Britain in 1999 and its subsequent annual uprating provide a unique 
opportunity to distinguish between these two effects.2
The important concern of how the MW should be changed in times of recession, 
when most wages are declining in real terms, is a current and pressing problem. The 
problem is compounded by the consideration of what effects the MW itself may 
have on employment during the biggest recession since the 1930s. Since inception, 
the UK NMW has been administered on a national basis, with both adult and youth 
rates applying to all parts of the country. However, the issue of whether a MW 
adequately reflects regional variation in the regional cost of living, the relative 
balance of industrial regional growth, and the growth and variation in regional 
productivity, is questionable. Clearly, longstanding geographic variation in wage 
rates across the UK have a direct effect on the ‘bite’ of the NMW in different areas, 
as the NMW reaches further up the wage distribution in poorer parts of the country 
than in others (Stewart, 2002). This study makes use of both this geographical 
2 There is voluminous literature on the inequality and other effects of the NMW. These are referenced, e.g., in Dolton 
et al. (2012). In this article we focus exclusively on the econometric estimation of the employment effects of the 
MW.
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variation and the variation in the real level that the NMW has been set at over 
time, in order to see how changes in the local area NMW incidence over several 
years of the minimum wage’s existence are correlated with changes in local area 
performance. We are also concerned that all of our geographic locations are not 
independent labour markets but interconnected (contiguous) markets. The very fact 
that the comparative prosperity of the South East of the country is conditioned by 
the economic gravity that is induced by proximity to London means that we should 
not treat local labour markets as independent observations in any statistical model. 
As Dube et al. (2010) recognize, the likely consequences of erroneously doing so 
induces an underreporting of the standard error of the estimates and hence makes 
it likely that there will be mistaken positive or negative inferences regarding the 
relationship between the MW and employment.
This paper builds on that literature by examining the impact of the NMW in 
the UK over the period 1997–2010, comparing the period two years before its 
introduction with the subsequent history of the NMW and its up-ratings. This 
enables us to provide an additional insight by distinguishing between effects in 
a NMW policy off period compared to each incremental up-rating of the NMW in 
subsequent years. Hence, instead of using a simple policy on-policy off, difference-
in-difference model, we examine a model in which each year’s change in the NMW 
is considered as a separate interaction effect. This ’Incremental Diff-in-Diff’ (IDiD) 
estimator (Dolton et al., 2012)3 introduces a yearly interaction term for each change 
of the NMW, so that we may gauge the year-on-year impact of the uprating of the 
NMW on employment.
Most existing UK studies have focused on the impact of the introduction of the 
NMW, finding broadly that the aggregate employment effects of the introduction 
were zero or small and positive (Stewart, 2002, 2004b, a; Dolton et al., 2009, 2010; 
Dolton and Rosazza-Bondibene, 2012). Arguably, this counter-intuitive employment 
effect could be due to the fact that any long-run effects have not been captured 
by previous studies or that the problem of identifying the introduction of the NMW 
has not been separated from the effects of the annual uprating of the NMW. Clearly, 
the overall effect of having a MW in the labour market may induce a long run 
impact whereas small changes in the uprating of the level of the NMW in any given 
year may induce short run adjustment effects. In this paper, we take a medium to 
long run look at the impact of the NMW in the UK and its up-ratings and assess 
whether these two separate processes may have had a differential impact across 
heterogeneous geographical areas.
3 This IDiD estimator is a logical corollary of the econometric model suggested by Wooldridge (2002) and Bertrand 
et  al. (2004).
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There is a large literature on the employment effects of a Minimum Wage (see Brown 
et al., 1982; Card and Krueger, 1995; Brown, 1999; Neumark and Wascher, 2008, 
for extensive reviews of the literature). In recent years, there has been a growing 
literature attempting to identify the effects of a MW on employment by using 
geographical variation in the bite of the MW in spatially separated markets, see Card 
(1992); Lee (1999); Neumark and Wascher (1992, 2007); Card and Krueger (1994, 
2000); Burkhauser et al. (2000); Dube et al. (2007, 2010); Baskaya and Rubinstein 
(2012) for the United States; Baker et al. (1999) for Canada; Bosch and Manacorda 
(2010) for Mexico; Stewart (2002, 2004a, b); and Dolton et al. (2009, 2010, 2012) for 
the UK. This literature has not concerned itself with what happens to employment 
effects of the MW in times of macro-economic recession. This paper focuses on the 
modern era in the UK from 1997 to 2010 with the introduction of the NMW in 1999 
and then leading into the current ‘Great’ recession of 2008–2010. Hence, we focus 
on the important question of what impact the MW has in an era when the economy 
is contracting, unemployment is rising, and real incomes are falling for many people 
in the economy. We do this explicitly by controlling for regional demand shocks 
using data on Gross Value Added, which is a direct measure of the level and shocks 
to economic activity over time at a regional level.
A second feature of nearly all the literature on the MW to date which uses 
geographical variation to identify the impact of the MW is that it has made the 
assumption that the geographical units of observation are geographically separate 
and unrelated to one another4. This assumption is unwarranted for many important 
reasons – we focus on just two. Firstly, in reality, a job vacancy is never posted with 
the condition that nobody outside the immediate geographical vicinity need apply. 
Clearly, being able to travel to the job location is the problem of the individual and 
the resulting commute is never considered in whether someone gets the job. This 
means that labour markets are not independent units of observation that bear no 
relation to one another. Economists frequently consider local labour markets as if 
each geographical area consists only of people who both live and work in the same 
location. Accordingly they model all such areas as a set of independent, unrelated 
observations. In reality, such a notion is false as all geographical areas have people 
who live in them but work in other locations. This pattern of commuting is then, in 
some sense, the realized form of all the subtle interrelationships between different 
geographical locations. A second flaw with treating such geographical units as 
independent is that spatially located phenomena like plant closures have an effect 
not just in the geographical location it occurred in, but also in the immediate 
4 One exception is the study by Dube et al. (2010), who consider cross-state border spillovers of the MW in the fast 
food industry in the US.
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neighbouring areas. The degree of contiguity of neighbouring locations is therefore 
an important factor in the spread of unemployment, poverty, wage rises and other 
labour market phenomena. The extent of spillover effects from one location to another 
will depend on transport links, the spatial distribution of related industries and many 
other factors. It is well known that if we model an econometric relationship under the 
mistaken assumption that the units of observation are independent of one another 
(spherical) – when in reality they are not – then we may get biased and inconsistent 
estimates of the resulting economic relationships. This means that if we estimate a 
model of the effects of the MW using geographical data under the assumption of 
non-spatially related units, when they are indeed spatially related, then we will get 
estimates of the effects which are different from what they should be and also more 
or less statistically significant than they ought to be. Hence, the assumption of spatial 
independence is a very important one in this context which should be tested.
An important problem that has been a preoccupation with papers in this 
literature is how to capture the autoregressive process of employment determination. 
Many papers have adopted the practice of attempting to control for this by using 
unemployment or various lags of employment (see Neumark and Wascher, 1994; 
Burkhauser et al., 2000). Clearly, such variables are endogenous to the employment 
dependent variable. To overcome this problem, we adopt an Arellano Bond system 
GMM IV estimator which explicitly controls for the lagged value of employment by 
a carefully constructed set of lagged values as IVs. This paper is the first in the MW 
debate (to our knowledge) to adopt this more robust consistent estimation strategy 
of a dynamic panel model.
Furthermore, with the GMM approach we consider another difficult issue: 
the problem of the appropriate way to address the potential endogeneity of the 
controlling MW regressor–typically the Kaitz index.5 Early papers in the literature 
just assumed that the wage regressor in the model was exogenous. More recently, 
some authors recognize the problem and use a variety of IV type strategies to solve 
it; Dube et al. (2010) considered different lag lengths regarding when the MW comes 
into effect and Dolton et al. (2011) considered temporal lags of different explanatory 
variables. In contrast, Baskaya and Rubinstein (2012) focus on the impact of 
federal minimum wages on state effective minimum wages where the latter have 
the property of being an external source of variation in state effective minimum 
wages. According to the authors, this impact varies depending on persistent cross-
state disparities in the economic situation and political preferences regarding state 
specific minimum wage policy. By implementing the lagged employment variable 
5 The problem is that the Kaitz index as a ratio is subject to change due to either the denominator, or the numerator, 
or both. This clearly means that it may shift as a result of the value of the MW (numerator) or as a result shifts in 
the wage distribution which changes the median of the wage distribution.
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in our equation we explicitly control for a potential (partial) wage determination 
by employment levels in previous periods. Crucially, in this paper, we examine 
whether the definition of the geographical unit used for the analysis matters. Since 
the definition of what constitutes a ’local labour market’ in Great Britain is still 
open to discussion, the analysis is undertaken at two different levels of geographical 
aggregation. Firstly, the data is divided into 140 areas comprising Unitary Authorities 
and Counties. Secondly we look at how the results change if we use the definition 
of 67% of people living and working in the same geography to capture a local 
labour market, as now used by the UK national statistics office to define a “travel-
to-work area” (TTWA, 138 resulting areas). We remain agnostic as to what the most 
appropriate definition of a ’local labour market’ is and let the data tell us whether 
such definitional variations matter.
A secondary goal of this paper is that it attempts to set the different estimates 
in the literature in context as our econometric estimation model is more general 
than previously used. In this respect, we introduce each of our contributions in 
a stepwise fashion demonstrating that we can replicate similar results to earlier 
papers – but that when we add important considerations like spatial dependence, 
regional aggregate demand shocks, lagged dependent variable regressors and other 
endogenous regressors, then we find clearer–less contradictory results. Hence, 
we examine the robustness of our results with regard to the specification issues 
associated with dynamic specification to incorporate the lagged effects of previous 
employment on current employment, and time and interaction effects. Much of 
the previous literature is presented ‘as if ’ the results are in stark contrast to each 
other. Often, different papers estimate fundamentally different parameters and this 
explains a large degree of the differences in results.
To summarize, this work contributes to the literature in the following ways. 
Firstly we separately identify the employment effect of having a MW from the 
possible effects of uprating the MW. Secondly, unlike the literature, we treat the 
geographical units of statistical analysis as being spatially related (rather than 
independent). Thirdly, we explicitly take account of the current recession by direct 
consideration of the role of shocks to aggregate demand and, finally, we directly 
tackle the issue of the dynamic nature of employment process by considering the 
autoregressive structure of employment using Arellano–Bond type IV estimation in 
a system GMM context. We suggest that these advances can provide a new insight 
into the effect of the MW on employment.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 4.2 describes the datasets used 
and the characteristics of the data and highlights its spatial nature. Section 4.3 
outlines the econometric methodology and identification for the analysis and 
section 4.4 presents the main results of the analysis. Section 4.5 concludes.
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4.2 Data
In our data, we can examine the spatial association of the ”bite” of the minimum 
wage with the geographic variation in employment. Geographical variation in 
wages in the UK is exploited in order to evaluate the impact of the NMW on 
employment at the local level. The data used in this study are drawn primarily 
from three sources. Data on earnings, and a restricted number of covariates 
all disaggregated by geography is provided by the New Earnings Survey (NES) 
from 1997 to 2003 and by the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE), 
which replaced the NES in 2004. In both surveys, conducted in April of each year, 
employers are asked to provide information on hours and earnings of the selected 
employees. The geographic information collected for the full sample period used 
in the paper is based on workplace rather than residence.
In what follows we describe the data6. In this paper we consider all workers, 
not just young people separately. This is in contrast to much of the literature. We 
do this because we are interested in the validly measured potential aggregate real 
effects of the MW on the whole labour market and not only the section of it which 
is most affected by the MW. In other words, we are interested in the overall effect 
of the MW on employment – i.e. the extensive margin of the MW effect – not its 
intensive margin.7
The geographic variation in wages will reflect the demographic and industrial 
composition of each local labour market. The changing industrial composition of 
an area and the extent to which industries are low and high paying will affect 
the changing incidence of the minimum wage working in a locality. Likewise the 
skill, age, gender and sector composition of the local workforce will be important 
factors. To a certain extent we can control for variation in these influences with a 
set of time varying local labour market control variables, drawn from either ASHE 
or matched in from complementary Labour Force Survey (LFS) data. However, 
the choice of what constitutes a local labour market is open to discussion, 
therefore the analysis is conducted at two different levels of aggregation. We 
perform our estimation separately, on the level of 140 Unitary Authorities and 
Counties (WAREA) and on the level of 138 travel-to-work areas (TTWA). Since 
our analysis is performed at both units of geography it is relevant to highlight 
the main differences between the different levels of analysis’. Specifically the 
140  level is borne of local government administrative areas and consists of 
6 More details of our data and its limitations and the technical properties of our key variables are described in 
appendix 4.A.1. In this appendix, we also discuss the alternative geographical units of analysis.
7 In addition it is not possible to perform the estimation for young people alone because there is no data for the 
policy off period of 1997 and 1998.
127
Data
Chapter 4
counties and separate conurbations. These boundaries were created largely by 
historical accident. The 138 TTWAs are defined by a threshold of the fraction (two 
thirds) who live and work in the same area. We perform our analysis for each of 
the two levels of geography as an important robustness test as the nature of the 
cross section units are fundamentally different in the case of our TTWA or WAREA 
areas. Since the economic geography literature is largely silent on what is the 
correct choice of the level of geographical analysis then we repeat our analysis for 
both levels. Obviously, the basis for our analysis is different if we are comparing 
administrative units rather than TTWA geographies. As we shall see later, we are 
largely reassured by the fact that our estimation results are qualitatively similar 
across the two different geographies.
4.2.1 The employment variable
We then match local area employment data from the LFS with the minimum 
wage covariates generated from ASHE. There is an important feature of the 
timing of data collection which we exploit in order to try and make sure that our 
employment variable is measured after the up-rating of the NMW. The ASHE and 
NES estimates for hourly earnings and therefore the minimum wage variables 
used in this paper are recorded in April of each year. Since the minimum wage 
was first introduced in April 1999 but then up-rated in October of each following 
year, the NMW variables are therefore generally recorded six months after each 
NMW up-rating.8
Data on employment at these levels of aggregation derived from the LFS are 
available via NOMIS for yearly data for 1997 and 1998. For the period 1999 to 
2005 we use employment rates calculated from the quarterly LFS local area data. 
For the years 2006 to 2010 we use the quarterly LFS Special License data to 
calculate the employment rate.
4.2.2 Measuring the National Minimum Wage
The most widely used variable to measure the level of the NMW in the literature 
is the Kaitz index, defined as the ratio of the minimum wage relative to some 
measure of the average wage. We use the median wage in our study. The closer 
the Kaitz index is to unity the “tougher” the bite of minimum wage legislation 
in any area. However the denominator can be influenced by factors other than 
the level of the NMW and so the median wage is arguably more endogenous 
8 There are, however, two exceptions that are described more in detail in appendix 4.A.1 (Definition of key variables).
IAB-Bibliothek 359128
Identifying the Employment Effect of Invoking and Changing the Minimum Wage
in an employment regression. For example, a positive correlation between the 
employment rate and the median wage might be generated by an exogenous 
labour demand shift. This will create a negative correlation between the Kaitz 
index and the employment rate. When we use alternative measures of the MW 
both in previous work9 and here we did not find that this alternative definitions of 
the MW variable made any qualitative difference to our conclusions.
4.2.3 Modelling conditional and compositional covariates
The geographical heterogeneity of areas and localities in the UK is well known. 
Our analysis attempts to condition out for this spatial variability by using a vector 
of observed (derived) covariates. Explicitly we control for: the demographic age 
structure of each population (using average age, age squared and age cubed); 
the level of human capital in each area using the fraction of those qualified to 
degree standard (NVQ level 4 or above in each geography); the fraction of each 
population of working age which is female; and the compositional industrial 
structure (Duranton and Overman, 2005) – specifically the fraction of who work 
in the public sector. The final variable requires a brief elaboration.
There is some considerable debate in the UK as to the extent to which the 
size of public sector ‘crowds out’ the private sector (Faggio and Overman, 2014). 
There is also a considerable debate on regional inequality and the so-called 
‘North-South’ divide (Smith, 1994). The thinking of free market economists is 
that a vibrant growing economy needs an expanding private sector and that a 
large public sector gets in the way of such potential growth (Bacon and Eltis, 
1976). This view predominated in the Thatcher era (1979–1987) and now has 
common currency in the coalition government (2010–2015) – but this was not the 
dominant view in the era leading up the NMW (1987–2010). Conversely, multiplier 
effects could result from a large local public sector. It was with this aim that many 
of the core government departments were moved out of London to the regions in 
the 1980s and 1990s10. These are the forces which have shaped the development 
of the regional economies of the UK over the last 20 years. We try to take account 
of these changes by controlling for the fraction of each local labour force working 
in the public sector. This is important since the public sector is not influenced by 
the MW as virtually all public sector workers are paid above the MW. Thus, it is 
important to consider (exogenous) decisions on widening and reduction of the 
public sector across spatial geographies.
9 See Dolton et al. (2012) where the fraction of people at or below the NMW and the spike are used.
10 Specifically, the Department of Health moved to Leeds, the Department of Work and Pensions to Sheffield, the 
Department of Social Security to Newcastle and the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Authority (DVLA) to Swansea.
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4.2.4 Modelling the spatial nature of labour markets
One of the innovations in this paper is our attempt to capture the interconnectedness 
of local labour markets to estimate unbiased coefficients for the employment 
effects of the Minimum Wage.
The importance of the spatial nature of labour markets is now becoming more 
widely recognized and exploited in the work of Patacchini and Zenou (2007), Moretti 
(2011), and others. More specifically the suggestion that commuting patterns in UK 
are a way of representing this spatial interconnectedness are being used by others 
(e.g., Manning and Petrongolo, 2011). Where a given ‘local labour market’ begins and 
ends and the extent of interconnectedness of spatially located areas will depend 
on a multitude of factors, including: distances, physical geographical features like 
rivers (Hoxby, 2000), lakes and mountains, rail networks (Gibbons and Machin, 
2006), bus links, the availability of major arterial roads, house prices (Gibbons 
and Machin, 2003), commuting patterns (Rouwendal, 1998; Holly et al., 2010), 
school quality, council tax levels, crime rates (Gibbons and Machin, 2008) and the 
provision of amenities, to name but a few. In some sense it is impossible to observe 
all these factors in determining how interconnected each labour market is to every 
other labour market. To a degree all these influences on the spatial nature of the 
location decision of where one lives and works are determined by a large number of 
unobservables11. Our approach to this problem is to assume the observed pattern of 
commuting behaviour is the empirical ‘reduced form’ of all these influences which 
we cannot possibly observe. In some sense, if the degree of interconnectedness of 
labour markets is, de facto the actual propensity for an individual to live in one 
region, and work in another, aggregated up over all regions and all workers. To the 
extent that true then this is what we should use in our calculations.
One concern that may be important is that using the commuting matrix as 
a weights matrix may be potentially endogenous in the sense that its degree of 
interconnectedness for any specific location may be related directly to its level 
of economic activity12. To allay this concern we also use an alternative weights 
matrix based on geographic contiguity. This is a logical alternative used in the 
literature to model the spatial dependence (Möller and Aldashev, 2007). This 
measure is specifically 1 if a specific location borders another location, and 0 
otherwise. We use this alternative weighting system as a robustness check on 
the grounds that such geographical divisions are administrative and historical 
11 There is a growing body of literature about commuting behavior. This includes mapping it (Titheridge and Hall, 
2006; Nielsen and Hovgesen, 2008), accounting for it in labour market search models (Rouwendal, 1998) and 
econometrically modeling its determination (LeSage and Pace, 2008).
12 The whole issue of how a weighting matrix is conceived is discussed in Harris et al. (2011).
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and therefore exogenous to current economic forces. The use of this alternative 
weight matrix is the other possible extreme of interconnectedness assumption – 
being based on simple close proximity and not any other factors which may be 
endogenous. This logic suggests that it is appropriate to implement the spatial 
dependence structure in the residual term based on the assumption that the 
spatial dependence structure is known but not what its explicit form is . This is 
the logic behind modelling spatial dependence of the error term in a so-called 
‘spatial error model for panel’ data (SEMP).
However, there are some criticisms of spatial models which use spatial weight 
matrices. The main concern relates to the correct specification of the matrix and 
a lack of formal theory which determines its structure (e.g. Gibbons and Overman, 
2012). There could be some more problems in case of the SEMP model because the 
(Maximum Likelihood) estimation procedure is based on strong assumptions about 
the underlying data generating process.
With our data, it is not possible to explore the exact spatial dependence 
structure and it is not our main concern. Instead our approach is to frame our 
analysis by: using the weakest form of spatial dependence, contiguity, and a 
potentially stronger form, commuting behaviour, and then let these two structures 
bound the analysis as a robustness check. Accordingly, we will be interested in 
the relative (size and) inference of the unbiased estimated effect and their 
standard errors. To operationalise this we used the alternative approach by Conley 
(1999, 2008) to draw inference on the variance-covariance matrix of the effect 
coefficients considering a dependence structure between areas that are situated 
within a certain regional distance assuming this as a proxy for “economic distance”. 
To utilize this estimator we computed geographic coordinates of the (polygon) 
centroids of each of our area. Since this approach is a variance-covariance matrix 
estimator it is possible to estimate the effects by using the baseline regression 
we theoretically derive in the next section and complement the point estimators 
with standard errors considering a spatial dependence structure. Conley (1999) 
shows that his estimator remains consistent when economic distances cannot 
be precisely measured. Notwithstanding this robustness test, it is still the case 
that the estimator is based on one or other (either contiguity or commuting) 
assumption about the spatial dependence structure. That’s why we generally tested 
for (remaining) strong spatial dependence in the residuals by means of Pesaran’s 
CD statistic (Pesaran, 2004).13 This test provides us with more insight as to whether, 
despite our econometric modelling, we still have strong spatial dependence in our 
estimation.
13 Details can be found in appendix 4.A.2.
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4.2.5 Measuring the recession
The second innovation of this paper is to attempt to net out of our estimation 
any underlying movements in aggregate demand and more importantly the 
large potential effects of the current recession. This has rarely been attempted 
– indeed to our knowledge the only research on this topic has been our own 
previous attempts to tackle this issue (see Dolton et al., 2011; Dolton and Rosazza-
Bondibene, 2012; Dickens and Dolton, 2010). This analysis was fairly simple in that 
it relied on dummy indicators for the presence of a recession or not. The problems 
associated with this when the formal definition of a recession is two quarters of 
negative GDP growth are rehearsed in Dolton et al. (2011). Here we adopt a more 
ambitious approach as we attempt to control for negative regional GDP growth 
shocks with a direct proxy for regional growth. Therefore we seek an (exogenous) 
variable which captures the depth of a recession on a regional basis but which 
is not endogenous to the determination of employment directly. The requirement 
that this variable is available on regional basis proved exacting. Arguably, the 
exogeneity requirement rules out, employment measures for other groups, 
unemployment or measures related to the claimant count14. We explored measures 
such as house prices as such data is collected at a local level. The problem with this 
data is that such series only mirror recessions with a significant and differential 
lag (of up to 5 years) which is dependent on geography. Another suggestion was 
to use VAT registrations of the birth and death of companies – but this data series 
ends on a regional basis in 2007. The variable which we use is the lagged level 
of Gross Valued Added on a regional basis which is available in Regional Trends. 
The definition of this variable is that it aggregates all firm revenues, profits and 
all wages on a regional basis to compute literally the gross value of goods and 
services in the regional economy. Hence, to all intents and purposes, this variable 
is a measure of GDP growth (per head) on a regional basis. This, in our view, is 
the closest one can get to a variable which measures in a continuous way the 
level of regional GDP growth changes over time and hence it is a variable which 
captures when negative aggregate demand shocks hit; when a recession occurs 
and how severe it is in different regions in different years. The obvious criticism 
of this variable is that it is potentially endogenous to employment levels in the 
sense that the wages of employed people are included in its calculation. But since 
the variable includes much more than this in terms of the values of goods and 
services produced, we suggest that this rate of change of GVA variable can act as 
14 Dube et al. (2010) use private sector employment, Neumark and Wascher (1992) and many other authors use 
unemployment for adults. These measures are arguably endogenous.
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a proxy for the onset, timing, severity and duration of regional GDP growth and 
hence of recessions. A second response to this is that it is an advantage to have 
regional data on this demand shock variable as the demand level at any specific 
local subgeography will not be an important constituent of this variable at the 
regional level. An alternative criticism of this variable is that it is not measured at 
the precise geography of our unit of analysis. It is not possible to overcome this 
as movements in GDP or GVA are not measured at any finer level of geography. In 
addition using this level of geographical unit has the advantage that de facto one 
is using a spatial IV of the average shock at the wider geographical level.
4.2.6 The logic of identification from the data
The logic of our identification strategy is evident in the descriptive statistics we 
present in figure 4.1 that highlights the temporal variation in the NMW, comparing 
the nominal hourly wage level change of the adult NMW over time with the 
average earnings growth. The figure shows how the NMW grew smaller than the 
rise in average earnings in 2000 and then rose more steeply than this series; this 
trend came to an end in October 2007. Most marked is the rise in this level in 
both real and nominal terms since 2003 (compare this finding also with Metcalf, 
2004). The largest rises in the NMW were in 2001, 2003, 2004 and 2006. This is 
mirrored in the rising level of the Kaitz Index over the same years, as shown in 
figure 4.2. The principle here is that we wish to use the height of the steps due to 
the up rating of the MW considered over all the different locations in our sample. 
Figure 4.3 is more instructive of our data as it shows the level of the NMW (right-
hand scale) plotted on the same graph as the employment rate (left-hand scale) 
in our sample. It plots this for the 138 TTWAs at the mean of the sample with the 
95% standard errors in dotted lines. Here, we can see the period of 2002–2006, 
the boom years prior to the recession, which began in 2008/2009. The nature of 
this trend in employment needs to be picked up in the data and this is why we seek 
to model the underlying ‘steadystate of employment’ by seeking to identify the 
autoregressive nature of this process. Figure 4.4 adds to our understanding of what 
was happening to employment in relation to the movements in the Kaitz index 
(again at the average for the sample with 95% confidence intervals plotted). Here 
we see that – to a large extent – the upward movements of the Kaitz are mirrored 
by a downward shift to the employment level.
Hence we would expect to see an overall negative relationship between these 
two key variables. Reassuringly – this is what we find – although what we set 
out to do is condition out the problems which beset this kind of data–namely, 
endogeneity, demand shocks, and the nature of the underlying employment process.
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Figure 4.1: Change in nominal hourly wage level of the NMW and average earnings
Source:  NMW: UK Low Pay Commission, www.lowpay.gov.uk; Average Earnings Growth:  
http://data.gov.uk/dataset/average_earnings_index.
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Figure 4.3: National Minimum Wage (Adult Rate) and employment rate in the UK 1997–2010
Employment Rate and NMW (138 areas) 1997–2010
Source:  NMW: UK Low Pay Commision, www.lowpay.gov.uk; unweighted yearly averages of the Employment Rate, 
own calculation.
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Figure 4.4: Kaitz index (Adult Rate) and employment rate in the UK 1997–2010
Employment Rate and NMW (138 areas) 1997–2010
Note: Unweighted yearly averages of the Employment Rate and the Kaitz index (MW/Median), own calculation.
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4.3 Methodology and identification
4.3.1 Invoking and change of the National Minimum Wage15
To understand any of the estimation results relating to the impact of the NMW one 
must be clear about the simplest econometric specification and which parameters 
we seek to identify in the model. As a baseline reference we begin with the most 
basic model and develop it. Neumark and Wascher (1992) were among the first 
to utilize panel data to address the question of the impact of the MW.16 They 
estimated the model:
Ejt = a + γTt + Jj + βM jt + πDjt + δXjt + εjt (4.1)
Where Ejt is employment at time t in local area j, MWjt is the level of the MW 
(adjusted for coverage) at time t in local area j, Djt is a measure of aggregate labour 
demand (or the recession) in region j in year t, Xjt is a set of controlling regressors 
at time t in local areas j, Tt is a set of year effects, and Jj is a set of spatial fixed 
effects. Fixed effect estimation identifies potential causal inferences based on 
changes in the regressor and regressand given the assumption that the unobserved 
heterogeneity across areas remains constant over time. Later Neumark and Wascher 
(2004) use nearly the same specification to estimate the impact of the NMW laws 
across countries with the slight modification that now the term is similar to the 
Kaitz index using the ratio of the NMW in country j at time t divided by the average 
wage in that year17. Neumark and Wascher in their various papers, whether at the 
US State level or at the level of countries, find a negative employment effect of the 
NMW.
The logical critique of this panel model is that it still suffers from potentially 
all the same sources of potential heterogeneity bias as the simple time series 
model. Indeed it could even be argued that using US States as the unit of 
observation could potentially have even more problems – if for example – one 
state legislature’s decision to implement or change a MW is heavily influenced by 
the current level of unemployment or a neighbouring state’s policy decision. This 
concern is less of a problem in the UK context as there is a national NMW rather 
than a state MW–in which case the actual level (and change) in the NMW is not 
under the control of the authorities in any particular location.
15 For the derivation of the baseline equation (4.5) in this subsection, we follow Dolton et al. (2012). 
16 More precisely, they used US states data from 1973 to 1989.
17 Usually, the Kaitz index is also weighted by some measure of ’coverage’ of the NMW in the sense of the fraction of 
the labour force that the NMW applies to.
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A related methodological departure focused on identification is suggested by 
Card (1992) and Stewart (2002) who propose a ‘structural’ econometric model 
consisting of two equations. The first is a form of labour demand equation which 
suggests that any change in the employment rate in area j is a movement along 
the labour demand curve which results from a change in the wage level in area j 
conditioning out for any shocks in aggregate labour demand, D.
ΔEj = γ0 + ηΔWjt + πDj + ε1j  (4.2)
The second equation is a form of identity suggesting that the wage increase in 
area j is a function of the proportion in the area who are ‘low paid’, Pj .
ΔWj = α1 + ωPj + ε2j  (4.3)
Substituting equation (4.3) into equation (4.2) we get:
ΔEj = γ0 + βPj + πDj + ε1j  (4.4)
Where β = ηω, with ω assumed to be positive, implying that β has the same 
sign as η which basic economic theory would suggest is negative if the demand 
for labour falls as wages rise. According to Stewart (2002) the precondition 
for identification is that the proportion in the area that are ‘low paid’, is a 
predetermined instrument for the endogenous wage change. In this paper, we 
use the Kaitz index to act as a proxy for the wage effect of the NMW.18. The 
central idea of our paper is also to see whether geographic variation in the “bite” 
of the minimum wage is associated with geographic variation in employment. 
However, we also allow the effect of any treatment to vary over time, given the 
differential pattern of upratings that we observe in the data. This can be done by 
pooling over the fourteen year period and letting the treatment be the measures 
of the “bite” of the NMW in each area at time t, Pjt , so that the baseline equation 
for the estimated model is:
E jt = γ0+ Jj+γt
t∑
k=1999
Yk(t)+θ0Pjt+θIDiDt
t∑
k=1999
Yk(t)Pjt+πDjt+δX jt+ jt  (4.5)
18 In a previous paper we explore two other measures of the MW and the substantive conclusions do not differ 
(Dolton et al., 2011). We also re-estimated a model using the share measure of the MW as the wage regressor. None 
of our substantive conclusions change and, therefore, our results are not sensitive to the nature of which wage 
regressor is used. The authors provide estimation results for the fraction at or below the NMW upon request. In 
our later section we nevertheless examine the possibility that the Katiz index is itself endogenous. Here, we use a 
novel  IV strategy.
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Where Ejt is a measure of area labour market performance in area j at time t 
and Jj are area effects. Yk(t) is a set of dummy year effects for the years 1999 
to the observation period t that amount to 1 if t equals k and otherwise 0. The 
index k starts from 1999 as the year in which the NMW was introduced and is 
subsequently up-rated. Our pre-period are the years 1997 and 1998 were we use 
a notional measure of the Kaitz index in these years by taking the NMW in 1999 
and deflating it by the level of wage inflation to provide estimates of what this 
ratio might have been in these years (in the absence of a NMW). This is the most 
appropriate logical assumption to make with our data regarding the unobserved 
counterfactual (of what the NMW would have been set at, if it had been 
introduced in 1997).19 Namely that, in this period, adjustments would have been 
largely conditioned on what was happening to wage inflation. Area fixed effects 
are included to control for omitted variables that vary across local areas but not 
over time such as unmeasured economic conditions of local areas economies that 
give rise to persistently tight labour markets and high wages in particular areas 
independently of national labour market conditions. Time fixed effects control for 
omitted variables that are constant across local areas but evolve over time.
The Incremental Difference-in-Difference coefficients θtIDiD on the interaction 
of the year dummies and the measure of the bite, capture the average effect of 
the up-rating of the NMW in each year, starting from the introduction of the 
policy in 1999, all relative to the ’off period’ of 1997 and 1998, provided of course 
that the proportion in the area who are ‘low paid’, is a valid instrument for the 
endogenous wage change. The advantage of using the IDiD estimation procedure 
is that it facilitates the estimation of year-on-year incremental effects of each 
year’s up-rating. So, even if the average overall effect of introducing a NMW, θ0, is 
insignificantly different from zero, this does not necessarily mean that the effect 
of any individual year’s change in the NMW is also zero. Note that one cannot 
deduce the longer run effect of all the changes in the NMW by simply summing all 
the year-on-year IDiD coefficients.20 The long run effect can only be measured in 
aggregate by using one DiD coefficient for the whole period. We therefore present 
both short run IDiD and medium run DiD estimates in what follows.
Though we have 3 more years with observations compared to previous work 
in Dolton et al. (2012) our time series remains quite short. Therefore there is no 
19 We also compared our assumption to the existing Agricultural MW changes over the 1997 and 1998 period and 
these changes did not depart much from what was happening to wage inflation. In a previous paper, (Dolton and 
Rosazza-Bondibene, 2012, p. 95, table A5) also explored alternative specifications of base years and found that the 
results were not sensitive to this assumption.
20 This is because some additional (untestable) assumptions relating to the independence of effects over time would 
be necessary. In addition, since we use a dummy variable interaction term rather than a normalised metric on how 
large each increment was, then this also makes aggregation of the individual interaction term estimates difficult.
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statistical method that could test for autocorrelation of a higher order in our 
panel data set. An additional concern, we also already mentioned in Dolton et al. 
(2012), is that spatially dependent areas lead to heteroskedastic errors. In what 
follows, we explicitly model these spatial relations.
4.3.2 Basic identification issues
An issue which must be addressed from the outset is the extent to which the process 
of choosing the initial rate of the MW in 1999 was endogenous. More specifically, 
was the rate set initially very low in 1999 deliberately to prevent employment 
effects with attendant expectation that later (possibly above inflation) rises in the 
MW rate would be appropriate and justifiable. We have researched this carefully. 
In choosing the initial rate the Low Pay Commission’s (LPC) stated aim was: ’… 
to balance the aim to address low pay and the need to ensure that the level is 
manageable for business and the economy’21 No mention was made in the lengthy 
chapter in Low Pay Commission (1998) on ’choosing the rate’ of attempting to 
minimise the employment consequences or intentionally to have a rate which 
was low to begin with and subsequently uprated by more that inflation. Metcalf 
(1999, p. F61) has also said in reflecting on the process of choosing the rate that 
’… It is impossible to forecast now whether the NMW will have any favourable 
or adverse direct employment consequences.’22 Another important consideration is 
the simple dynamics of our investigation. Specifically, how long will it take the 
introduction (or changes) in the NMW to have their full effects on employment 
and other economic indicators (especially since some of the variables in the data 
are already measured with a lag). This raises the econometric issue about including 
a lagged effect of the minimum wage variable in the regression. The literature to 
date is divided on this issue. On the one hand, employers might react relatively 
quickly to increases in minimum wages. Employers might even adapt before the 
implementation of the minimum wage. Brown et al. (1982, pp. 496), regarding 
employment, argue that: ”One important consideration is the fact that plausible 
adjustment in employment of minimum wage workers can be accomplished simply 
by reducing the rate at which replacements for normal turnover are hired”. The 
authors also suggest that minimum wage increases are announced months before 
they are implemented – typically six months in the UK – therefore, firms may have 
begun to adapt before the increase of the minimum wage come effectively into 
21 See chapter 6 in Low Pay Commission (1998, p. 89).
22 We have also had further correspondence with Sir David Metcalf (a member of the original LPC) to clarify this issue 
and he has reaffirmed to the authors in correspondence that the process of setting the NMW initially was not 
endogenous.
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force. On the other hand, it might take time for employers to adjust factor inputs to 
changes in factor prices. Hamermesh (1995) points out that in the short run, costly 
capital inputs are not easily adjusted. If firms adjust capital slowly following an 
increase of the minimum wage, the adjustments of labour input might be slowed as 
well. The use of a lagged minimum wage measure as well as the inclusion of fixed 
(area) effects in the regression also helps to overcome the possible endogeneity of 
the minimum wage variable which occurs as a result of correlation of either the 
proportion paid at the minimum or, in case of the Kaitz index, the minimum wage 
and the median wage with labour market conditions or productivity.
An issue of identification arises from the ’common trends assumption’ which, 
in our context, is the assumption that the effect of market conditions will be the 
same across all geographic units before the introduction of the NMW – resulting 
in any differences in the employment across geographical units being constant, 
prior to the introduction of the NMW. One way of examining this is to consider 
whether the employment rate has the same underlying trend across all our 
geographical units before the introduction of the NMW. In our case we cannot 
do this because the small geography LFS data which we use to construct the 
employment rate does not go back before 1997. However, it is possible to have a 
longer off-period starting from 1994 and using 95 areas, which correspond to the 
coding used on the NES (the National Earnings Survey which preceded the ASHE) 
up to 1996.23 The results of the test give us some confidence about the internal 
validity of the model, being unable to reject the null of a common trend at 10% 
level.24 Whilst this is no proof of the presence of common trends in our data, this 
gives us some confidence about the internal validity of our model for the full set 
of more detailed geographies.
4.3.3 Modelling spatial dependencies
In recent years, the econometrics literature has exhibited a growing interest in 
specifying spatial dependencies, or more generally, cross sectional dependencies 
because estimation results could be spurious if there is spatial dependency that is 
not considered in the model (LeSage and Pace, 2009).
The idea is that an economic aggregate like employment in a certain region does 
not only depend on economic forces in the same region but also in other regions. 
23 The areas comprise all existent counties, the counties abolished with the 1996 local government reform and the 
London boroughs. The “City of London” was deleted from the dataset due to small sample size and the Scottish 
Islands were excluded from the analysis because they are not present in the data across all years.
24 For all workers (16 years to retirement) we cannot reject the null of a common trend at the 10% level (F(91, 276)=1.45) 
if we omit three areas, all with small sample sizes (Scottish Borders, Gwynedd and Shropshire). However, omitting these 
areas from our IDiD regressions does not change our main results.
IAB-Bibliothek 359140
Identifying the Employment Effect of Invoking and Changing the Minimum Wage
To consider these dependencies a class of econometric models were developed 
that consider spatially autoregressive processes, e.g. in the dependent variables 
or in the error term. The first model is often called the Spatial Lag or Spatial 
Autoregressive Panel Model (SARP) and the second is called the Spatial Error Panel 
Model (SEMP, Elhorst, 2010c). The question is – which model specification should 
be preferred – models without spatial dependencies or with spatial lags? This is 
crucial because misspecification would lead to biased estimates of the coefficients 
of interest. We therefore conduct Lagrange Multiplier Tests, derived by Debarsy and 
Ertur (2010), which show us that spatial dependence is present and should not be 
neglected and there are indications that the SEMP approach should be preferred 
in the vast majority of specifications (all details can be found in appendix 4.A.3. 
Aside from this, one should also consider that a shortcoming of the utilized LM 
tests by Debarsy and Ertur (2010) is that they are only able to test the SEMP and 
SARP, their combination as well as a somewhat spatial specification against no 
spatial lag. Gibbons and Overman (2012) discussed the formal representation of 
the SEMP and SARP models with the spatial Durbin model that contains spatial 
lags of the dependent variable and the exogenous regressors. They show that the 
reduced forms of SARP and SEMP model that contain spatial lags of independent 
variables with order 1 to infinity only differ in their coefficient terms. On this 
basis, they argue that reduced forms of the SEMP and SARP cannot, in practice, 
be empirically distinguished from other specifications. The reason for this result is 
that some assumption has to be made regarding the form of the weights matrix 
WT and the spatial lags of different orders on the explaining variables are almost 
always expected to be highly correlated. Apart from this statistical consideration, 
there is another motivation for utilizing the SEMP model that considers spatial 
dependence structure in unobservable (explaining) variables. This is in contrast 
to the SARP model that is based on the notion that the dependent variables, the 
employment rates, influences each other in the same observation period. This is 
possible, for example, in a rationale expectations model that assumes the existence 
of economic actors who directly or indirectly, through the independent variables, 
fix the employment rates in each region during each observation period. This may 
be possible in the case of dependent policy variables like tax rates, but it is more 
difficult to motivate in the case of economic aggregates like employment rates. 
Taking all these considerations into account we favour using the SEMP model.
Thus, we extend our model in equation (4.5) with spatial lags of the error term:
E jt = γ0+ Jj+γt
t∑
k=1999
Yk(t)+θ0Pjt+θIDiDt
t∑
k=1999
Yk(t)Pjt+πDjt+δX jt+u jt (4.6)
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u jt =λ
n∑
i=1
wi juit+ jt   (4.7)
where λ is the coefficient for the spatial lag term∑ni=1 ijuit , a linear combination of 
the error terms for regions i that are assumed to influence the error term in region 
j (LeSage and Pace, 2009). The weights ij contain zeros if there are no spatial lags 
and the main diagonal of the weight matrix contains zeros because it is assumed 
that a region cannot have an influence on itself. Furthermore, the weight matrix 
used for the estimation is standardized with rows summing to unity, irrespective 
of information used to model regional dependencies. The weights used reflect 
the assumption about the relative strength of the spatial lag. In every case it is 
intended to identify the spatial dimension of economic or regional activity and to 
implement that in the model.
A simple assumption is that neighbouring or nearby regions have a greater 
influence on other than those that do not share a border or vertex (LeSage and 
Pace, 2010). The contiguity weights matrix before row-standardization contains 
ones in case of contiguity and zeros otherwise. Like weight matrices based on 
distances between regions, this matrix is symmetric. This implies that, e.g., region 
A influences region B to the same extent as region B influences region A. It is 
important to acknowledge that this could be a restrictive assumption for the UK, 
where there are clearly asymmetric economic relations between economically 
strong regions like London and surrounding economically weaker provinces. It is 
this logic which induced us to use commuting patterns. These are good indicators 
of the intensity of regional labour market interdependencies since they summarize 
spatially related economic decisions and behaviour. Furthermore, commuting 
flows have direction – the number of people that go from their (home) region A 
to work in region B differs to that number of other people that go from region B 
to region A. Therefore, we decided to use commuting flows and to compare our 
results with specifications that are based on contiguity as a robustness check (see 
appendix 4.A.4 for some more details). Hence, we use the flow of commuters from 
their home region i to region j where they work.25 To form a spatial lag or a linear 
combination of values from the “nearby” regions, for each region j, weights 1j to 
nj
 are normalized to the (row) sum of unity.
Equations (4.6) and (4.7) in matrix notation are:
E = γ0ιnT + YNγt + θ0P + (θNIDiD' YN)' P + Xδ + u (4.8)
25 We are sensitive to the possibility that weighting matrix W may be endogenous. In the empirical estimation, we also 
run all our analysis with an alternative ‘contiguity’ weighting matrix which is simply constructed as a matrix of 1’s and 
0’s for each geographical location depending on whether the location abuts a neighbouring location (1) or not (0).
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with a spatially autoregressive process in the error term u,
u = λWTu + ε  (4.9)
Hence, E(P/YN /u/ε) is the nT × 1 vector containing the employment rates Ejt 
(the measures for the Kaitz index Pjt / the year effects variables Yt with Yt = 0 for 
t = 1997, 1998 / the spatially correlated residuals ujt / the error term εjt ), WT is a 
nT × nT matrix containing all weights ij that are equal for all years. ιnT is a unity 
vector with dimension nT × 1. The nT × 1 vector γt contains the parameters for 
the year effects and the nT × 1 vector θNIDiD contains the (stacked) Incremental 
Difference-in-Difference coefficients θtIDiD. The nT × k matrix X contains the k 
control variables including the aggregate demand shocks measure D, and the 
k  ×  1 vector δ the k coefficients of the control variables.
Finally solving equation (4.9) for u and implementing that in (4.8) leads to the 
estimable SEMP model
E = γ0ιnT + YNγt + θ0P + (θNIDiD' YN)' P + Xδ + (I – λWT )–1ε (4.10)
Since the regression equation in (4.10) is non-linear in its parameters, 
maximumlikelihood estimation is used to estimate the parameters. We use the 
estimation procedure suggested by Elhorst (2010b), which includes a bias correction 
for both time and spatial fixed effects (for details see Lee and Yu, 2010).
Being mindful of the problems discussed above in specifying the weight matrices 
in spatial specifications like the SEMP models which we present, we focus our 
attention on the inference in the effect estimators and their variance-covariance-
matrices. To this end we additionally utilized an approach by Conley (1999, 2008) to 
estimate a variance-covariance matrix considering interrelatedness of local areas 
within a certain distance and assuming that the interrelatedness decreases with 
distance. According to Conley (2008) the usual point estimators for the regression 
coefficients of, e.g., equation (5) remain consistent in the case of weak spatial 
dependence. However, this does not hold for the variance-covariance matrix. Conley 
(1999) proposes a nonparametric estimation of the covariance matrix. The idea 
behind this procedure is to use time series heteroskedasticity and autocovariance 
(HAC) consistent covariance matrix estimation. With the use of residuals εˆjt as 
computation of εjt , the variance-covariance matrix can be estimated as a weighted 
sum of cross products with the regressor vectors xjt , whereas j denotes local area 
j = 1, …, N (N = [138,140]) and t denotes observation period t = 1,  …, T (T = 13):
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ΣˆN = 1NT
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
KN (i, j)xjt εˆjt x'it εˆ it  (4.11)
KN denotes a kernel utilized to weight pairs of observations. Here the spatial 
kernel KN (i, j) is specified to be a Bartlett or a triangular window function. Thus, 
this kernel decays linearly with distance in all directions26.
4.3.4 Dynamics
A standard assumption of the OLS and Fixed effects models as well as their spatial 
counterparts is that they require that the explanatory variables to be uncorrelated 
with the residuals. In practical applications like ours, this requirement is rarely 
completely satisfied. Potential reasons for this could be the dynamic properties 
of the used variables, e.g. hysteresis of the employment variable, measurement 
errors in the variables or further omitted variables that are not observable. To 
overcome these problems the most commonly used approach is to use dynamic 
panel instrumental variable methods (see Arellano and Bond, 1991; Greene, 2012, 
pp. 256).27
We adopt the system generalized method of moments estimator (SGMM) 
developed by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988); Arellano and Bover (1995); Blundell and Bond 
(1998). Generally, the SGMM estimator can be applied for panel data sets with a short 
observation period in terms of small T and many cross section units, and thus large 
N (Roodman, 2009b). Furthermore, the estimator assumes that the only available 
instruments are “internal” in terms of lags of the instrumented variables in differences 
or levels. We prefer the SGMM to Difference GMM (and other alternatives) because 
SGMM is more efficient and precise since it reduces the finite sample bias (Baltagi, 
2008). Nevertheless, a crucial initial condition for the validity of the additional 
instruments in SGMM is that fixed effects do not correlate with differences in the 
26 Generally, the form of the Kernel KN(i, j ) should represent the idea that nearby observations receive a weight 
near  1 and those far apart receive weights near zero. Our estimation procedure, developed by Hsiang (2010), 
additionally allows a uniform kernel that equals 1 if i and j are located within a cut-off distance and zero otherwise. 
Conley (1999, 2008) underlines that estimations based on this Kernel are robust to location errors within in the 
threshold distance – the results remain stable compared to the results that would be obtained on the base of the 
“true” locations. Changes in weights occur only for those points whose true distance is near enough to the cut-off 
distance and the observed (wrong) distance between two areas and the true distance between those areas are on 
different sides of the cut-off distance. However, although the Bartlett window is obviously more sensitive to the 
“real” distances, we decided to use this kernel because the results based on the uniform kernel form do not reveal 
differences but, in a few cases, the computation of Conley standard errors based on this kernel was impossible due 
to not positive definite covariance matrices.
27 The estimation strategy behind the assumption that some or all explaining variables are correlated with the error 
term is that one finds a set of (instrumental) variables that are correlated with the explaining variables but not with 
the error terms. Due to the resulting set of relationships among instruments, explaining variables, and error terms a 
consistent estimator of the coefficients of interest can be derived. For this purpose a number of assumptions have 
to be made, Roodman (2009b).
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instrumenting variables. Roodman (2009a) showed that this requirement can be 
satisfied in a “steady state” situation, when deviations from long-term values are not 
systematically related to fixed effects. A “steady state” can be assumed, if the variable 
of interest – here it is the employment rate – tends to converge. This can be checked 
empirically by unit root tests for panel models or by estimating a simple fixed effects 
model with only a lagged dependent variable as regressor, thus an AR(1)-model. In 
the latter case the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable should be smaller 
than the absolute value of unity. The results of these estimations confirm that our 
lagged dependence coefficients are significantly smaller than unity28 for both our 
alternative geographical areas.
Our baseline equations are nearly equivalent to the fully specified model from 
equation (4.5) with and without the recession variable:
E jt =αE jt−1+γ0+ Jj+γt
t∑
k=1999
Yk(t)+θ0Pjt+θIDiDt
t∑
k=1999
Yk(t)Pjt+πDjt+δX jt+ jt  (4.12)
We included the lagged employment rate and complemented the model with 
certain levels and differences of the control variables (in Xjt ) as instruments. There 
are three groups of instruments. Variables in the first group – GMM instruments 
– are assumed to be endogenous, hence, lags of levels and differences of those 
instruments are in this group. The employment rate and all or some of the control 
variables belong to this group. The second group – instrumented variables in 
levels and first differences – are handled to be strictly exogenous. We handle 
the recession variable, the Kaitz index, the incremental difference-in-difference 
variables, and remaining control variables that are not assigned to the first group 
as strictly exogenous. Levels and differences of those variables are utilized as 
instruments. The third group – instrumented variables only in levels – contains 
levels of all variables in the second group and, additionally, the levels of year 
effects.
An important consideration in our estimation strategy is to find the optimal 
specification in terms of the choice and number of the instruments. This is 
important since too many instruments could ‘over-fit’ the endogenous variables 
(of interest) and lead to invalid results (Roodman, 2009a). Regarding the choice 
of the instruments, we have to bear in mind that we apply a reduced form of 
employment equation because we cannot observe the detailed employment 
generating process at the micro-level, it could suggest that the employment 
28 We estimated the equation yit = α yit – 1 + μi + εit with the employment rate yit , yit – 1 in region i and time t and 
its value from the pre-period t – 1, the lagged dependent coefficient α, the fixed effect μi , and the error term εit . 
The results are (1) α138 areas = 0.199***, and (2) α140 areas = 0.234***. All coefficients are significantly smaller than 
unity (significance level of 1 per cent).
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rate29, as well as the control variables, are also partly influenced by their previous 
values. The overall MW bite, as well as the yearly incremental MW bites, are 
considered not to be influenced by their lagged level or difference values, but 
in that specification they can be influenced by the (lagged) employment rate. In 
all our estimations, we use the two step procedure to get robust results and test 
statistics as well as the Windmeijer correction for small sample size to reduce 
the downward bias of standard errors after the two-step procedure (Windmeijer, 
2005). Furthermore to handle instrument proliferation we integrated the 
instrument set into one column as proposed by Roodman (2009b). We utilize 
the Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) and AR(2) in first differences, Hansen’s J-test 
of overidentifying restrictions, and the Difference-in-Hansen’s J statistic to test 
the validity of the model specification30. Furthermore, we checked the robustness 
of the model specification by varying the number of lags of the instrumental 
variable sets Roodman (2009a). In line with Bond (2002), we checked whether 
the coefficient for the lagged dependent variable lies somewhere between the 
results obtained from adequate OLS and fixed effects estimators.31 Throughout 
these specification tests, our reported results provide acceptable test values 
ensuring that our estimates remain robust.
4.4 Results
We present the estimates for the non-dynamic specification in table 4.1 for the 
138 travel-to-work areas and in table 4.2 for the 140 areas. The first column of 
both tables contains the results of the DiD model in equation (4.1) using (the 
log of) employment as the labour market outcome of interest to summarise 
the NMW effect on employment over the medium term, namely, the average 
over 14 years since its introduction relative to the base period of 1997/1998. 
The coefficients of the Kaitz measure for the 138 TTWA suggest that there is 
an overall difference in employment growth rates between areas where the 
NMW bites most compared to areas where the NMW had less impact; in the 
case of the 140 areas this effect is notably smaller and insignificant. Columns 2 
of tables  4.1 and 4.2 augment the base model with the model specification of 
the IDiD estimator in equation  (4.5). The following column in these tables also 
29 A logical question is: why did we not include a lagged term of the dependent variable in the OLS, FE, and 
spatial specifications. The answer is that it is known that pooled OLS specification results in an upward bias of 
the appropriate coefficient and FE downward biased results (Nickell, 1981, e.g.). However, we used adequate 
specifications to detect the validity of the SGMM. See also below in the text.
30 A further description of the mentioned tests can be found in appendix 4.A.5.
31 The results from pooled OLS and fixed effects specifications including lagged dependent variables are reported in 
table 4.10 in same appendix 4.A.5.
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include the GVA lagged variable as a measure for the recession. As expected, 
the recessionary variable is positively significant suggesting the intuitively 
‘correct’ sign of the impact of growth on employment. This is also true for all 
specifications in other columns. The addition of the GVA variable attenuates 
downwards the size of the IDiD coefficients on the NMW variables for each 
year. This indicates that modeling the employment effect of the MW without 
taking into account demand shocks and recessions is problematic and likely to 
overstate any measured MW effects on employment.
Columns 4 to 6 of tables 4.1 and 4.2 again present the point estimates of 
equation (4.5) and their standard errors computed with the variance-covariance 
estimations procedure by Conley (1999, 2008). based on the Bartlett kernel for 
three different regional distance thresholds, namely 50 km, 100 km, and 200 km. 
Only with a few exceptions are Conley’s standard errors mainly smaller than 
the standard errors in column 3. We report point estimates in bold when this 
has implications for the significance levels. As Conley (1999); Conley and Ligon 
(2002) point out, the consequence of spatial dependence is generally not that the 
standard errors are larger, because negative spatial correlation in the residuals 
lead to smaller standard errors. Generally, the results suggest spatial dependence 
because the standard errors changed. However, the significance levels of the point 
estimates in column 3 change after considering that non-parametric estimation 
procedure only in a few cases for the 140 areas; then, the results become more 
precise.
Columns 7 and 8 of tables 4.1 and 4.2 contain estimates for the ‘full model’ using 
the complete Incremental Diff-in-Diff structure but includes the spatial effects using 
the SEMP model from equation (4.10) for the 138 and 140 samples respectively. The 
results for the point estimates are quite similar to the results in column 3 (to 6) 
where the standard errors lie mostly between those of the specifications in column  3 
and Conley’s standard errors (columns 4 to 6). The spatial lag coefficient λ is nearly 
Zero and insignificant for the 140 areas and it is weak significantly positive for the 
138 areas.
The main results from our non-dynamic estimations are, first taking the 
common findings across nearly all specifications: we can suggest that the 
recession, as captured by the GVA-lagged variable, plays an important role in 
the determination of employment but that the consequence of this variable’s 
inclusion is that the NMW interaction effects are always attenuated. Likewise, 
these estimated effects are further attenuated when we explicitly take account 
of the spatial effects.
Our second main finding is that after including the IDiD Kaitz interaction term 
the magnitude of this (negative) overall effect rises nearly in all specifications 
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and becomes statistically significant whereas the coefficients of the Kaitz 
interaction term become partly significantly positive. This can be interpreted as 
the continuous, underlying effect of having a NMW in place rather than the 
effect of the size of the year on year up rating. This is an important conclusion 
which potentially enables us to understand much of the controversy in the 
research literature. Indeed it suggests that, if our specification is correct (and our 
logic were applicable to the US state context), then the source of much of the 
disagreement between the main protagonists, Card and Krueger (1994, 1995) or 
Neumark and Wascher (1994, 2004) may have been misplaced due to equation 
misspecification.
Turning to the estimations and distinguishing between the results from 
the different geographies is instructive. Looking first at table 4.2 relating to the 
140  geography we see that there are significantly positive – at least at a 10 per 
cent significance level – interaction effects in the years 2000, 2003, 2004, 2006, 
and 2007.
For the 138 areas which are travel-to-work areas (TTWA) in table 4.1 we see 
that there is no evidence of interaction effects in the IDiD model with the exception 
of the years 2003 and 2004. This suggests that if one uses a geography which 
is defined on the nature of the commuting pattern – which the TTWA is – then 
this effectively cancels out the IDiD effect. Hence, if one believes that the analysis 
should be done on the basis of the TTWA geography, then there are no appreciably 
significant incremental year on year effects of the NMW.
Turning to the models which reflect the specification of the spatial models 
(columns 7 and 8) we found for the SEMP specifications a significantly positive 
coefficient λ for the spatial lag of the error terms in case of the TTWA geography 
and no significant coefficient for the WAREA geography.32
Overall, where our NMW incremental effects are found to be significant it 
should be stressed that these point estimates effects are small in magnitude, but it 
is clear that they are masked if the simple DiD policy-on-policy-off variable is used. 
If the standard assumptions of Diff-in-Diff relating to the Stable Unit Treatment are 
applicable (namely that no other systematic factors are varying across geography and 
over time) then we can interpret this as a direct impact of the year-on-year upratings 
to the NMW which may cancel out the overall negative impact of the presence of the 
32 We found higher positive coefficients λ in all model versions without the GVA variable, though the coefficient 
remains insignificant for the WAREA. The explanation is that the GVA variable is measured at the Government 
Office Regional level which is the higher administrative geographical unit to the utilized geographies and, in 
effect, the spatial dimension is soaked up by the inclusion of this variable. This is reflected in the fact that the lack 
of significance of λ tells us that the spatial model is not necessary (when the GVA lagged term is included). The 
results of Lagrange Multiplier tests, presented in appendix 4.A.3, and Pesaran’s CD statistic confirm this finding. The 
CD statistics and the estimation results for SEMP specifications without GVA variable are presented in the table in 
appendix 4.A.6.
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NMW as captured by the Kaitz variable. On this basis, if anything, the employment 
rate appears to have risen more in areas where the NMW has more relevance.
Our empirical strategy is further justified by examination of the residuals 
for spatial autocorrelation. We found only weak spatial autocorrelation in our 
model specifications, even after including the demand variable. To test for spatial 
autocorrelation, we use Pesaran’s CD test (Pesaran, 2004) a simple test statistic, to 
be found at the bottom of tables 4.1 and 4.233. The statistic is reported to be robust 
to structural breaks and valid for panel data where the number of cross sections is 
larger than the number of observations periods – as it is here for our case for the two 
geographies. For both geographies the test statistics are below the critical value of 
1.96 (equivalent to a significance level of 5 per cent). The SEMP model reduces the 
extent of the spatial dependence in the residuals for the geography with 138 areas 
and for the 140 areas based on the contiguity matrix (tables 4.1 and 4.2).
Table 4.3 contains the estimation results for the SGMM specifications. The 
first four columns contain results for the 138 areas and the second four columns 
contain results for the 140 areas. The presented model specifications differ 
in their number of chosen instruments (within these models that passed the 
specifications tests we present in table 4.4; the specifications of the instrument 
subsets can be found in table 4.5) and we show those to assess the robustness 
of the results. For the SGMM model specifications, Pesaran’s CD statistics lie 
predominantly below the critical value for the 1 per cent level; and in some cases 
below the 5 per cent level (column 3 for the TTWA and 8 for the WAREA, see the 
bottom of table 4.3). We can conclude, on the equivalent significance level of 
5  per cent, that there is no strong cross-sectional dependence in the residuals in 
the latter specifications.
A common result is the significantly positive coefficient of the lagged dependent 
employment variable. Compared to our previous results, our parameters of interest 
are notably smaller, the standard errors rise and, thus, become mostly insignificant. 
The rise in the standard errors can at least partly be explained by the loss of the year 
1997 as an observation period because we included the lagged employment rate 
in our dynamic specification. But the main reason for the difference in the results 
from tables 4.1 and 4.2 is that the lagged employment rate soaks up the MW long-
term effect and, in a few cases, also the demand variable effect. Following these 
results, we did not find any significant long-term effect of the Kaitz index. However, 
there are some – weak – significantly negative coefficients for the year-on-year 
adjustments, those effects are not robust and the significance level is never lower 
than 10 per cent; the results are different between the two geographies. All in all,
33 Details can be found in appendix 4.A.2.
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Table 4.1:  Within Group estimates of Minimum Wage effects on employment,  
16 years to retirement age, 1997–2010, all regressions contain control variables, area 
and year effects. Travel-to-Work Areas (TTWA), resulting in 138 regions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Basic specifications Spatial specifications
w/o Yearly 
Interaction 
MW Effects/ 
w/o GVA
with Yearly  
Interaction  
MW Effects
Conley 
Standard 
Errors  
(50 km)
Conley 
Standard 
Errors  
(100 km)
Conley 
Standard 
Errors  
(200 km)
SEMP
Commuting 
Matrix
SEMP
Contiguity 
Matrix
Kaitz -0.108*** -0.145*** -0.127*** -0.127*** -0.127*** -0.127*** -0.122*** -0.123***
(0.039) (0.047) (0.048) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.044) (0.044)
GVA 0.709*** 0.709*** 0.709*** 0.709*** 0.678*** 0.719***
(0.239) (0.181) (0.192) (0.209) (0.192) (0.190)
Share Public -0.062 -0.059 -0.066 -0.066* -0.066* -0.066* -0.065** 0.066**
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.033) (0.033)
Kaitz *1999 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.012
(0.052) (0.054) (0.050) (0.050) (0.052) (0.050) (0.049)
Kaitz *2000 0.043 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.043 0.039
(0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.040) (0.041) (0.050) (0.049)
Kaitz *2001 -0.010 -0.023 -0.023 -0.023 -0.023 -0.02 -0.021
(0.037) (0.037) (0.035) (0.036) (0.037) (0.049) (0.048)
Kaitz *2002 0.035 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.014
(0.032) (0.033) (0.035) (0.034) (0.032) (0.048) (0.048)
Kaitz *2003 0.101** 0.084** 0.084** 0.084** 0.084** 0.080 0.080
(0.043) (0.042) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.050) (0.049)
Kaitz *2004 0.110** 0.091* 0.091* 0.091* 0.091* 0.090* 0.092*
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.047) (0.048) (0.050) (0.049)
Kaitz *2005 0.042 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.021 0.024
(0.050) (0.050) (0.048) (0.047) (0.049) (0.052) (0.051)
Kaitz *2006 0.006 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.015 -0.015
(0.058) (0.057) (0.053) (0.046) (0.043) (0.053) (0.052)
Kaitz *2007 0.053 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.037 0.034
(0.055) (0.055) (0.048) (0.051) (0.049) (0.052) (0.051)
Kaitz *2008 0.074 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.06 0.061
(0.050) (0.050) (0.048) (0.049) (0.047) (0.051) (0.050)
Kaitz *2009 -0.016 -0.034 -0.034 -0.034 -0.034 -0.032 -0.032
(0.061) (0.060) (0.056) (0.055) (0.055) (0.052) (0.051)
Kaitz *2010 0.058 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.031
(0.053) (0.054) (0.052) (0.058) (0.063) (0.053) (0.052)
Lambda 0.090** 0.061*
(0.039) (0.033)
Observations 1,932 1,932 1,932 1,932 1,932 1,932
R-squared 0.131 0.137 0.145 0.145
log-likelihood 3,252.833 3,252.477
Pesaran’s CD -0.186 -0.518 -1.421 -1.421 -1.156 -1.304
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Columns 1–3: Robust standard errors. 
Columns 4–6: Conley s.e. are based on spatial Bartlett kernel. Coefficients are printed in bold in case of 
significance level changes compared to column 3.
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Table 4.2:  Within Group estimates of Minimum Wage effects on employment,  
16 years to retirement age, 1997–2010, all regressions contain control variables, area  
and year effects. Unitary Authorities and Counties (WAREA), resulting in 140 regions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Basic specifications Spatial specifications
w/o Yearly 
Interaction 
MW Effects/ 
w/o GVA
with Yearly  
Interaction  
MW Effects
Conley 
Standard 
Errors  
(50 km)
Conley 
Standard 
Errors  
(100 km)
Conley 
Standard 
Errors  
(200 km)
SEMP
Commuting 
Matrix
SEMP
Contiguity 
Matrix
Kaitz -0.056 -0.137*** -0.106** -0.106** -0.106** -0.106** -0.106*** -0.106***
(0.044) (0.050) (0.051) (0.043) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
GVA 0.888*** 0.888*** 0.888*** 0.888*** 0.890*** 0.886***
(0.221) (0.148) (0.142) (0.134) (0.168) (0.168)
Share Public -0.076* -0.072* -0.073* -0.073** -0.073** -0.073** -0.073** -0.073**
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.036) (0.035) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033)
Kaitz *1999 0.038 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.048
(0.036) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Kaitz *2000 0.085** 0.081* 0.081** 0.081* 0.081* 0.080* 0.081*
(0.040) (0.042) (0.039) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.044)
Kaitz *2001 0.047 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.02 0.021
(0.045) (0.047) (0.044) (0.040) (0.034) (0.042) (0.042)
Kaitz *2002 0.079** 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.045 0.046
(0.037) (0.038) (0.039) (0.036) (0.032) (0.042) (0.042)
Kaitz *2003 0.185*** 0.150*** 0.150*** 0.150*** 0.150*** 0.15*** 0.15***
(0.053) (0.054) (0.041) (0.039) (0.039) (0.043) (0.044)
Kaitz *2004 0.111** 0.074 0.074* 0.074* 0.074** 0.074* 0.074*
(0.046) (0.047) (0.044) (0.043) (0.037) (0.044) (0.044)
Kaitz *2005 0.130*** 0.099** 0.099*** 0.099*** 0.099*** 0.098** 0.099
(0.038) (0.039) (0.034) (0.031) (0.027) (0.046) (0.046)
Kaitz *2006 0.169*** 0.121*** 0.121*** 0.121*** 0.121*** 0.122*** 0.122***
(0.039) (0.040) (0.034) (0.032) (0.029) (0.046) (0.047)
Kaitz *2007 0.135** 0.099* 0.099** 0.099** 0.099** 0.099** 0.099**
(0.054) (0.054) (0.050) (0.045) (0.039) (0.046) (0.046)
Kaitz *2008 0.105*** 0.063 0.063* 0.063* 0.063** 0.063 0.063
(0.039) (0.039) (0.033) (0.032) (0.031) (0.045) (0.045)
Kaitz *2009 0.049 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.042) (0.043) (0.038) (0.034) (0.029) (0.046) (0.046)
Kaitz *2010 0.090* 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.03 0.03
(0.050) (0.050) (0.043) (0.044) (0.042) (0.048) (0.048)
0.048 0.048
Lambda -0.01 -0.003
(0.038) (0.031)
Observations 1,960 1,960 1,960 1,960 1,960 1,960
R-squared 0.115 0.130 0.143 0.143
log-likelihood 3,363.179 3,363.164
Pesaran’s CD 0.497 0.223 -1.516 -1.516 -1.522 -1.366
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Columns 1–3: Robust standard errors.  
Columns 4–6: Conley s.e. are based on spatial Bartlett kernel. Coefficients are printed in bold in case of 
significance level changes compared to column 3.
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Table 4.3: SGMM estimates of Minimum Wage effects on employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Travel-to-Work Areas (TTWA),  
138 regions
Unitary Authorities and Counties (WAREA), 
140 regions
SGMM SGMM SGMM SGMM SGMM SGMM SGMM SGMM
Kaitz -0.016 -0.015 -0.013 -0.030 -0.026 -0.025 -0.030 -0.073
(0.056) (0.056) (0.078) (0.071) (0.063) (0.062) (0.073) (0.093)
Et –1 0.239*** 0.239*** 0.218*** 0.241*** 0.242*** 0.241*** 0.236*** 0.250***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.031) (0.036) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032)
GVA 0.635** 0.638** 0.646 1.045** 0.556** 0.553** 0.582** 0.485
(0.310) (0.310) (0.413) (0.410) (0.273) (0.272) (0.277) (0.343)
Share Public -0.150*** -0.149*** -0.194* -0.110 -0.200*** -0.201*** -0.207*** -0.269***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.103) (0.092) (0.043) (0.043) (0.041) (0.068)
Kaitz *1999 0.045 0.045 0.001 0.001 0.012 0.011 0.015 0.019
(0.059) (0.059) (0.051) (0.051) (0.054) (0.053) (0.059) (0.054)
Kaitz *2000 0.026 0.026 -0.005 -0.016 0.043 0.042 0.029 0.026
(0.051) (0.051) (0.047) (0.046) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
Kaitz *2001 -0.080 -0.079 -0.102* -0.091* -0.073* -0.073* -0.091* -0.083*
(0.056) (0.056) (0.054) (0.049) (0.043) (0.043) (0.047) (0.050)
Kaitz *2002 -0.024 -0.023 -0.042 -0.059 -0.044 -0.045 -0.065 -0.053
(0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.046) (0.043) (0.043) (0.045) (0.048)
Kaitz *2003 0.010 0.011 -0.010 0.007 0.096* 0.096* 0.086 0.092
(0.057) (0.057) (0.058) (0.058) (0.057) (0.057) (0.068) (0.071)
Kaitz *2004 0.054 0.055 0.012 -0.002 0.052 0.052 0.021 0.024
(0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.067) (0.066) (0.066) (0.067) (0.070)
Kaitz *2005 -0.011 -0.010 -0.016 -0.014 0.070 0.069 0.054 0.032
(0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.055) (0.053) (0.053) (0.054) (0.051)
Kaitz *2006 -0.038 -0.036 -0.054 -0.055 0.066 0.066 0.063 0.052
(0.062) (0.062) (0.061) (0.059) (0.054) (0.054) (0.056) (0.060)
Kaitz *2007 0.063 0.064 0.020 -0.010 0.004 0.004 -0.013 -0.020
(0.079) (0.079) (0.074) (0.065) (0.067) (0.067) (0.068) (0.070)
Kaitz *2008 0.033 0.033 0.010 0.030 0.033 0.033 0.028 0.017
(0.057) (0.057) (0.055) (0.053) (0.059) (0.059) (0.062) (0.060)
Kaitz *2009 -0.117* -0.116* -0.124* -0.091 -0.027 -0.027 -0.039 -0.053
(0.069) (0.069) (0.068) (0.066) (0.059) (0.059) (0.066) (0.062)
Kaitz *2010 0.007 0.008 -0.033 -0.012 0.002 0.003 -0.004 0.008
(0.077) (0.077) (0.074) (0.072) (0.071) (0.071) (0.075) (0.075)
Observations 1,794 1,794 1,794 1,794 1,820 1,820 1,820 1,820
Number of 
instruments
70 70 82 94 70 70 82 94
Pesaran’s CD -2.088 -2.083 -1.877 -2.105 -1.983 -1.980 -2.228 -1.785
Note:  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. SGMM validity test statistics are 
provided in table 4.4.
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Table 4.4:  SGMM estimates of Minimum Wage effects on employment,  
validity test statistics of estimates in table 4.3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Travel-to-Work Areas (TTWA),  
138 regions
Unitary Authorities and Counties 
(WAREA), 140 regions
SGMM SGMM SGMM SGMM SGMM SGMM SGMM SGMM
Number of instruments 70 70 82 94 70 70 82 94
Arellano-Bond test for AR in first differences
AR(1)
Prob > z 
AR(2)
Prob > z
-6.2996
0.0000
-1.1015
0.2707
-6.3030
0.0000
-1.1080
0.2679
-6.0811
0.0000
-1.1223
0.2617
-5.8567
0.0000
-0.7272
0.4671
-6.3738
0.0000
1.0026
0.3161
-6.3760
0.0000
1.0027
0.3160
-6.2990
0.0000
0.8746
0.3818
-6.3083
0.0000
0.9504
0.3419
Hansen test of overidentified restrictions
J
Prob > chi2
42.9479
0.1980
42.9110
0.1991
56.3820
0.1901
69.3673
0.1909
32.9967
0.6122
32.9116
0.6163
44.6749
0.6099
54.4889
0.6765
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets
– GMM instruments for levels –
C
Prob > chi2
41.7672
0.1408
41.7202
0.1419
52.4702
0.1786
64.3460
0.1820
29.5218
0.6410
29.4348
0.6453
40.8947
0.6055
51.8766
0.5947
– Instrumented variables in levels and first differences –
C
Prob > chi2
22.1767
0.2242
22.2916
0.2193
35.5849
0.2612
54.4141
0.1351
16.6261
0.5489
16.6104
0.5500
30.4035
0.4965
41.6539
0.5727
– Instrumented variables only in levels –
C
Prob > chi2
28.7026
0.2315
28.7231
0.2307
40.9215
0.2633
53.1814
0.2815
21.9747
0.5808
21.5937
0.6035
33.9595
0.5660
39.5766
0.8014
Table 4.5:  SGMM estimates of Minimum Wage effects on employment,  
specifications of instruments subsets of regression models in table 4.3
Model 
no.
GMM instruments Variable instruments  
for 1st differences equation
Variable instruments  
for level equation
Travel-to-Work Areas (TTWA), 138 regions
(1) Et –1, Age, Age
3 Kaitz, Kaitz *1999–Kaitz *2010, 
GVA, Share Public, Age2, NV4qplus, 
female workers share
Kaitz, Kaitz *1999–Kaitz *2010, GVA, 
Share Public, Age2, NV4qplus, 
female workers share, year dummies
(2) Et –1, Age, Age
2 Kaitz, Kaitz *1999–Kaitz *2010, 
GVA, Share Public, Age3, NV4qplus, 
female workers share
Kaitz, Kaitz *1999–Kaitz *2010, GVA, 
Share Public, Age3, NV4qplus, 
female workers share, year dummies
(3) Et –1, Age
2, Age3, 
female workers share
Kaitz, Kaitz *1999–Kaitz *2010, 
GVA, Share Public, Age, NV4qplus
Kaitz, Kaitz *1999–Kaitz *2010, GVA, 
Share Public, Age, NV4qplus, year 
dummies
(4) Et –1, Age, Age
2, NV4qplus, 
female workers share
Kaitz, Kaitz *1999–Kaitz *2010, 
GVA, Share Public, Age3
Kaitz, Kaitz *1999–Kaitz *2010, GVA, 
Share Public, Age3, year dummies
Unitary Authorities and Counties (WAREA), 140 regions
(5) Et –1, Age, NV4qplus Kaitz, Kaitz *1999–Kaitz *2010, 
GVA, Share Public, Age2, Age3, 
female workers share
Kaitz, Kaitz *1999–Kaitz *2010, GVA, 
Share Public, Age2, Age3, female 
workers share, year dummies
(6) Et –1, Age
2, NV4qplus Kaitz, Kaitz *1999–Kaitz *2010, 
GVA, Share Public, Age, Age3, 
female workers share
Kaitz, Kaitz *1999–Kaitz *2010, GVA, 
Share Public, Age, Age3, female 
workers share, year dummies
(7) Et –1, Age, Age
2, NV4qplus Kaitz, Kaitz *1999–Kaitz *2010, 
GVA, Share Public, Age3, female 
workers share
Kaitz, Kaitz *1999–Kaitz *2010, GVA, 
Share Public, Age3, female workers 
share, year dummies
(8) Et –1, Age, Age
2, NV4qplus,
female workers share
Kaitz, Kaitz *1999–Kaitz *2010, 
GVA, Share Public, Age3
Kaitz, Kaitz *1999–Kaitz *2010, GVA, 
Share Public, Age3, year dummies
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we found only rather weak evidence for year-on-year adjustment effects. The results 
suggest that the modelling of demand shocks and the spatial dependence pattern 
of employment is important for the identification of MW effects. Quite clearly these 
effects are severely attenuated by more rigorous econometric models and estimation 
methods. Reassuringly our results are robust to the fairly stern test of using two 
different geographical units of observation34. To sum up, following the results of 
the last model specification that takes the potential endogeneity of the Kaitz index 
as well as the dynamic properties of the employment equation into account we 
conclude that we did not find significantly negative long-term employment effects. 
Furthermore, our results also suggest that there are no year-on-year effects of 
uprating the Minimum Wage.
4.5 Conclusions
The contribution of this paper is to update the econometric evidence of the impact 
of the NMW on employment in the UK and focus on the particular context of the 
recession of 2008–2010. We use geographical variation in the impact of the NMW 
and the recession to identify the separate employment consequences of imposing a 
NMW and its up-ratings over the years. We used four sources of variation to try and 
identify the effect of the NMW in the UK. The first exploits a natural variation in how 
the NMW bites in different geographical locations. In our UK case the MW is set 
nationally, thus there is no decision to be made at the local level (in sharp contrast 
to the US States case). This implies a natural variation in the measured bite of the 
NMW which is different at each geographical area. Our second source of variation 
examined the effect of changes in the up-rating of the NMW over the years since 
it was introduced. This estimation is based on an Incremental Diff-in-Diff method 
which allows us to estimate the marginal (interaction) effect of each year’s change 
in the NMW. The third source of variation we exploit is to allow the size, timing and 
duration of the recession to affect different regions differently. This provides us with 
the capacity to estimate the effect of the recession on local employment and to net 
out this factor in assessing the impact of the NMW on employment. Clearly, any 
34 We also checked the robustness of our results using restricted geography samples by dropping out those regions 
that are economically weak. Although we use regional variation for our identification strategy, we assume that the 
economic behavior in terms of the employment elasticity of the bite of the minimum wage is equal over all regions. 
It is known that the economic power of the UK is not equally distributed over the whole country and there are 
some economic hot spots like – first of all – London, but also the whole area around London and there are other 
regions that are more or less economically dependent of those strong regions. Hence, it could be reasonable that 
the employment effects of the MW are somewhat different between the strong and the weaker regions. Details can 
be found in appendix 4.A.7. Finally, due to the concerns on the Kaitz variable, we used the fraction of people paid at 
or below the NMW in each local area as alternative treatment measure. The results qualitatively corroborated our 
main conclusion. Details can be found in appendix 4.A.8.
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assessment which fails to net out this factor will bias the estimates of the impact of 
the NMW on employment. The final source of variation we exploit is that our spatial 
model allows the nature of the complex pattern of regional interconnectedness and 
spillover effects to be present in the estimation and thus gave us some confidence that 
we have netted out their impact in terms of the effect of the NMW on employment. 
The combination of these four different sources of variation in the data along with 
the rigorous use of different robustness checks means that we can be more confident 
about the estimated effect of the impact of the NMW. Our conclusions are all the 
more credible in the sense that we obtained consistent results even though we re-
analysed the data using two completely different geographies. This paper makes four 
important contributions to the literature on evaluating the effect of the MW on 
employment. Our first concern is that all the existing literature on the MW is unable 
to distinguish between having a statutory MW in existence and the changes or up-
ratings of the MW, e.g. on an annual basis. We are able to make such a distinction 
since we are able to observe a ‘pre-period’ before the MW legislation was enacted 
(namely, prior to 1999), when no NMW existed. It turns out that such an important 
distinction is vital to try and understand why the previous literature has found 
negative or zero employment effects of the MW.
Our second major concern focuses on previous research which has attempted 
to use geographical variation in the bite of the MW to identify its effects. The 
problem with this literature is that it has ignored the possible geographical 
contiguity and spatial spillovers associated with neighbouring locations. More 
specifically the literature to date has modelled panel data on geographical 
areas over time under the assumption that they are completely independent 
observations. We relaxed this assumption using spatial econometric methods. 
To do this we used the observed pattern of commuting behaviour between our 
geographical areas as this represents the reduced form pattern of the many 
observed and unobserved influences on commuting decisions and hence the 
interconnectedness of local labour markets. For robustness we compare our 
results with model specifications which utilize contiguity matrices instead and 
found that our results were largely unchanged.
Most of the literature on the employment impact of the MW has ignored the 
potential identification problem associated with netting out the effect of changes in 
the aggregate economy. The third contribution of this paper is to condition directly 
on the nature of demand shocks in our estimation of the regional employment 
effects of the MW. This is most pertinent since we are interested in the effect the 
MW in a time of the deepest recession the Western world has experienced since 
the Great Depression of the 1930s. We attempted to solve this problem by using 
geographically varying information from Gross Value Added by region which is 
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related to the onset, severity and duration of the recession in different locations. We 
find that this important adaptation of the standard econometric model leads directly 
to a considerable attenuation of the year on year interaction effects and hence may 
explain why previous papers got (spuriously) positive employment effects.
Our final area of contribution relates directly to the modeling of the dynamic 
form of employment changes. Specifically, we use a SGMM model to circumvent 
potential endogeneity problems relating to the inclusion of a lagged term in the 
employment dependent variable. This modeling adopts an Arellano-Bond type  IV 
estimation procedure to overcome the bias introduced by having a dynamic model 
of employment adjustment (Arellano and Bover, 1995). We found that when the 
effects of demand side shocks, a lagged dependent variable and endogenous wage 
effects are explicitly modeled, then the effects of the NMW on employment, which 
have been previously found, are largely attenuated. Specifically, we find that 
the incremental effects of having a NMW and invoking NMW upratings are not 
identified. It is quite clear that the modelling of changing demand conditions is 
a real contribution of this paper which suggests that: firstly, papers in the past, 
which have neglected to study this, may be finding spuriously significant effects 
when none exist; and secondly, that the overall effect of NMW depends on what 
stage of the cycle the economy is in. We can see that a tight labour market in 
a recession may induce negative employment effects – but that NMW uprating 
in boom times may induce little or no overall effect. This relationship points the 
importance of controlling adequately for demand side factors (including the steady 
state autoregressive path of employment) in modelling what might happen to 
employment in the face of a NMW (imposition or up-rating). Our further robustness 
checks suggest that our preferred models do not exhibit strong spatial dependence.
The conclusion from our spatial model estimations is that overall there may be 
incremental employment effects of up ratings to the MW in a year-on-year context. 
The years where the estimations for both geographies revealed a small positive 
coefficient are 2003, 2004, 2007 and 2010 which are historically some of the years 
when the NMW up rating started to exceed the RPI rise in the cost of living and 
hence the up rating of the NMW was relatively generous and where there is a boom 
in the economy and hence a potential measurement error problem in the modeling 
of employment. In contrast, the underlying effect of the presence of the NMW 
is reflected in the Kaitz index coefficient in the tables. In the spatial models this 
coefficient is nearly always negative and significant suggesting that the effective 
implementation of the NMW has an underlying negative impact on employment. 
It should be stressed that our measured marginal effects were consistently 
attenuated when we condition out for the presence and severity of the recession in 
the regional context. These conclusions are robust to our two different definitions 
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of the geography, which are used to perform the estimation. Furthermore, they 
are robust to changing the nature of our weights matrix. Specifically, we used a 
simple neighbouring contiguity matrix instead of our commuting matrix and our 
overall conclusions did not change. Additionally they remain after utilizing a non-
parametric estimation for the variance-covariance-matrix.
The central question which remains a concern for any of our spatial models is 
that the specific form of the spatial dependence is assumed from the outset. Our 
final, more general, preferred approach to this is to use System GMM estimation 
in which we can be more general in our approach to the dynamics of employment 
and the potential endogeneity of the Kaitz index wage effect term. This approach, 
which uses a generalized IV strategy, leads us to the conclusion that there are 
no effects of either having or uprating a NMW on employment (other than those 
which results from employment dynamics). Our SGMM results also suggest, with 
the use of the CD test that, with the appropriate number of instruments, the 
problem of strong spatial dependence can be circumvented.
Our findings are interesting as they rationalize the controversial debate in the 
literature as to why one might get negative impacts of the MW – i.e., due to 
the effect of the presence of the MW rather than its up rating. Our results are 
also consistent with much of the recent literature focusing on the introduction 
of the NMW but also because they explain why it may be possible to get both 
zero and positive effects. Our results thus present quite a departure from the 
literature which has studied the employment effects of the minimum wage but 
never distinguished between the effect of imposing a MW and uprating the MW on 
a regular basis. John Kennan’s excellent review of Card and Krueger (1995) argues 
that when studying the effects of minimum wages on employment “we are looking 
for employment rate changes of about one percentage point, and such changes 
happen all the time, even from one month to the next. In short, we are looking for 
a needle in a haystack” [emphasis added] (Kennan, 1995, p. 1955). We completely 
agree with this conclusion and accordingly suggest the total effect of invoking and 
uprating a MW will nearly always be insignificantly different from zero. We have 
also demonstrated that the reason for some of the literature finding positive effects 
of the MW is that it does not distinguish between the issues of: spatial dependence, 
the endogeneity of the MW (in the form of the Kaitz index), recessionary demand 
shocks, and the steady state trend in the employment series. Our suggestion from 
this UK evidence is that failing to take account of these complications could lead 
to spuriously positive (or negative) MW effects with underestimated standard 
errors where strong spatial dependence is clearly present. Although our evidence 
is only for one country, our results suggest it may be possible to reconcile that the 
perennial debate between the pro- and anti-MW lobbies.
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4.A  Appendix to chapter 4
4.A.1 Data
Geography of 138 and 140 areas
In this paper we use two different levels of geographical aggregation. The first 
geography approximates travel-to-work areas (TTWAs). The second geography 
is borne of administrative areas (WAREA). The travel-to-work areas (TTWAs), 
following an ONS definition, correspond to areas in which not less than 67% 
of people are living and working in the same geography. Since TTWAs were not 
available for the entire period of analysis the only option was to attempt to 
replicate our results for the most reasonable definition of TTWA that we could 
manually reconstruct from the data available. We used ASHE data from 2002 in 
which we have information about 406 administrative areas for the UK where 
people work and the equivalent areas where they live (WLAs35). We then compute 
commuting shares (given by the proportion of people who live in an area and 
work in another area and the proportion of people who work in an area and live 
in another one). We then keep all the districts and unitary authorities where the 
ONS definition of travel-to-work areas holds (around 12% of areas). For the other 
WLAs, with the help of GIS software, we overlap the map of ONS TTWA with the 
map of WLAs and combine Districts and Unitary Authorities into existing TTWA 
boundaries. With these new geographies we compute the commuting patterns to 
check the consistency with ONS definition of travel-to-work areas. For the few 
areas (14%) where the ONS definition of travel-to-work areas still does not hold, 
we aggregate further. Some 90% of these are such that at least 67% of working 
residents work in the area and at least 67% of workers are resident in the areas. 
This gives us 138 (new geographical) TTWA areas for which we repeated our 
analysis. The median sample cell size is 581 and the smallest cell is 37.
The WAREA geography includes 34 English counties, 6 English metropolitan 
counties, 46 English Unitary authorities, Inner and Outer London and finally 
52  Unitary authorities in Scotland and Wales. This resulted in 140 local areas36. 
Here, the median sample cell size is 581 and the smallest cell is 53.
35 The WLA’s consist of 32 London boroughs, 238 Districts, 36 metropolitan districts and the 46 Unitary Authorities 
in England; the 22 Unitary Authorities in Wales and 32 Unitary Councils in Scotland, resulting in 406 (WLA) local 
areas.
36 The Orkney Islands, Shetland Isles and Western Isles are aggregated together. The 36 English metropolitan districts 
are combined into 6 English Metropolitan Counties. London Boroughs are aggregated into Inner and Outer London. 
This allows to have match geographies in the LFS and in the ASHE/NES, using the definition of the variable “uacnty”, 
denoting Unitary Authority/County Level, in the LFS.
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Figure 4.5 helps to understand how our TTWAs actually differ from our WLAs and 
WAREAs. By focusing only on a small part of the country such as the south-London 
coast, we can see how the TTWAs are generally extending over the narrow boundaries 
of the Districts (figure 4.5 a), which characterize the WLAs (figure 4.5 b). They can also 
be smaller than the administrative counties of the WAREAs (figure 4.5 c). In addition, 
the administrative boundaries of the counties do not necessarily determine the 
boundaries of the TTWA, since people living at the borders of a county can commute 
and work in a neighboring town which is not necessarily part of that specific county. 
These figures clearly show the merits and limitations of working with different units 
of geography. Focus on the county for Kent (the county with the darker shading) – the 
most southeastern of the counties in the UK – which is at the bottom left hand corner 
of figures  4.5  a,  b, and c. Using the WLA geography the county becomes 10  separate 
areas. Using the WAREA geography, we see that this whole area is basically a single 
geography with the sole exception of Gillingham and Chatham which adds additional 
further urban area in the north west of the county. Using TTWA the county becomes 4 
different areas based on the feasibility of the transport connections (and by definition 
the observed patterns of commuting behavior). At the same time it loses a small slice 
of its southwestern edge to neighbouring Sussex.
Definition of key variables
Employment rate. Total number of employees, self-employed, unpaid family workers 
and participants in government-supported training and employment programs in 
working age as a proportion of people in working age in each local area. Data on 
employment used in this paper is taken from June to August of each year. Source: 
Labour Force Survey. Residence based analysis.
Kaitz Index. The ratio of the NMW to the median hourly wage in each local area:
 • From 1999 to 2003, we use a weighted average of the minimum wage shares 
of persons from 18 to 21 years and of persons from 22 to retirement age.
 • From 2004 onwards, with the introduction of the new development rate for 
young between 16 and 17 years, we use a weighted average of the minimum 
wage of persons of persons of 16 and 17 years, of persons from 18 to 21 years 
and of persons from 22 to retirement age.
Generally, the ASHE/NES based minimum wage variables used in this paper are 
recorded in April of each year and the NMW variables are recorded six months 
after each NMW up-rating due to the fact that the minimum wage was invoked in 
April 1999 but then up-rated in October of each following year. There are, however, 
two exceptions: April 1999, which is contemporaneous to the introduction of the 
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Figure 4.5:  Differences between TTWA, WLA, and WAREA geographies,  
focusing on South-East-London coast
a) TTWA
b) WLA
c) WAREA
Note: The darker regions belong to the county of Kent.
Source: http://edina.ac.uk/ukborders/, TTWA geographies are manually constructed by the authors from WLAs.
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minimum wage, and April 2000, which is one year from the introduction of the 
minimum wage. To reduce simultaneity concerns, the wage data in April of year t is 
regarded as having absorbed any effect of the NMW upgrade in October of year t – 1. 
This is in turn matched to employment data taken from June to August of year t. For 
the pre-period 1997 and 1998, data on employment rates are collected from March 
1997 to February 1998 and from March 1998 to February 1999. Quarterly data is not 
available for these two calendar years. Since LFS Local Area data is only available in 
seasonal quarters, it is only possible to use the quarter June-August and not a longer 
period (eg. from May to September). This means that the estimated impact effect we 
identify is a mixture of the impact of the up-rating in year t – 1 and any changes from 
the already announced anticipation of the effect of the new NMW level in year t. As a 
robustness check we have varied our timing assumptions and our results suggest that 
any anticipation effect is negligible. Swaffield (2008) shows that there is very little 
early upward adjustment in wages in the six months prior to October over several 
years of data.
Other Covariates. The other covariates in the dataset are derived from the underlying 
micro datasets. In the case of age, gender and sector we use the ASHE/NES to compute 
these variables by each of the geographies and simply computed proportions. In the 
case of the human capital regressor – the proportion of the workforce with a degree 
level qualification we used the LFS to derive this variable since the ASHE/NES does not 
have education information on respondents. The Gross Value Added (GVA) variable 
was derived from official statistics sources from table 3.3 of ‘Regional Trends’ from 
various years: Workplace-based gross value added (GVA) per head at current base 
prices. This GVA variable is measured at the level of the government office region and 
not at the level of the individual geography. It is not possible to measure the effect of 
aggregate demand at any finer geography than the government office region level. 
However, this has the advantage that we are controlling for demand shocks at a 
different level of geography than our basic units of observation.
Further properties of the ASHE/NES datasets to be considered
Even if ASHE is considered to give reliable wage figures though payroll records 
and it has a relatively large sample size, there are some limitations of this dataset 
which could affect this study.
 • Possible measures of hourly earnings.
The Low Pay Commission recommended construction of the hourly pay 
variable on the NES/ASHE data involves dividing gross pay (excluding overtime, 
shift and premium payments) by basic paid hours. This variable closely matches 
the definition of National Minimum Wage. However, the variable is available 
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in the panel only from 2000. It is therefore necessary to use another measure 
of hourly earnings in this study which covers the period 1997 to 2007.
The variable used is a “basic hourly wage rate”, defined as gross weekly earnings 
excluding overtime, and divided by normal basic hours. As a result this variable 
will be slightly larger than the true hourly wage and the measurement error will 
tend to be larger than the higher shift and premium payments are. This might 
therefore result in an under-statement of the number of low paid workers.
 • Discontinuities in NES/ASHE dataset across years.
Time series analysis was complicated when the ASHE replaced the NES in 
2004 and also by several changes in the ASHE methodology from 2004 to 2007.
First of all, the coverage of employees for the ASHE is greater than that 
of the NES. The NES surveys employees from HM Revenue & Customs PAYE 
record, excluding the majority of those whose weekly earnings fall below the 
PAYE deduction threshold. Moreover, this survey does not cover employees 
between sample selection for a particular year and the survey reference week in 
April. Thus, mobile workers who have changed or started new jobs between the 
drawing of the sample and the reference week are excluded. In conclusion, NES 
understate the proportion on NMW as it does not record the earnings of many 
low paid workers, especially part-time and mobile workers. In 2004, the ASHE 
survey was introduced to improve the representation of the low paid workers: it 
improved the coverage of employees including mobile workers who had either 
changed or started new jobs between sample selection and the survey reference 
in April. Also, the sample was enlarged by including some of the employees 
outside the PAYE system.
In 2005, a new questionnaire was introduced. In particular, the definition 
of incentive/bonus pay changed to only include payments that were paid and 
earned in April. Also, a new question including “pay for other reasons” was 
introduced. This implies respondents might include earnings information which 
was not collected in the past. Even if the results for 2004 have been reworked 
to exclude irregular bonus/incentive payments and to allow for this missing 
pay, results from 1997 to 2003 remain inconsistent with the ones from 2004 
onwards.
Given that the main source of information on hourly pay in this study 
includes shift and premium payments and from 2004 “pay for other reasons”, 
estimations of measures of minimum wage and wage inequality might be 
affected by this discontinuity, with an increase of the average measurement 
error and the dispersion in the measurement error from 2004 onwards.
Finally, in 2007 the sample size of ASHE was reduced by 20%. ASHE results 
for 2007 are based on approximately 142,000 returns, down from 175,000 in 
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2006. The largest sample cuts occurred principally in industries where earnings 
are least variable, affecting the randomness of the sample.
Consistent series which takes into account of the identified changes has 
been produced going back from 2006 to 2004 and from 2007 to 2006. For 
2004 results are also available that exclude supplementary information, to be 
comparable with the back series generated by imputation and weighting of 
the 1997 to 2003 NES data. Unfortunately, it is not possible to get consistent 
datasets for the entire period concerning this study (1997–2007).
4.A.2 Spatial autocorrelation in the residuals
To assess the residuals, εˆjt , for strong spatial autocorrelation we utilize Pesaran’s  CD 
test, compare the last rows of tables 4.1–4.3 in the main text and tables 4.11, 4.12 
and 4.13 in the appendix.
This statistic has the following form
ρˆ i j = ρˆ ji =
∑T
t=1 ˆitˆ jt
(
∑T
t=1 ˆ
2
it)
1/2(
∑T
t=1 ˆ
2
jt)
1/2
CD =
√
2T
N(N−1)(
N−1∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
ρˆ i j)
According to Pesaran (2004), the CD statistic is N (0, 1) normal-distributed under 
the null hypothesis of i.i.d. residuals. E.g., the critical value, equivalent to the 
5  per  cent significance level, is 1.96.
4.A.3 Lagrange multiplier tests for spatial specification
We used the Lagrange Multiplier tests described and provided by Debarsy and Ertur 
(2010) for the panel models with area effects to shed more light on these questions 
from a statistical point of view. Therefore, at first we test for the null hypothesis 
of (i) no spatial lag of the dependent variables and no spatial autoregressive error 
term vs. there is at least one kind of spatial dependency. In this and all other 
tests the Null hypothesis has to be rejected if the p value is higher than a certain 
significance level. Afterwards if the null hypothesis has to be rejected we test for 
four specifications with the null hypothesises of
(ii) no spatial lag of the dependent variables (vs. a spatial lag),
(iii) no spatial autoregressive error terms (versus the existence of spatial 
autoregressive error terms),
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(iv) no spatial lag of the dependent variables vs. spatial lag, given spatial 
autoregressive errors, and finally of
(v) no spatial autoregressive errors vs. the existence of spatial autoregressive 
errors, given spatial lags of dependent variables.
These (hierarchical) steps are necessary to get indices for which either model SEMP 
or SARP should be preferred because both models are not nested and, therefore, 
could not be directly compared.
The results can be found in tables 4.6 to 4.9 for the 138 TTWA and the 140 area 
data sets, respectively. The results for the 138 TTWA areas indicate that SEMP would 
be the preferred model at a significance level of ten per cent with one exception: 
the SARP model would be preferred for the fully specified model with GVA variable37 
(tables 4.6 and 4.7).
For the 140 area data set the joint test indicate no spatial dependencies 
for 2 of 4 models including the recession variable (tables 4.8 and 4.9). For the 
model with the full specification and those without the recession variable, spatial 
dependencies cannot be rejected. Further test statistics for the models without 
recession variables and either no interaction terms for the Kaitz index or no 
control variables allow us to conclude that the SEMP model should be preferred. 
For the full specified models (with and without recession variable) the decision 
between a SARP or SEMP specification is not clear, because in both models the 
joint tests statistics indicate spatial dependencies but the tests for no spatial lag 
and no spatial autoregressive term cannot be rejected. To sum up, the results of 
the LM tests indicate that spatial dependencies of the dependent variable and/or 
the error terms cannot be ruled out. This is especially true for the full specification 
models. Furthermore, the results lead to the conclusion that the SEMP model 
should be preferred in the majority of cases. For the other models other spatial 
specifications should be tested. In such a case LeSage and Pace (2009) recommend 
to test models with spatial lags of the independent variables that also include 
spatial lags of independent variables and error terms. However, not least because 
of possible identification problems, as it is notably discussed by (Gibbons and 
Overman, 2012), it is a task for further research to establish if these spatial 
specifications are indeed more adequate.
37 However, the p-value is 0.107 and therefore only 0.7 percent points higher than the chosen significance level.
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4.A.4 Weight matrix in spatial specifications
We want to examine the extent to which our results are robust to the assumption 
that the commuting matrix is not the sole form of weights matrix which will give 
rise to these results. Therefore, we compare our results with model specifications 
containing contiguity matrices. Accordingly, we decided to handle the islands 
as regions without neighbours. That means that the rows and columns of the 
contiguity matrix for the islands (Isle of Anglesey, Isle of Wight, Orkney Islands, 
Shetland Islands, and Western Isles) only contains Zeros and consequently they 
are assumed not to interact with other regions. Compared to the results for the 
community matrix, we found weaker spatial interdependency coefficients. We 
explain that with the fact that commuting represents the spatial interdependencies 
of local labour markets in a more satisfactory way than by simply weighting which 
other areas each location shares a geographical border with. We found that the 
results for the NMW coefficients are robust to the variation of the weights matrix.
4.A.5 Specification tests for the SGMM model
In order to find a correct model specification with valid instruments that complies 
with the requirements of the SGMM estimator we conducted several statistical 
tests. One requirement for the validity of instruments is that the twice lagged 
idiosyncratic disturbance term is not autocorrelated (Arellano and Bond, 1991; 
Roodman, 2009b). We use the Arellano-Bond test for autoregression of first and 
second order in the first differences of the error term. The Null of this test is that 
there is no autocorrelation. While autocorrelation of first order does not violate 
the requirements of SGMM and hence the validity of the instruments, the Null 
of autocorrelation of order 2 should not be rejected. A crucial assumption of this 
test is that errors are not correlated across cross sectional units. We take this into 
account in line with Roodman (2009b) since we included time dummy variables 
as instruments in levels (to handle any cross-sectional dependence in terms of 
contemporaneous correlation). We report the test results in table 4.3 for the main 
analysis and in table 4.14 for the restricted geography sample. The first four rows 
of those table contain results of the Arellano-Bond test for autoregression of first 
and second order in the first differences of the error term (test statistics and 
p  values). In all specifications for all geographies Null of no autocorellation of 
order 1 in first differences of the error term has to be rejected, whereas the Null 
of no autocorrelation of order 2 could not be rejected.
Hansen’s J statistic allows to test for the Null of joint validity of all instruments 
considering that those should be exogenous, and thus not correlated with the 
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error term. The test is robust against conditional heteroscedasticity and serial 
correlation in the error terms (Hansen, 1982). Test statistics and p values can 
be found in rows 6 and 7 of the mentioned tables. In all specifications for all 
geographies, the Null of joint validity could not be rejected.
Furthermore, we tested subsets of instruments. There are three groups of 
instruments: GMM instruments, instrumented variables in levels and differences 
and instrumented variables only in differences, compare with section 4.3. To 
test for the validity (exogeneity) of those subsets we use Difference-in-Hansen 
or C-statistics respectively. These are based on computations of differences of 
Hansen’s J statistics for the “unrestricted” model without the subset and the 
“restricted” model including the subset, thus the increase of J statistic after the 
“unrestricted” model is complemented by the subset (Baum, 2006, p. 201  f.). All 
tests fail to reject the Null of validity of instrument subsets (compare C statistics 
and p values in rows 8 to 13 of table 4.4 and the final specifications of the 
instruments subsets in detail in table 4.5).
Finally, we followed Bond (2002) and we checked whether the coefficient for 
the lagged dependent variable lies somewhere between the results obtained from 
adequate OLS and FE. This is true for both geographies (compare the results of the 
coefficients of Et – 1 in table 4.10 with the results in table 4.3).
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Table 4.10:  Estimation results for specifications including a lagged dependent variable based  
on OLS and fixed effects estimators. 16 years to retirement age, 1997–2010,  
all regressions contain control variables and year effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Travel-to-Work Areas (TTWA),  
138 regions
Unitary Authorities and Districts 
(WAREA), 140 regions
OLS Fixed effects OLS Fixed effects
Kaitz -0.024 -0.137** -0.001 -0.070
(0.041) (0.057) (0.037) (0.053)
Et –1 0.579*** 0.130*** 0.645*** 0.168*** 
(0.026) (0.028) (0.024) (0.026)
GVA 0.430** 0.501** 0.544*** 0.745***
(0.186) (0.239) (0.177) (0.210)
Share public -0.069*** -0.051 -0.106*** -0.052
(0.022) (0.042) (0.022) (0.038)
Kaitz *1999 0.046 0.033 0.030 0.038
(0.063) (0.057) (0.052) (0.042)
Kaitz *2000 0.062 0.061 0.063 0.069
(0.056) (0.044) (0.047) (0.046)
Kaitz *2001 -0.040 -0.005 -0.047 0.001
(0.057) (0.046) (0.052) (0.045)
Kaitz *2002 0.024 0.042 -0.004 0.030
(0.054) (0.035) (0.049) (0.036)
Kaitz *2003 0.085 0.106** 0.101** 0.134**
(0.056) (0.047) (0.049) (0.053)
Kaitz *2004 0.053 0.107* -0.032 0.044
(0.063) (0.059) (0.060) (0.050)
Kaitz *2005 -0.038 0.034 0.016 0.075*
(0.064) (0.057) (0.053) (0.045)
Kaitz *2006 -0.010 0.014 0.053 0.103**
(0.060) (0.058) (0.051) (0.043)
Kaitz *2007 0.041 0.062 -0.038 0.065
(0.072) (0.062) (0.054) (0.057)
Kaitz *2008 0.031 0.082 -0.003 0.045
(0.072) (0.054) (0.050) (0.042)
Kaitz *2009 -0.057 -0.014 -0.057 -0.013
(0.066) (0.064) (0.052) (0.049)
Kaitz *2010 0.080 0.072 0.025 0.028
(0.065) (0.059) (0.058) (0.053)
Observations 1,794 1,794 1,820 1,820
R-squared OLS 0.505 0.638
R-squared within 0.144 0.152
***p < 0.01,**p < 0.05,*p < 0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. OLS specification contains a 
constant (not reported).
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4.A.6 SEMP specifications without the GVA variable
Table 4.11:  Within Group estimates of Minimum Wage effects on employment, 16 years to 
retirement age, 1997–2010, all regressions contain control variables, area and year 
effects. SEMP specifications without GVA variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Travel-to-Work Areas (TTWA),  
138 regions
Unitary Authorities and Districts 
(WAREA), 140 regions
SEMP
Commuting 
Matrix
SEMP
Contiguity 
Matrix
SEMP
Commuting 
Matrix
SEMP
Contiguity 
Matrix
Kaitz -0.134*** -0.139*** -0.136*** -0.137***
(0.043) (0.042) (0.039) (0.039)
GVA – – – –
Share Public -0.060* -0.060* -0.072** -0.071**
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Kaitz *1999 0.011 0.012 0.041 0.039
(0.049) (0.048) (0.043) (0.042)
Kaitz *2000 0.045 0.041 0.088** 0.086**
(0.049) (0.048) (0.043) (0.043)
Kaitz *2001 -0.009 -0.009 0.048 0.047
(0.048) (0.047) (0.041) (0.041)
Kaitz *2002 0.03 0.032 0.079* 0.079*
(0.047) (0.046) (0.041) (0.041)
Kaitz *2003 0.093 0.096** 0.184*** 0.185***
(0.049) (0.048) (0.043) (0.042)
Kaitz *2004 0.105 0.110** 0.108** 0.110**
(0.049) (0.048) (0.043) (0.043)
Kaitz *2005 0.032 0.038 0.128*** 0.129***
(0.050) (0.049) (0.045) (0.045)
Kaitz *2006 -0.006 -0.003 0.166*** 0.168***
(0.052) (0.051) (0.045) (0.045)
Kaitz *2007 0.046 0.045 0.132*** 0.134***
(0.051) (0.050) (0.045) (0.044)
Kaitz *2008 0.072 0.075 0.101** 0.104**
(0.050) (0.048) (0.043) (0.043)
Kaitz *2009 -0.018 -0.017 0.047 0.049
(0.051) (0.050) (0.045) (0.044)
Kaitz *2010 0.052 0.052 0.087* 0.089**
(0.051) (0.050) (0.046) (0.045)
Lambda 0.122*** 0.068** 0.037 0.01
(0.039) (0.033) (0.038) (0.031)
Observations 1,932 1,932 1,960 1,960
log-likelihood 3,249.011 3,247.399 3,351.447 3,351.043
Pesaran’s CD -0.341 -0.515 0.265 0.500
***p < 0.01,**p < 0.05,*p < 0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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4.A.7 Restricted geography sample
We tested the robustness of our results by restricting our samples: we dropped 
out those regions that are known to be somewhat economically weaker, such as 
the Western and Northern parts of England, Wales, and Scotland. Therefore we 
selected 82 from the 138 TTWA sample and 74 from the 140 WAREA sample. The 
estimation results can be found in tables 4.12 to 4.14.
The results reveal only marginal differences regarding the employment 
effects of the NMW. The overall effect tends to be zero or negative, whereas 
the incremental year-on-year effects are more likely to be zero or positive with 
similar patterns to the results for the full samples. This is also true for the SGMM 
specification (columns 9 of tables 4.12 and 4.13), where the coefficient for the 
lagged employment rate is – though a bit smaller – significantly positive and thus 
very robust. The coefficients for the spatial dependency terms become insignificant. 
The coefficient for the demand variable probably reveals the biggest difference: 
whereas we found a significantly positive influence on employment for each of 
the full sample data sets, the coefficient gets insignificant in all specifications.
4.A.8  Alternative variable: proportion of workers paid at or below the 
minimum wage
Dolton et al. (2012) used other treatment measures for the the MW: the fraction 
of people at or below the NMW and the “spike” in terms of the proportion of 
workers paid at the minimum wage in each local area. The results based on these 
alternative definitions of the MW variable led to the same conclusions.
In this paper we considered the proportion of workers paid at or below the 
minimum wage in each local area as alternative measure (Minimum wage share). 
The shares are generated for three age bands in each local area. Starting from 
1999, the shares are a weighted average of the minimum wage shares of persons 
from 18 to 21 years and of persons from 22 to retirement age. From 2004, with 
the introduction of the new development rate for young between 16 and 17 years, 
the shares are a weighted average of the minimum wage shares of persons of 
persons of 16 and 17 years, of persons from 18 to 21 years and of persons from 22 
to retirement age. The results can be found in tables 4.15, 4.16, and 4.17. Again, 
these results do not change our main conclusions.
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Table 4.12:  Robustness Check: Within Group and SGMM estimates of Minimum Wage effects on 
employment, 16 years to retirement age, 1997–2010, all regressions contain control 
variables, area and year effects. 82 selected regions (from 138 TTWA areas)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Basic specifications Spatial specifications SGMM
w/o Yearly 
Interaction 
MW 
Effects/  
w/o GVA
with Yearly  
Interaction  
MW Effects
Conley 
Standard 
Errors  
(50 km)
Conley 
Standard 
Errors  
(100 km)
Conley 
Standard 
Errors  
(200 km)
SEMP
Commuting 
Matrix
SEMP
Contiguity 
Matrix
Kaitz -0.021 -0.057 -0.057 -0.057 -0.057 -0.057 -0.072 -0.069 -0.112
(0.045) (0.049) (0.049) (0.059) (0.058) (0.057) (0.046) (0.048) (0.071)
Et –1 0.128*** 
(0.048)
GVA -0.242 -0.242 -0.242 -0.242 -0.311 -0.326 -0.485
(0.334) (0.248) (0.261) (0.295) (0.336) (0.331) (0.499)
Share Public -0.088 -0.088 -0.087 -0.087* -0.087** -0.087** -0.088* -0.085 -0.306**
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.045) (0.043) (0.040) (0.053) (0.053) (0.117)
Kaitz *1999 -0.034 -0.036 -0.036 -0.036 -0.036 -0.032 -0.034 0.003
(0.055) (0.055) (0.053) (0.057) (0.061) (0.057) (0.055) (0.043)
Kaitz *2000 0.041 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.041 0.039 0.074
(0.039) (0.040) (0.041) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.055)
Kaitz *2001 -0.012 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 -0.009 0.022
(0.048) (0.049) (0.045) (0.049) (0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.061)
Kaitz *2002 0.029 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.037 0.037 0.051
(0.037) (0.039) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.038) (0.038) (0.052)
Kaitz *2003 0.101** 0.106** 0.106** 0.106** 0.106** 0.113** 0.113** 0.122**
(0.047) (0.048) (0.046) (0.048) (0.053) (0.049) (0.048) (0.060)
Kaitz *2004 0.129*** 0.134*** 0.134*** 0.134*** 0.134*** 0.142*** 0.142*** 0.136*
(0.044) (0.046) (0.043) (0.046) (0.048) (0.045) (0.046) (0.070)
Kaitz *2005 0.069 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.079 0.080 0.075
(0.047) (0.049) (0.051) (0.054) (0.051) (0.049) (0.050) (0.066)
Kaitz *2006 0.024 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.038 0.037 0.032
(0.069) (0.069) (0.063) (0.066) (0.057) (0.071) (0.072) (0.076)
Kaitz *2007 0.053 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.068* 0.069* 0.035
(0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.041) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.065)
Kaitz *2008 0.086* 0.092* 0.092** 0.092** 0.092** 0.099* 0.103** 0.057
(0.047) (0.049) (0.045) (0.045) (0.042) (0.050) (0.051) (0.071)
Kaitz *2009 0.020 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.039 0.043 -0.019
(0.059) (0.062) (0.053) (0.053) (0.056) (0.060) (0.061) (0.089)
Kaitz *2010 0.105 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.133* 0.138* 0.095
(0.071) (0.076) (0.071) (0.081) (0.094) (0.076) (0.077) (0.106)
Lambda 0.031 0.067
(0.050) (0.041)
Observations 1,148 1,148 1,148 1,148 1,148 1,148 1,066
R-squared 0.180 0.191 0.192 0.192
log-likelihood 2,058.200 2,059.391
No. of instr. 70
Pesaran’s CD -0.707 -1.253 -0.906 -0.906 -0.837 -0.838 -2.093
Note:  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Columns 1–3, 9: Robust standard errors. Columns 4–6: 
Conley s.e. are based on spatial Bartlett kernel. Coefficients are printed in bold in case of significance level changes 
compared to column 3. SGMM specification: Further validity test statistics are provided in table 4.14.
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Table 4.13:  Robustness Check: Within Group and SGMM estimates of Minimum Wage effects on 
employment, 16 years to retirement age, 1997–2010, all regressions contain control 
variables, area and year effects. 74 selected regions (from 140 WAREA areas)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Basic specifications Spatial specifications SGMM
w/o Yearly 
Interaction 
MW 
Effects/  
w/o GVA
with Yearly  
Interaction  
MW Effects
Conley 
Standard 
Errors  
(50 km)
Conley 
Standard 
Errors  
(100 km)
Conley 
Standard 
Errors  
(200 km)
SEMP
Commuting 
Matrix
SEMP
Contiguity 
Matrix
Kaitz -0.090 -0.171*** -0.171*** -0.171*** -0.171*** -0.171*** -0.171*** -0.171*** -0.060
(0.056) (0.061) (0.061) (0.050) (0.046) (0.043) (0.046) (0.046) (0.062)
Et –1 0.204*** 
(0.055)
GVA 0.255 0.255 0.255 0.255 0.255 0.256 0.211
(0.255) (0.197) (0.196) (0.186) (0.213) (0.216) (0.346)
Share Public -0.050 -0.046 -0.045 -0.045 -0.045 -0.045 -0.045 -0.045 -0.309***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.042) (0.037) (0.041) (0.041) (0.083)
Kaitz *1999 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 -0.043
(0.035) (0.035) (0.033) (0.029) (0.026) (0.042) (0.042) (0.051)
Kaitz *2000 0.084** 0.086** 0.086** 0.086*** 0.086*** 0.085** 0.086** 0.061
(0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.033) (0.028) (0.042) (0.043) (0.040)
Kaitz *2001 0.071 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.067* 0.067 0.037
(0.044) (0.046) (0.048) (0.047) (0.044) (0.041) (0.041) (0.038)
Kaitz *2002 0.094** 0.087** 0.087** 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.087** 0.087** 0.052
(0.036) (0.039) (0.036) (0.031) (0.024) (0.041) (0.042) (0.044)
Kaitz *2003 0.159** 0.153** 0.153*** 0.153*** 0.153*** 0.153*** 0.152*** 0.102
(0.065) (0.067) (0.046) (0.040) (0.035) (0.042) (0.043) (0.070)
Kaitz *2004 0.114** 0.108** 0.108*** 0.108*** 0.108*** 0.108** 0.108** 0.074
(0.050) (0.052) (0.035) (0.031) (0.024) (0.042) (0.043) (0.060)
Kaitz *2005 0.112*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 0.105** 0.106** 0.074*
(0.035) (0.037) (0.035) (0.031) (0.024) (0.044) (0.044) (0.040)
Kaitz *2006 0.152*** 0.146*** 0.146*** 0.146*** 0.146*** 0.146*** 0.146*** 0.089
(0.045) (0.046) (0.034) (0.034) (0.031) (0.043) (0.044) (0.065)
Kaitz *2007 0.065 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059* 0.059 0.059 -0.016
(0.052) (0.052) (0.039) (0.036) (0.033) (0.043) (0.043) (0.063)
Kaitz *2008 0.097** 0.089* 0.089*** 0.089*** 0.089*** 0.089** 0.088** 0.040
(0.046) (0.046) (0.032) (0.029) (0.023) (0.042) (0.043) (0.061)
Kaitz *2009 0.037 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.000
(0.050) (0.052) (0.042) (0.039) (0.032) (0.044) (0.044) (0.061)
Kaitz *2010 0.100* 0.088 0.088** 0.088** 0.088** 0.088** 0.088* 0.064
(0.050) (0.054) (0.041) (0.041) (0.036) (0.045) (0.045) (0.077)
Lambda -0.015 0.007
(0.052) (0.041)
Observations 1,036 1,036 1,036 1,036 1,036 1,036 962
R-squared 0.182 0.206 0.207 0.207
log-likelihood 2,057.709 2,057.697
No. of instr. 70
Pesaran’s CD -0.282 0.070 -0.439 -0.439 -0.454 -0.424 -2.057
Note:  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Columns 1–3, 9: Robust standard errors. Columns 4–6: 
Conley s.e. are based on spatial Bartlett kernel. Coefficients are printed in bold in case of significance level changes 
compared to column 3. SGMM specification: Further validity test statistics are provided in table 4.14.
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Table 4.14:  Robustness Check: SGMM estimates of Minimum Wage effects on employment,  
validity test statistics of estimates in columns 9 of tables 4.12 and 4.13
82 selected regions  
(from 138 TTWA areas) 
74 selected regions  
(from 140 WAREA areas)
SGMM SGMM
Number of instruments 70 70
Arellano-Bond test for AR in first differences
AR(1)
Prob > z 
AR(2)
Prob > z
--5.0635
0.0000
-2.2441
0.0248
-4.7720
0.0000
0.1183
0.9059
Hansen test of overidentified restrictions
J
Prob > chi2
44.4279
0.1581
37.7687
0.3884
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets
– GMM instruments for levels –
C
Prob > chi2
42.2896
0.1290
35.9651
0.3314
– Instrumented variables in levels and first differences –
C
Prob > chi2
23.9395
0.1570
22.1308
0.2262
– Instrumented variables only in levels –
C
Prob > chi2
32.8185
0.1080
24.8479
0.4141
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Table 4.15:  Fraction at or below the minimum wage as alternative NMW treatment variable:  
Within Group and SGMM estimates of Minimum Wage effects on employment, 16  years 
to retirement age, 1997–2010, all regressions contain control variables, area and year 
effects. Data set disaggregated by Travel-to-Work Areas, resulting in 138 regions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Basic specifications Spatial specifications SGMM
w/o Yearly 
Interaction 
MW 
Effects/  
w/o GVA
with Yearly  
Interaction  
MW Effects
Conley 
Standard 
Errors  
(50 km)
Conley 
Standard 
Errors  
(100 km)
Conley 
Standard 
Errors  
(200 km)
SEMP
Commuting 
Matrix
SEMP
Contiguity 
Matrix
Share MW 0.003 -0.019*** -0.016** -0.016** -0.016** -0.016** -0.016* -0.015* -0.017
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.017)
Et –1 0.231*** 
(0.032)
GVA 0.686*** 0.686*** 0.686*** 0.686*** 0.651*** 0.699*** 0.676*
(0.231) (0.180) (0.191) (0.204) (0.193) (0.190) (0.407)
Share Public -0.042 -0.043 -0.049 -0.049 -0.049 -0.049 -0.049 -0.051 -0.185
(0.041) (0.040) (0.040) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.033) (0.033) (0.122)
ShareMW *1999 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.019
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017)
ShareMW *2000 0.024* 0.023* 0.023** 0.023* 0.023* 0.024** 0.024** 0.018
(0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.018)
ShareMW *2001 0.015 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.001
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.018)
ShareMW *2002 0.023** 0.019* 0.019* 0.019* 0.019* 0.02 0.019 0.020
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017)
ShareMW *2003 0.021* 0.018* 0.018* 0.018* 0.018* 0.017 0.017 0.019
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) (0.021)
ShareMW *2004 0.044*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.024
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.021)
ShareMW *2005 0.016 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.000
(0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.023)
ShareMW *2006 0.043*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.004
(0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) (0.020)
ShareMW *2007 0.013 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.009
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.017)
ShareMW *2008 0.036*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.016
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.018)
ShareMW *2009 0.018 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.014 -0.003
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.022)
ShareMW *2010 0.021 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.011
(0.019) (0.018) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.022)
Lambda 0.106*** 0.071**
(0.039) (0.033)
Observations 1,932 1,932 1,932 1,932 1,932 1,932 1,794
R-squared 0.127 0.138 0.145 0.145
log-likelihood 3,254.371 3,253.656
No. of instr. 82
Pesaran’s CD -0.619 -0.128 -0.981 -0.981 0.572 0.146 -1.631
Note:  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Columns 1–3, 9: Robust standard errors. Columns 4–6: 
Conley s.e. are based on spatial Bartlett kernel. Coefficients are printed in bold in case of significance level changes 
compared to column 3. SGMM specification: Further validity test statistics are provided in table 4.17.
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Table 4.16:  Fraction at or below the minimum wage as alternative NMW treatment variable: 
Within Group and SGMM estimates of Minimum Wage effects on employment, 
16 years to retirement age, 1997–2010, all regressions contain control variables, 
area and year effects. Data set disaggregated by Unitary Authorities and Districts 
(WAREA), resulting in 140 regions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Basic specifications Spatial specifications SGMM
w/o Yearly 
Interaction 
MW 
Effects/  
w/o GVA
with Yearly  
Interaction  
MW Effects
Conley 
Standard 
Errors  
(50 km)
Conley 
Standard 
Errors  
(100 km)
Conley 
Standard 
Errors  
(200 km)
SEMP
Commuting 
Matrix
SEMP
Contiguity 
Matrix
Share MW 0.003 -0.010 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.010
(0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013)
Et –1 0.241*** 
(0.034)
GVA 0.898*** 0.898*** 0.898*** 0.898*** 0.898*** 0.899*** 0.633**
(0.219) (0.140) (0.133) (0.125) (0.164) (0.164) (0.312)
Share Public -0.064 -0.050 -0.050 -0.050 -0.050 -0.050 -0.050 -0.050 -0.198***
(0.042) (0.040) (0.039) (0.037) (0.036) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.042)
ShareMW *1999 -0.011 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.010
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015)
ShareMW *2000 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014)
ShareMW *2001 0.009 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.008
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014)
ShareMW *2002 0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 0.004
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
ShareMW *2003 0.013 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.010
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.017)
ShareMW *2004 0.027*** 0.019* 0.019* 0.019* 0.019** 0.018* 0.018* 0.018
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.018)
ShareMW *2005 0.026** 0.019* 0.019* 0.019* 0.019** 0.019* 0.019* 0.022
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.018)
ShareMW *2006 0.034*** 0.023** 0.023** 0.023** 0.023*** 0.023* 0.023* 0.014
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015)
ShareMW *2007 0.029** 0.021* 0.021* 0.021 0.021 0.021** 0.021* 0.006
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.016)
ShareMW *2008 0.013 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 -0.000
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.016)
ShareMW *2009 0.013 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 -0.010
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015)
ShareMW *2010 0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.010
(0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.018)
Lambda -0.015 0.007
(0.052) (0.041)
Observations 1,960 1,960 1,960 1,960 1,960 1,960 1,820
R-squared 0.114 0.126 0.140 0.140
log-likelihood 3,359.811 3,359.819
No. of instr. 70
Pesaran’s CD 0.061 0.210 -1.513 -1.513 -1.514 -1.504 -2.050
Note:  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Columns 1–3, 9: Robust standard errors. Columns 4–6: 
Conley s.e. are based on spatial Bartlett kernel. Coefficients are printed in bold in case of significance level changes 
compared to column 3. SGMM specification: Further validity test statistics are provided in table 4.17.
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Table 4.17:  Fraction at or below the minimum wage as alternative NMW treatment variable:  
SGMM estimates of Minimum Wage effects on employment, excluding direct effect  
of Minimum Wage, validity test statistics of columns 9 in tables 4.15 and 4.16
Travel-to-Work Areas (TTWA),  
138 regions
Unitary Authorities and Districts 
(WAREA), 140 regions
SGMM SGMM
Number of instruments 82 70
Arellano-Bond test for AR in first differences
AR(1)
Prob > z 
AR(2)
Prob > z
-6.1216
0.000
-1.2527
0.2103
-6.4232
0.000
0.9762
0.329
Hansen test of overidentified restrictions
J
Prob > chi2
60.6156
0.1045
33.3196
0.5967
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets
– GMM instruments for levels –
C
Prob > chi2
54.2984
0.1374
30.3282
0.6008
– Instrumented variables in levels and first differences –
C
Prob > chi2
39.1773
0.1487
15.9183
0.5982
– Instrumented variables only in levels –
C
Prob > chi2
42.5849
0.2088
23.1238
0.5125
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The following general conclusions from the previous chapters are drawn:
The central question in chapter 2 is how the empirical fact of occupational 
mobility can be considered in a job search and matching framework and how 
can a resulting matching function be empirically evaluated. In order to do this, 
a model is utilised that is based on the assumption that the optimal search 
intensity of workers or firms results from weighing up expected gains and costs 
of search. These costs could be higher due to the additional financial burden of, 
e.g., further training in the case of occupational changes. If the costs are not too 
high, occupational changes can occur. This has also implications for matching 
efficiency estimates. For the evaluation of this theoretical finding, the preferred 
empirical model is a pooled-mean group model including terms for cross-sectional 
lags of unemployed and vacancies, that is adequate to the dynamics and structure 
of the used panel data. It is empirically shown that there are compensation 
mechanisms to a long-term constant relationship between new matches and 
stocks of vacancies and unemployed. By using information about occupational 
groups, that can be considered as alternatives in recruiting or job search, the 
results reveal considerable dependencies between these occupational groups 
in the matching process. Particularly, they show the significant dependence of 
new matches on vacancies and unemployed in “similar” occupations. Thus, the 
theoretical expectations are corroborated.
Chapter 3 deals with the German labour market reforms 2003–2005 and 
the development of the matching productivity. It partially corroborates previous 
findings that the matching productivity increased during and after the reform stages 
and shows that this is also true for the last reform stage in 2005. Furthermore, the 
matching productivity increased on all occupational labour markets, though there 
are some differences in detail. Lastly, even when considering the local economic 
situation, the average matching productivity on the whole labour market as well 
as on some occupational labour markets was deteriorated during the financial 
crisis.
Finally, chapter 4 focusses on long- and short-term employment effects of 
the National Minimum Wage in the United Kingdom 1999–2010 facing up crucial 
concerns on previous studies. This analyses reveal that the total effect of invoking 
and uprating a minimum wage is insignificantly different from zero; thus, the 
results suggest no discernible employment effects of the National Minimum 
Wage. This is accompanied by a discussion that the reason for some other findings 
in the literature could be neglecting spatial dependence, the endogeneity of the 
minimum wage treatment in the form of the Kaitz index, recessionary demand 
shocks, and the steady state trend in the employment series.
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Abstract
The contributions in this book either refer to mechanisms of creating new 
employment or selected changes of labour market institutions and their impact.
The central question in the first contribution is how the empirical fact of 
occupational mobility can be considered in a job search and matching framework 
and how a resulting matching function can be empirically evaluated. In order to 
do this, a model is utilised that is based on the assumption that the optimal search 
intensity of workers or firms results from weighing up expected gains and costs of 
search. These costs could be higher due to the additional financial burden of, e.g., 
further training in the case of occupational changes. If the costs are not too high, 
occupational changes can occur. This has also implications for matching efficiency 
estimates. It is empirically shown that there are compensation mechanisms to a 
long-term constant relationship between new matches and stocks of vacancies 
and unemployed. By using information about occupational groups, that can 
be considered as alternatives in recruiting or job search, the results reveal 
considerable dependencies between these occupational groups in the matching 
process. Particularly, they show the significant dependence of new matches on 
vacancies and unemployed in “similar” occupations.
The second contribution deals with the German labour market reforms 
2003–2005 and the development of the matching productivity. It partially 
corroborates previous findings that the matching productivity increased 
during and after the reform stages and shows that this is also true for the last 
reform stage in 2005. Furthermore, the matching productivity increased on all 
occupational labour markets, though there are some differences in detail. Lastly, 
even when considering the local economic situation, the average matching 
productivity on the whole labour market as well as on some occupational 
labour markets was deteriorated during the financial crisis.
The third contribution focusses on long- and short-term employment effects 
of the National Minimum Wage in the United Kingdom 1999–2010 facing up 
crucial concerns on previous studies. This analyses reveal that the total effect of 
invoking and uprating a minimum wage is insignificantly different from zero; thus, 
the results suggest no discernible employment effects of the National Minimum 
Wage. This is accompanied by a discussion that the reason for some other findings 
in the literature could be neglecting spatial dependence, the endogeneity of the 
minimum wage variable, recessionary demand shocks, and the steady state trend 
in the employment series.

195IAB-Bibliothek 359
Kurzfassung
Die Frage, wie der Arbeitsmarkt funktioniert und welchen Einfluss die Politik aus-
üben kann, ist ein Dauerbrenner in der gesellschaftlichen, politischen und wissen-
schaftliche Debatte. Das hierzu nötige Wissen speist sich aus der Arbeitsmarkt-
forschung und diese bekommt häufiger die Impulse aus dem Alltagsgeschäft der 
Arbeitsmarktpolitik. Umgekehrt laden Fortschritte in der Methodenentwicklung 
und der Datenerschließung die Arbeitsmarktpolitik dazu ein, neue Fragen aufzu-
werfen, die bisher nicht beantwortet werden konnten. Die Beiträge in diesem Buch 
greifen solche Entwicklungen auf. Dabei fokussieren sie auf drei Themenbereiche: 
Berufliche Mobilität und Effizienz des Arbeitsmarktausgleichs, die Entwicklung 
der Matchingeffizienz vor, während und nach den Jahren der deutschen Arbeits-
marktreformen 2003–2005 auf beruflichen Teilarbeitsmärkten und die Wirkung 
des flächendeckenden Mindestlohns in Großbritannien auf die Beschäftigung.
Der erste Beitrag befasst sich mit der Frage, wie berufliche Mobilität bei der 
Beurteilung der Effizienz von Arbeitsmarktausgleichsprozessen theoretisch und in 
Messkonzepten berücksichtigt werden sollte. Bei der Entscheidung für oder gegen 
eine berufliche Alternative orientieren sich Arbeitnehmer an einer ganzen Reihe 
von Kriterien. Das wichtigste Kriterium dabei dürfte sein, inwieweit die Erfahrun-
gen aus der bisherigen beruflichen Tätigkeit bei der infrage stehenden beruflichen 
Alternative anwendbar sind. Auf Grundlage neuer Daten zu beruflichen Tätigkeits-
inhalten und einem daraus konstruierten Maß für berufliche Ähnlichkeiten wurde 
ein zu erwartendes Muster beruflicher Mobilität abgeleitet. Auf dieser Grundlage 
wird eine makroökonomische Matchingfunktion geschätzt, die dieses Muster be-
rücksichtigt. Die Ergebnisse belegen die Relevanz beruflicher Mobilität und zeigen 
insbesondere auch, dass in bisherigen Studien die Matchingeffizienz in einem ge-
wissen Maß verzerrt geschätzt wurde.
Im zweiten Beitrag wird die Entwicklung der Effizienz des Arbeitsmarktaus-
gleichs vor, während und nach den Arbeitsmarktreformen 2003–2005 beobachtet. 
Hierbei wurde auf einen umfangreichen und dieser Form erstmalig aufbereiteten 
Datensatz zurückgegriffen. Dieser erlaubt sehr genaue Effizienzmessungen auf der 
Grundlage etablierter Modelle und erstmalig auch für berufliche Teilarbeitsmärk-
te. Verbesserungen im Arbeitsmarktausgleich lassen sich im Verlauf der 2000er 
Jahre für nahezu alle beruflichen Teilarbeitsmärkte beobachten; Unterschiede 
werden während und nach der Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise deutlich – in einigen 
beruflichen Teilarbeitsmärkten wird die positive Entwicklung getrübt.
Der dritte Beitrag setzt an der kontroversen Diskussion zu den Beschäftigungs-
wirkungen von Mindestlöhnen an. Dabei kommt die Mindestlohnforschung selbst für 
gleiche Zeiträume und gleiche beobachtete Regionen immer noch zu widersprüch-
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lichen Ergebnissen. Basierend auf regional gegliederten Datensätzen für Groß-
britannien wird untersucht, inwieweit die regional unterschiedliche konjunkturelle 
Entwicklung, inhärente Trends in der Beschäftigungsentwicklung selbst, Verflech-
tungen zwischen den Regionen sowie Wechselwirkungen zwischen der Beschäfti-
gung und den Löhnen die Ergebnisse zu den Beschäftigungseffekten beeinflussen. 
Im Modell, das diese Aspekte aus Sicht des Autorenteams am besten berücksichtigt, 
können schließlich weder positive noch negative Beschäftigungseffekte nachgewie-
sen werden.
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The functioning of the labour market and the impact of labour market 
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this respect, labour market research acquires the necessary knowledge 
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progress in the development of research methods and data mining 
encourages labour market policymakers to ask new questions that 
have not been answered yet.
Michael Stops picks up such developments and focusses on the 
following three issues:
• Occupational mobility and the job matching efficiency
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•  The employment effect of the National Minimum Wage in the 
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